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The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope 
relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral 
function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient 
formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its 
legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African 
constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships 
between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this 
concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, 
constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable.  
The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the 
separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African 
Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, 
judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with 
a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The 
development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack 
of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which 
raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. 
This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa 
develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The 
Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts 
can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether 
the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in 
developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be 
developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally 
compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the 
extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face 
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EXPLANATION OF KEY WORDS 
Bill of Rights - also known as a proclamation of rights. It contains an inventory of 
fundamental rights of the inhabitants of a country.1 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms - is a declaration of rights which are guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Canada. These rights also form the initial component of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.2 
Common-law constitutionalism - expresses the interpretation of a Constitution which 
is not only based on its text but also on judicial decisions that were reached by courts 
over years when applying the Constitution.3 
Constitutional dialogue - reflects the interactions amongst the courts and other 
branches of government in the settlement of constitutional matters.4 
Constitutional separation of powers - expresses the ideal that a Constitution’s 
objective is to set up a framework which sets out to divide government’s powers into 
three branches, that is, legislature, executive and the court, within certain confines.5 
Counter-majoritarian - expresses the judicial review powers where unelected and 
unaccountable courts are empowered by a Constitution to invalidate legislation enacted 
by the majority-elected legislature.6 
Judicial activism - judges’ decisions which are not inevitably centred on the law, but 
on judges’ personal beliefs, opinions, tenets, philosophy and theoretical views.7 
                                                          
1  Legal Dictionary https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Bill+of+Rights (Date of use: 18 June 
2019).  
2  Justice Education Society http://www.lawlessons.ca/lesson-plans/1.3.overview-of-the-canadian-
charter-of-rights-and-freedoms (Date of use: 18 June 2019). 
3  Strauss 1996 Univ Chicago LR 877. 
4  Bateup 2007 Temple Int Comp LJ 3.  
5  Duclos and Roach 1991 McGill LJl 4. 
6  Tremblay 2005 Int J of Const Law 617.  




Judicial independence - expresses the idea that the courts have to be unconnected 
and insulated from the other arms of government, that is, the legislature and the 
executive.8 
Judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation - expresses the position where 
courts are viewed as “the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions”.9 
Judicial pragmatism - reflects the belief that it is sensible and justifiable that society’s 
contemporary demands can best be served by changing constitutional standards.10 
Judicial restraint - reflects the belief that judges’ personal thoughts or methods should 
not be infused into the law, and results in second-guessing the legislature’s intention in 
enacting that law.11  
Judicial review - is a procedure in which the judiciary can re-examine and rethink 
measures and acts of the legislature and executive.12 
Judicial supremacy - expresses the principle where the courts are considered to 
possess progressively exceeding powers than the legislative branch to construe the 
contents and text of a Constitution.13 
Legislative intent - expresses the objectives and intention of the legislative arm of 
government when enacting a legislation.14 
Living Constitution - reflects the thought that a Constitution is a body of laws that 
develop and transform based on society’s transforming demands.15 
                                                          
8  Encyclopaedia Britannica https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-independence (Date of use: 21 
June 2019).  
9  Carson https://fee.org/articles/judicial-monopoly-over-the- constitution-jeffersons-view/ (Date of 
use: 1 October 2019). 
10  Easterbrook 2008 Harvard JL and Public Policy 901.  
11  USLegal https://definitions.uslegal.com/j/judicial-restraint/ (Date of use: 21 June 2019). 
12  Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 352.  
13  Morton 2003 Policy Options 25. 
14  Duclos and Roach 1991 McGill LJ 28. 
15  Scalia A matter of interpretation 25. 
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Originalism - reflects the notion that a “Constitution is a written instrument. As such, 
its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now.”16 
Rule of law - reflects the position where the country’s laws are followed, and are 
supposed to be enforceable against each person.17 
Supremacy of the Constitution - reflects the system of a state where the dominance 
of the legislature’s legislative role yields to the demands and stipulations of a 
Constitution.18 
Textualism - reflects the rule that contents and wording of a law means what it was 
accepted and assumed to signify at the time when the legislature passed that law, and 
that laws cannot take on new purposes and significance when society’s needs 
changes.19 
  
                                                          
16  Scalia and Garner Reading law 81. 
17  Merriam-Webster https://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/rule/of/law (Date of use: 21 June 
2019). 
18  Duhaime’s Law Dictionary http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C-Page4.aspx (Date of use: 21 
June 2019). 





1.1 Background information 
The South African constitutional state is founded on an unswerving belief that in 
order for the government system to work and create a clear bridge with our past 
political dispensation, the separation of powers’ doctrine has to be a foundational 
principle.1 Although there are different branches of government which all form an 
integral part of the governing structure, the separation of powers’ principle remain a 
significant tool to distribute authority.2 Through this doctrine, it is thought that the 
nation has safeguards against the abuse of power in that these different branches 
of government are in charge of distinct functions, that is, judging, legislating and the 
enforcement of the law.3 Moreover, according to Peabody and Nugent: 
Separation of powers ties different functions and traits essential for governance 
and different kinds of power to distinct institutions in order to promote 
accountability, effective policymaking and administration, and political 
legitimacy, amongst other goals.4  
Separation of powers is thought to enhance a government’s answerability, efficient 
law-making, and at the same time maintain a truly constitutional democratic rule by 
the people. This interaction within the government’s constitutional framework is also 
enhanced by checks and balances which at the same time give limitations that 
restrict the powers of every branch of government.5 The courts carry out an 
exceptional and significant duty of determining disputes by making use of the laws 
enacted by the legislature. They have been enjoined with the remarkable authority 
of judicial review in looking after the constitutional boundaries between the branches 
of government.6 It is in these latter views that the courts are seen to have the 
                                                          
1  Constitutional Principle VI, Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
200 of 1993 (hereinafter the Interim Constitution). 
2  Benedict 2007 Brooklyn LR 1265.  
3  Benedict 2007 Brooklyn LR 1266. 
4  Peabody and Nugent 2003 Am Univ LR 34.  
5  Peabody and Nugent 2003 Am Univ LR 26. 
6  Cohen v State of New York 720 NE 2d 850 (NY1999) 854.  
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authority to invalidate acts and policies enacted by the legislature. Unfortunately, 
this latter notion has, according to Carson, resulted in the following state of affairs: 
The judges act as if they have a monopoly of interpretation of the Constitution. 
Members of Congress usually make it clear that they believe the opinions of the 
Federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, are determinative. Presidents 
increasingly leave to the courts the questions they may have about the 
constitutionality of laws that come before them.7 
Verkuil argues that the maxim ‘separation of powers’ contains unrealistic facets 
which circumvents its interpretation.8 He adds that the maxim is not a precise 
account of the working of government, and the expression ‘shared powers’ would, 
in his view, be more persuasive. Verkuil furthermore identifies what he considers to 
be the main factor in this ambiguity, in that: “the maxim has so many historical 
parents that its lineage is almost impossible to trace.”9 This latter view is evident in 
that when Sharp comments on the origin of this doctrine, he argues that it can be 
followed back to the works of Aristotle.10 Mojapelo J,11 on the other hand, argues 
that the doctrine can be traced back to the writings of John Locke, and specifically 
where Locke observed that: 
It may be too great a temptation for the humane frailty, opt to grasp at powers, 
for the same persons who have power of making laws, to have also in their 
hands the power of executing them, whereby they may exempt themselves from 
the law, both in its making and execution to their own private advantage.12 
Moreover, the prevailing views seem to be that the doctrine of separation of powers 
is traced back to the text of the French philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu, titled 
‘De l’esprit des loix’ (The spirit of laws).13 In this acclaimed work first published in 
1748, Montesquieu, after observing the English system of government, envisioned 
a similar constitutional system for France which would be built on a basic 
                                                          
7  Carson https://fee.org/articles/judicial-monopoly-over-the-constitution-jeffersons-view/ (Date of 
use: 1 October 2019). 
8  Verkuil 1989 William and Mary LR 301. 
9  Verkuil 1989 William and Mary LR 301.  
10  Sharp 1935 Univ of Chicago LR 385.  
11  Mojapelo 2013 Advocate 37. 
12  Mojapelo 2013 Advocate 37. 
13  Badenhorst 2015 De Rebus 66. One supporter of this viewpoint is Kavanagh who traces the 
doctrine’s origin back to Montesquieu’s work, and points out that the separation of powers had 
been a significant safeguard against the perversion of powers by the state and dictatorship for 
the past centuries, and that it still occupies a prominent role in modern-day constitutional 
governments. See Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 221. Bellany, however, 
argues that the origin of this doctrine can be traced back to the writings of United Kingdom (UK) 
scholars. See Bellamy 2011 Int J of Const Law 86. 
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fundamental rights system. For this ideal to work, he reasoned that the 
government’s powers must be divided into three branches, and that the power 
should not only be vested in one person, but be shared amongst the government 
branches. In support of these views, he remarked that: 
All would be in vain if the same person, or the same body of officials, be it the 
nobility of the people, were to exercise these three powers: that of making laws, 
that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging crimes or disputes 
of individuals.14 
Montesquieu argued that freedom and separation of powers are inseparable.15 He 
asserted that citizens cannot live in democracy and have their rights guaranteed 
where there is no separation of powers.16 Pierce, on the other hand, dismisses out 
of hand the concept of the separation of powers. He argues that: 
…if powers truly were separated so that each branch of government could 
exercise only a discrete set of powers to the exclusion of the other branches, 
the Nation would be ungovernable.17  
While this doctrine has been a foundational concept for the survival and existence 
of constitutional democracies since the eighteenth century, Kavanagh points out that 
its success is overshadowed by profound popular criticisms, amongst other things 
as mentioned above, if a state’s powers were separated, a country would be 
unmanageable and anarchy would ensue. She adds that maximising the autonomy 
of branches of government would counter the application of checks and balances. 
Because checks and balances, Kavanagh further argues, requires joint oversight 
from all branches of government, the scope and extent of the doctrine is difficult to 
ascertain. In addition, she avers that when looking back at the eighteenth century 
and the developments which confronted the government’s functioning, the once-
honoured separation of powers doctrine is now considered old-fashioned, obsolete 
                                                          
14  Montesquieu The spirit of laws chapter 6. 
15  Montesquieu The spirit of laws chapter 6.  
16  Montesquieu The spirit of laws chapter 6. 
17  Pierce 1989 William and Mary LR 365. See also Loewenstein Political power 35 who argues 
that “separation of powers doctrine is obsolete and devoid of reality”. McKay American politics 
54 suggests that: “There are more than enough critics who claim that the basic division of power 
between legislature and executive is inappropriate for the efficient policy making needed to run 
an economically powerful late 20th century world power.” 
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and bizarre, and fails to account for all structures of government.18 
In South Africa, in the 1990s during the multi-party dialogue, which paved way for 
the new constitutional dispensation, the Constitutional Principle VI was adopted and 
appended to the Interim Constitution, which amongst other things, provided that: 
There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.19 
Still, the nature of the scope and limitations of this doctrine as well as the extent of 
its checks and balances remained unclear in the Interim Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court, when confirming the 1996 Constitution,20 had to determine 
whether the South African Constitution adhered to this concept, and it was held that: 
There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers, and in 
democratic systems of government in which checks and balances result in the 
imposition of restrains by one branch of government upon another, there is no 
separation that is absolute.21 
The view of the Court is that separation of powers could not result in conferring the 
creation of limitations of powers in each branch of government over another. After 
examining the text and contents of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the 
Constitution adhered to the Constitutional Principle VI, a view which is also shared 
by O’Regan where she observes that not only does the doctrine form part of the 
South African constitutional framework, but the Constitution also contains 
“appropriate checks and balances”22 which might be required in its development. 
The interaction between the courts and legislature as well as the context and text 
on the scope of this doctrine were the issues for determination in 1996 by the 
                                                          
18  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 221-222. Also see Marshall Constitutional 
theory 307 who suggests that is incomprehensible whether the system of checks and balances 
“is part of, or a departure from, separation of powers.” 
19  Interim Constitution. 
20  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the South African 
Constitution). 
21  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC) paras 108-109 (hereinafter Certification of the 1996 Constitution). 
22  O’Regan 2005 PELJ 121. See also Ramotsho http://www.derebus.org.za/separation-power-
defines-ethical-boundries-south-africas-law-makers/ (Date of use: 20 June 2019) quoting Mr 
Kgalema Motlanthe, former President of South Africa, who points out that: “The reason why we 
have separation of powers, is to make sure that there are checks and balances, so that power 
is never centralised in the hands of one arm or the other of the state.” 
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Constitution Court in S v Dodo.23 In addition, the Court also had to consider whether 
or not it was within the legislature’s powers to enact the mandatory minimum 
sentencing statute24 where it was argued that this legislation has encroached into 
the courts’ constitutional perimeters of deciding on the appropriate sentence, that 
is, the courts’ sentencing discretion. When rejecting this argument, Ackermann J 
pointed out that: 
There is under our Constitution no absolute separation of powers between the 
judicial function, on the one hand, and the legislature and executive on the 
other.25 
In reaching this conclusion, Ackermann J asserted that while the separation of 
powers doctrine was part of the South African Constitution, the legislature, when 
enacting the challenged legislation, that is, the Criminal Law Amendment Act,26 did 
not encroach on the courts’ constitutional function in determining crimes’ appropriate 
sentences. In his view, the formulation or development of public policy in the context 
of mandatory minimum sentences is an area which not only concerns the courts, 
but also the legislature.27 
It is clear from the brief introduction above that a conundrum exists as to the 
boundaries between the different branches of government, that is, the executive, 
the legislative, and the judiciary functions. There is furthermore the question as to 
the necessity of such constitutional separation of powers. These points in issue, as 
well as several others, will be probed in this study.  
1.2 Research problem 
The discussion of the research problem will entail an analysis of two distinct 
statements; which will be examined in separate sections. Firstly, the question will 
be asked as to whether the South African Constitution provides sufficient safeguards 
in order to protect judicial authority and independence against encroaching conducts 
of the other branches of government, or not. The second part of the problem 
                                                          
23  S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) (hereinafter Dodo). 
24  Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
25  Dodo paras 22, 23. 
26  Act 105 of 1997. 
27  Dodo para 26. 
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statement, on the other hand, seeks to probe the question: Do the South African 
courts have absolute powers to rearrange South African laws and public policy to 
conform to their theoretical and dogmatic standpoints? 
The enquiry in the first part of this discussion seems to hinge on the fundamental 
presupposition that the courts, in carrying out their constitutional function, are 
unconstrained and autonomous under the control of the Constitution.28 The focal 
point will be on considering the rationale for the existence of this doctrine, and its 
place in the South African Constitution. These sentiments seem to stem from the 
scope and extent of the provisions in the Constitution where the courts are enabled 
to develop laws by making use of the interests-of-justice framework.29 Section 2 of 
the Constitution, on the other hand, guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution. 
This constitutional provision delegates courts with far-reaching powers which are 
not clearly defined, and seems to provide no forms of restraint in that courts may 
invalidate laws passed by the citizens’ elected majority by making use of the 
supremacy of the Constitution principle. Hence this research calls for an analysis of 
the fundamental principles and standards which this doctrine assists to defend. This 
study will also consider the doctrine’s place in present-day constitutional 
democracies.  
The second part of the research, on the other hand, examines whether or not the 
courts have been faithful in executing its function of policing the constitutional 
boundaries of the conduct of all branches of government, including its own conduct 
and deciding cases based on legislature’s passed laws. This enquiry will entail 
examining the extent and perimeters of the courts’ constitutional law-making role, 
and whether the courts have always acted as courts ought to act while being mindful 
of its main function, which is deciding disputes by making use of the laws enacted 
by the legislature, while leaving the law-making function to the elected legislature. 
The latter part of the study will also probe the extent of the courts’ powers as an 
                                                          
28  Section 165(1) of the South African Constitution. Section 165(1) provides that: “The judicial 
authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. (2) The courts are independent and subject only 
to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice.” 
29  Section 173 of the South African Constitution provides: “Inherent power - The Constitutional 
Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and 




unelected body. Their powers seem to surpass those of the elected legislature in 
deciding that laws passed by the legislature should be deemed unconstitutional. 
Moreover, this part of the study will also probe the nature and scope of the latter 
provisions of the Constitution which seem to be unclear on how far the courts can 
go in invalidating legislation by making use of the supremacy of the Constitution 
framework. This conduct seems to ordain the court to be the only arm of government 
which has the monopoly to the truth in deciding the constitutionality of laws and 
conduct of the legislature. The investigation will also question which exceptional 
skills or training the courts have enabling them to make this determination; skills and 
training which the legislature might lack. 
As illustrated above, at the core of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine 
is the thought that if one of the branches of government is in charge of legislating 
laws, the implementation of those laws shall not fall within the authority of that same 
branch’s authority and, furthermore, that branch will lack judicial review powers over 
those laws.30 For this purpose, it is necessary to examine the application of the 
separation of powers doctrine in selected jurisdictions. For example, similar to the 
British unwritten constitutional system, under South Africa’s written Constitution, 
members of the executive are also members of parliament, which is the branch 
commonly known as the legislature.31 In other words, there seems not to be clear 
and distinct arms of government constituted by the legislature, executive and 
judiciary operating within comprehensively drawn boundaries. As previously stated, 
section 165 of the South African Constitution only seems to be clear regarding the 
structure and independence of the courts, its authority, and its role in deciding cases 
and applying the Constitution. Deciding cases, as it will be shown in the subsequent 
discussions, includes the trial courts’ discretion to decide the appropriate sentence.  
The Criminal Law Amendment Act,32 on the other hand, which is a mandatory 
minimum sentence statute, contains provisions which are unclear on the role, 
authority and interaction between the courts and the legislature, and whether the 
courts’ sentencing discretion remains a principle of South African law. The 
                                                          
30  Mojapelo 2013 Advocate 37, where he also observes that: “The same will be said of the 
executive authority, it is not supposed to enact law or to administer justice and the judicial 
authority should not enact or execute laws.”  
31  Pypers South Africa’s parliamentary system 3. 
32  Act 105 of 1997. 
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constitutional separation of powers doctrine seems obfuscated by section 51 of this 
legislation which read as follows: 
51   Discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences 
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a 
regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of 
an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment for life. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a 
regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person who has been 
convicted of an offence referred to in  
(a) Part II of Schedule 2, in case of – 
(i) A first offender, to imprisonment for a period of not less than 15 
years; 
(ii) A second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period 
of not less than 20 years; and 
(iii) A third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment 
for a period not less than 25 years; 
(iv) … 
(3) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial 
and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser 
sentence than the sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter 
those circumstances on the record of the proceedings and must thereupon 
impose such lesser sentence: Provided that if a regional court imposes 
such lesser sentence in respect of an offence referred to in Part I of 
Schedule 2, it shall have jurisdiction to impose a term of imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding 30 years. 
(Aa) When imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape the 
following shall not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances 
justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence: 
(i) The complainant’s previous sexual history; 
(ii) An apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant; 
(iii) An accused person’s cultural or religious belief about rape; or 
(iv) Any relationship between the accused person and the complainant 
prior to the offence being committed. 
Section 51 contains mandatory and minimum sentences for nearly all serious 
offences. Because the sentences contained in this legislation are mandatory, such 
course of action was disapproved of by the court because it was found to have 
“reduced the courts to rubber stamps and violate the independence of the courts 
and the separation of powers.”33 In addition, the court in the Toms case has also 
                                                          
33  S v Toms 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) paras 806h-807b (hereinafter Toms). The relevant passage 
provides that “the infliction of punishment is a matter for the trial court; mandatory sentences 
reduce court’s normal sentencing function to the level of a rubber stamp”. 
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remarked that the introduction of mandatory and minimum sentences by the 
legislature has inevitably been viewed as an unpopular and unhelpful encroachment 
upon the courts’ sentencing duty.34 The courts’ disapproval and rejection of these 
mandatory minimum sentences were also in full display in S v Mofokeng where it 
was stated that: 
For the legislature to have imposed minimum sentences … severely curtailing 
the discretion of the courts, offends against the fundamental constitutional 
principles of the separation of powers of the legislature and the judiciary.35 
The discretion of the court in sentencing was emphasised by the Appellate Division 
in S v Mpetha, where Corbett JA lamented the prejudice and unfairness caused by 
legislation which stipulates mandatory minimum sentences because it “takes away 
from the trial Judge the discretion which he normally enjoys in the imposition of 
sentences.”36 Moreover, Smuts AJ in S v Budaza, when disapproving the mandatory 
sentences legislation, remarked that the Act embodied a: 
…a grave tampering with the role and independence of the judiciary. The court 
should not be party to any injustice - a little bit of injustice to satisfy the 
legislature is simply not an option.”37  
Smuts AJ added that “I might well have been constrained to conclude that to 
implement the provisions of section 51 of the Act would be in conflict with my oath 
of office”.38 However, amongst Smuts AJ’s criticisms of the mandatory minimum 
sentences legislation in the Budaza case, was his finding that the legislation was 
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine, as well as on the accused person’s right to a fair trial because it subjected 
                                                          
34  Toms paras 830j-831b. 
35  S v Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) 525h (hereinafter Mofokeng). At para 526g, the court 
remarked that: “That the legislature has seen it fit to use the courts as rubber stamps that must 
apply the legislature’s arbitrary sentences … is an unfortunate breach of the separation of 
powers. It tends to undermine the independence of the courts, and to make them mere cat’s 
paws for the implementation by the legislature of its own inflexible penal policy that is capable 
of operating with serious injustice in particular cases.” See also S v Montgomery 2000 (2) SACR 
318 (N) paras 322f-g where it was remarked that “most judges regard section 51 as 
disconcerting.” In S v Ibrahim 1999 (1) SACR 106 (C) paras 114h-I, the court commented about: 
“the appallingly bad manner in which the sections have been drafted”. Also, in S v Jansen 1999 
(2) SACR 368 (C) paras 371i, 372h (hereinafter Jansen), the court referred to what it found to 
be “uncertainty prevailing in all courts as a result of the poor drafting”. Similarly, in S v Swartz 
1999 (2) SACR 380 (C) para 383b, it is regarded as “appallingly drafted”. 
36  S v Mpetha 1985 (3) SA 702 (A) paras 706d-g.  
37  S v Budaza 1999 (2) SACR 491 (E) para 502f (hereinafter Budaza). 
38  Budaza para 224e. 
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an accused to what he considered to be “cruel, inhumane or degrading 
punishment.”39 While these latter views seem not to be only criticisms by the courts 
on the constitutionality of the mandatory sentences, and what is considered to be 
its impact on the separation of powers doctrine, it also became a contentious issue 
in S v Jansen where the court remarked that: 
…mandatory sentences per se run the risk of being unconstitutional, for it is 
possible that a mechanistic implementation of a system of mandatory sentences 
without regard to the individual context could well be considered to be cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment.40 
The underlying concern by the court in this latter case seems to be legislation’s lack 
of judicial independence in determining sentences, an area which has been widely 
accepted to be falling within the core duties of the courts. According to Mahomed 
CJ, judicial authority and independence form the foundational principle of a 
sustainable representative government established on the rule of law, and the 
repercussions of undermining this doctrine would, in his view, be felt by citizens in 
the implementation of the law.41 It seems the idea behind this thought is that an 
independent judiciary is capable of acting as bulwark against the abuse of 
constitutional rights. 
Academics’ standpoints on the courts’ decisions on mandatory and minimum 
sentences, and whether these sentences limit judicial independence, vary. 
Terblanche, amongst others, points out that it cannot be questioned that it is the 
legislature’s core function to make the law. When the legislature enacts legislation 
which provides minimum and mandatory sentences, the courts’ function, in his view, 
remains unchanged, in that it has to implement that law. He adds that a single 
judge’s assenting or dissenting “is almost as irrelevant as agreement or 
disagreement with the general speed limit of 120 km/h.”42  
                                                          
39  Budaza para 502e. See also S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (1) SACR 1 (CC) para 122 
(hereinafter Makwanyane) where Chaskalson P remarked: “The greatest deterrent to crime is 
the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended and punished” and not the imposition of harsh 
judgments or legislature’s pre-ordained sentences. 
40  Jansen para 372i. 
41  Mahomed 1998 SALJ 112.  
42  Terblanche 2001 SACJ 4.  
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When commenting on the separation of powers and mandatory sentencing policy 
enacted by the legislature in the United States, Munro and Wasik43 argue that 
mandatory minimum sentences legislation is consistent with the Constitution and 
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. They point out that these were also 
the views of the United States Supreme Court where the constitutionality of 
mandatory minimum sentences was at issue in Mistretta v United States, and where 
it was held that “the scope of judicial discretion with respect of the sentence is 
subject to congressional control…”.44 These latter views expressed by academics 
and the United States Supreme Court on the interaction between the legislature and 
the courts regarding this kind of legislation are also shared by some of our courts.45 
Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers, on the other hand, question and reject the efficacy of our 
minimum sentencing legislation, and argue that while its objectives were to “reduce 
serious and violent crimes, achieve consistency in sentencing, and satisfy the public 
that sentences were sufficiently severe, the legislation has achieved little or no 
significant impact with regard to these goals”.46 When commenting on the 
Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act,47 which, like the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act,48 also provides mandatory sentences of life imprisonment to 
numerous conducts, Mollema and Terblanche seem to share these latter views, 
where they caution against the belief that “all society’s serious problems should be 
dealt with by the most severe possible sentences.”49 As evidenced by these 
observations, legal researchers, academics and South African courts have given 
divergent views on the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences, and 
on whether this legislation encroached upon their judicial independence and 
authority under the separation of powers doctrine. These differing opinions will be 
probed in the study in order to consider the place of the separation of powers 
doctrine in the South African Constitution, and whether the courts have been faithful 
                                                          
43  Munro and Wasik Sentencing, judicial discretion and training 13.  
44  Mistretta v United States 488 US 361 (1989).  
45  See S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) (hereinafter Malgas) and S v Matyityi (695/09) [2010] 
ZASCA 127 (30 September 2010) (hereinafter Matyityi) in succeeding discussions. 
46  Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers 2005 SA Crime Quarterly 15. 
47  Act 7 of 2013. 
48  Act 105 of 1997. 
49  Mollema and Terblanche 2017 SACJ 223. 
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in executing its function of policing the constitutional boundaries of the conduct of 
all branches of government. 
 
1.3 Research questions and hypothesis of the study 
The following questions are put forward and form part of this study:  
 What is the origin of the separation of powers doctrine? 
 What was the rationale for the formation of this doctrine? 
 Does the original concept of separation of powers still remain relevant in 
twentieth century democracies? 
 Does absolute separation of powers exist? 
 How do South African courts interpret and apply the provisions of sections 
173 and 39 of the Constitution which give courts the authority to develop 
laws? 
 Has the legislature, when enacting the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 
1997, encroached on the courts’ constitutional independence and authority? 
 Has South Africa succeeded in developing its own distinct separation of 
powers doctrine since 1994? 
 Does the South African Constitution give courts too much power to make 
laws and public policy? 
 Does the current constitutional framework guarantee the original concept of 
separation of powers? 
 How do comparative jurisdictions interpret and apply the separation of 
powers doctrine? 
 What can South Africa learn from the application and practice of other 
jurisdictions on their separation of powers doctrine? 
 Is law reform needed to clarifying the courts’ constitutional limitations and its 
role in developing the laws, and on the other hand, the legislature’s powers 





The hypotheses essential to the research in this study are the following: 
 The separation of powers doctrine has never been fully articulated and 
incorporated into the South African Constitution.  
 The legislative scheme which currently regulates South Africa’s separation of 
powers seems to be incoherent and insufficient; consequently, its 
implementation and application becomes uncertain and unforeseeable.  
 The test for determining whether each branch of government is acting within 
its constitutional limitations seems to be inadequate and muddled, particularly 
in constitutional litigations and in the development of social and economic 
legislative policies. 
 The origin and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine in 
South Africa in the light of the fact that this doctrine cannot be absolute. 
 Judicial supremacy under the South African Constitution allows the courts 
too much power to make laws and public policy. Such a powerful unelected 
judiciary does not conform to the original concept of separation of powers, 
which, amongst other things, was aimed at defending citizens against tyranny 
and give more power to citizens’ elected representative, that is, the 
legislature. 
 The manner in which comparative jurisdictions deal with their constitutional 
separation of powers may assist South Africa to develop a coherent and 
comprehensible doctrine of separation of powers. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The study will be centred on examining the contents and texts of primary and 
secondary sources with the objective of understanding the application and scope of 
the separation of powers doctrine in the South African Constitution. To this end, the 
study will undertake a comparative and logical-analytical probe of the pertinent legal 
resources. This enquiry will take the form of a qualitative research study, which is 
“used to answer questions about experience, meaning and perspective, most often 
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from the standpoint of the participant.”50 An analysis of primary and secondary texts 
and documents falls under this type of research technique. 
A literature study has disclosed that there are sufficient sources to favourably 
embark on this research. The primary resources are in the form of common law, 
legislation and case law. There are other secondary resources in the form of 
textbooks, articles, reports, internet sources, research papers, law reform 
commissions’ reports that will be made use of. 
1.5 Literature review 
When describing the constitutional structure of the separation of powers doctrine, 
Rautenbach argues that the concept consists of three foundational and significant 
features, that is, the legislative, executive and judiciary branch. In his view, the 
legislative branch has the authority to pass laws; the executive branch has the 
power to administer, execute and implement the laws, and the judicial branch has 
the authority to decide on issues according to the laws, and to use the laws in 
resolving disputes.51 O’Regan has pointed out that while the South African 
Constitution does not use the phrase ‘separation of powers’, the doctrine of 
separation of powers is part of the South African constitutional system.52 This 
sentiment is also shared by the Constitutional Court in the Certification of the 1996 
Constitution case.53 While there is no doubt that this doctrine forms part of South 
African law, it is held that a distinct South African separation of powers jurisprudence 
still needs to be developed.54 
Considering the doctrine of separation of powers in England as a feature of the 
British legal system and its significances, Lord Mustill in Regina v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department Ex Parte Fire Brigades Union has pointed out that: 
It is a feature of the peculiarly British conception of the separation of powers 
that Parliament, the executive and the courts each have their distinct and largely 
exclusive domain. Parliament has a legally unchallenged right to make whatever 
                                                          
50  Hammarberg et al Human Reproduction 499. 
51  Rautenbach Constitutional law 78. 
52  O’Regan 2005 PELJ 120. 
53  See footnote 21 above. 
54  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC) para 108-109.  
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laws it thinks right. The executive carries on the administration of the country in 
accordance with the powers conferred on it by law. The courts interpret the laws, 
and see that they are obeyed.55 
The British separation of powers doctrine enjoins parliament with limitless powers 
to make any laws it considers necessary without any consideration on whether such 
laws might be unconstitutional. The courts have no power to invalidate laws enacted 
by the legislature. As England has no written Constitution, there is no statutory 
provision guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution or the constitutional 
standards to review conducts or legislation passed by the legislature. Unlike South 
Africa and Canada, the English courts’ power to determine disputes making use of 
the laws enacted by the legislature is seemingly restrained, but they have no 
authority to invalidate laws enacted by the elected representatives of the citizens. 
While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not make use of the 
concept of separation of powers as a constitutional principle which divides powers 
between the branches of government,56 the 1997 judgment of Lamer CJ makes it 
clear that this concept does form part of the Charter: 
What is at issue here is the character of the relationship between the legislature 
and executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. These 
relationships should be depoliticised. When I say that those relationships are 
depoliticised, I do not mean to deny that they are political in the sense that court 
decisions (both constitutional and non-constitutional) often have political 
implications, and that the statutes which courts adjudicate upon emerge from 
the political process. What I mean instead is that the legislature and the 
executive cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political pressure on the judiciary, 
and conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise reserve in 
speaking out publicly on issues of general public policy that are or have the 
potential to come before the courts, that are the subject of political debate, and 
which do not relate to the proper administration of justice.57 
In the United States and in France, on the other hand, the separation of powers 
doctrine is a concept which has a wide range of explanations and significance. 
Amongst these are that members of the executive cannot be members of the 
legislature; one branch of government cannot have the power to regulate the affairs 
of another branch, and one branch of government cannot be tasked to perform the 
                                                          
55  Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 
UKHL 3 (05 April 1995) para 26.  
56  Venter Constitutional comparison 219.  
57  Provincial Judges Reference [1997] 3 SCR 3 para 139. 
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functions of another branch.58 According to Entin, while the expression ‘separation 
of powers’ is an epitome which constitutes a defining aspect of the American 
constitutional system, it is also not comprehensively articulated in the United States 
Constitution.59 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court decided in 1803 that the 
courts have within the concept of the separation of powers the task “to say what the 
law is.”60 This has since been understood by the United States Supreme Court to 
be founded on the idea that the court has the final, if not the sole authority to 
determine constitutional construction.61 
Kavanagh distinguishes between what she terms the ‘pure view’ of the separation 
of powers; and a ‘reconstructed view’. She suggests that separation of labour or 
personnel of the different government branches cannot constitute a limit of the 
separation of powers, and checks and balances supplement the separation of 
powers. Kavanagh argues that in order for the separation of powers doctrine to be 
effective, it must be supported by concepts of checks and balances, which is based 
on the principles of “coordinated institutional effort between branches of 
government”62 in the structure of government. The concepts of separation of powers 
as described by Kavanagh will consequently be discussed. 
1.5.1  The pure view of separation of powers 
Separation of powers can be complete in the way that the constitutional boundaries 
of the different services of government are fully divided and functions separately. 
Separation of powers might be limited and permit the government branches to be 
linked in executing their function.63 Kavanagh seems to agree with the views of Vile 
on the composition and functioning of the government based on what is considered 
to be the primary values contained in the pure precept of the separation of powers, 
which is that: 
the government should be divided into three branches or departments, the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. To each of these branches, there is 
                                                          
58  Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and administrative law 4.  
59  Entin 1990 Ohio State LJ 175. 
60  Marbury v Madison 177.  
61  Powell v McCormack 395 US 486 (1969) 549, and Cooper v Aaron 358 US 1 (1958) 18.  
62  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 223. 
63  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 223. 
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a corresponding identifiable function of government, legislature, executive, or 
judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise of its 
own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other 
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of 
government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to 
be at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way each of the 
branches will be a check to the others and no single group of people will be able 
to control the machinery of the State.64 
The separation of powers doctrine in this form seems to be clearly defined, and 
members of the executive are disqualified from being members of the legislature, 
as was touched on earlier in the constitutional structure of the United States and 
France.65 While Vile acknowledges that separation of powers in this form is 
impractical and cannot be sustained, he seems not to dispute that this pure 
separation of powers doctrine constitutes what was celebrated to be the yardstick 
which distinguishes it from other concepts of separation of powers.66 
Brennan and Hamlin again argue that separation of powers which is absolute and 
precise based on a government’s operational basis can be situated at the core of 
“the classic doctrine of the separation of powers”,67 as expressed by Montesquieu.68 
However, Montesquieu never distinctly expressed a system of ideas embracing an 
operational separation in its unmixed formation.69 Montesquieu’s system of ideas 
contained three branches of government which were broadly disapproved of, all the 
more during the eighteenth century.70 Whatever the accuracy of Montesquieu’s 
system of ideas on the pure view of separation of powers, the pure thought of 
separation of powers has had a long-lasting impact on the world’s common view of 
the separation of powers doctrine.71 
                                                          
64  Vile Constitutionalism and the separation of powers 97.  
65  Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and administrative law 4. 
66  Vile Constitutionalism and the separation of powers 97. 
67  Brennan and Hamlin 1994 J of Theoretical Politics 351.  
68  Tomkins Public Law 36. See also Manin Checks and balances and boundaries 30 who remarks 
that “the question here is not whether or not Montesquieu himself advocated this pure version 
of the theory of the separation of powers. The fact is that for decades if not centuries, most legal 
experts and political actors (with the notable exception of the American Federalists) believed 
and proclaimed that he did”. 
69  Vile Constitutionalism and the separation of powers 90. 
70  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 419.  
71  Corwin The Constitution of the United States of America 9-10. 
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1.5.2  The reconstructed view of separation of powers  
When arguing for the accuracy of this particular view, Kyritsis articulated 
Montesquieu’s forewarning that “constant experience shows us that every man 
interested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will 
go”.72 Sharing powers amongst different government branches was aimed at 
guaranteeing that no individual government agency was supreme, and each was 
entrusted with the power to check and bring to book each other’s functions. 
Restraining the misuse of power and avoiding the concentration of powers in a 
single government branch were considered as the fundamental justification of the 
separation of powers doctrine.73 
In a justification for the recreated view of the separation of powers doctrine, 
Kavanagh argues that for a government to function effectively under this doctrine, 
an unconstrained judiciary is needed to settle disputes regarding the laws. There is 
furthermore a need for a prudent and elected organisation called a legislative 
assembly to make laws governing the citizens’ affairs.74 Ekins further contends that 
an independent judiciary ensures that disputes are decided and settled objectively 
and equitably by implementing the laws enacted by the legislature.75 Kavanagh 
suggests that because the legislative and judiciary functions may encroach on each 
other’s functions, their boundaries must be clearly stated, because “if both the courts 
and the legislature make law, how can we distinguish between them?”76 She states 
that the truth of the matter is that these government branches develop laws on 
different levels.77 The courts develop laws in an unsystematic and supplementary 
manner,78 and must do so within limits even when making laws. The legislature, on 
the other hand, has the power to develop sweeping and revolutionary laws which 
are not grounded on present legal values.79 Gardner comprehensively expresses 
these views in the following terms: 
                                                          
72  Kyritsis 2007 Canadian JL and Juris 386.  
73  Albert 2010 Int J of Const Law 207.  
74  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 230. 
75  Ekins Statutory interpretations 8.  
76  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 231. 
77  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 231. 
78  Kavanagh 2004 Oxford JLS 270-744. 
79  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 232. 
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What is really morally important under the heading of the separation of powers 
is not the separation of law-making powers from law-applying powers, but rather 
the separation of legislative powers of law-making (i.e. powers to make legally 
unprecedented laws) from judicial powers of law-making (i.e. powers to develop 
the law gradually using existing legal resources).80 
The widely accepted understanding seems to be that the courts and the legislature, 
despite the constitutionally drawn boundaries, share the law-making function albeit 
to a limited extent where these lines could become indistinct. 
1.5.3 Checks and balances in managing the separation of powers 
Kavanagh argues that while there is a need to detach employees of the government 
branches to ensure that each maintains its distinct constitutional role; checks and 
balances would still remain a key factor in ensuring the sustainability of the doctrine 
of separation.81 The importance of checks and balances are articulated by Madison 
as he maintains that the very first task as regards the separation of powers was “to 
make some division of the government into distinct and separate departments”.82 
Joining together separation with an oversight role by both the courts and the 
legislature, would, in Kavanagh’s view, be an ideal concept as it would be impossible 
to have an absolute separation of powers.83 Madison also adds that this oversight 
function alone would not be sufficient, but “the next and most difficult task is to 
provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others”.84 
Moreover, Madison points out that it would not be: 
…sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments [of 
government], and to trust to the parchment barriers against the encroaching 
spirit of power.85 
With a view to preventing the peril of perversion of power, Madison reasons: 
…so contrive the interior structure of the government as that its several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
other in their places.86  
                                                          
80  Gardner 2001 Am J of Juris 217. 
81  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 233. 
82  Madison No 51 288.  
83  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 233. 
84  Madison No 48 276.  
85  Madison No 48 276. 
86  Madison No 48 276-281. 
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The belief is that government branches cannot be trusted to maintain their 
constitutional boundaries, but that clear functional safeguarding measures are 
needed. Kavanagh seems to be in accord with this notion as she argues that checks 
and balances safeguard the separation of powers, and prevent government 
branches from overstepping their constitutional functions.87 
1.5.4 Governing collectively in a shared project  
Sharing employees and the checks and balances form a core principle of the 
separation of powers doctrine.88 Kavanagh also argues that, for an effective 
separation of powers amongst government branches, there should be a 
synchronised “joint enterprise of governing”.89 Moreover, Kavanagh questions the 
ambiguity and mystery embedded into this view of separation of powers: “How can 
the separation of powers be underpinned by the value of coordinated institutional 
action as part of a joint enterprise?”90 The integration required under this separation 
of powers concept seems to make it difficult to maintain what was thought to be its 
original identity when considering its absolute or pure view. This view advocates for 
separate branches of government, and no form of integration or synchronisation of 
its services.  
The United States Supreme Court seems to have embraced the standpoint that the 
services of the different branches must be integrated:  
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity.91 
The Court’s view is that the different branches need each other, and have to function 
collectively in order to render services. Kavanagh also observes that the 
government project is sustained by each branch rendering its limited input. Madison 
again questions why the separation of powers within this format should work, as he 
envisages that each branch would function separate and unconnected. While he 
                                                          
87  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 234. 
88  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 234. 
89  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 235. 
90  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 235. 
91  Youngstown Co v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952) 635.  
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concedes that there should be a separation of powers in this design, he cannot 
imagine that the legislature, executive and the judiciary would be “wholly 
unconnected with each other”.92 
According to Farina,93 when the different states’ conventions of the United States 
Constitution were debated, a system of government was recommended where its 
powers were not only separated, but preferably shared between the different hubs 
of power: 
Sir, when you have divided and nicely balanced the departments of government; 
when you have strongly connected the virtue of your rulers with their interest; 
when, in short, you have rendered your system as perfect as human forms can 
be, - you must place confidence; you must give power. The true principle of 
government is this - make the system complete in its structure, give a perfect 
proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers you give it will never affect 
your security.94 
While the government’s different branches should function cohesively, it is clear that 
the courts’ duty, those of the legislature and the executive remain different.95 This is 
confirmed by Sachs J in Du Plessis v De Klerk,96 in describing the different 
government branches’ constitutional limitations: 
The judicial function simply does not lend itself to the kind of factual enquiries, 
cost-benefit analyses, political compromises, investigations of 
administrative/enforcement capacities, implementation strategies and 
budgetary priority decisions which appropriate decision-making on social, 
economic and political questions requires. 
It seems that the overwhelming view articulated by the South Africa Constitutional 
Court is that the development of public policy such in areas as the social, economic, 
political remain within the spheres of the political arms of government, namely, the 
legislature and the executive. The courts, on the other hand, are not without power 
but are tasked with all other forms of power which causes it to be part of the 
integrated government’s oversight over the different government branches. 
                                                          
92  Madison No 48 276-281. 
93  Farina 1989 Columbia LR 495.  
94  Elliot The debates in the several state conventions 350.  
95  Kohn The burgeoning constitutional requirement 21.  
96  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) para 178.  
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1.5.5 Possible encroachment on functions of other branches  
The possible encroachment on the functions of other branches is exemplified in 
several courts’ decisions. In the Dodo case, for example, the Constitutional Court 
attempted to answer the question whether the legislating of mandatory minimum 
legislation has crossed the separation of powers boundaries, thereby encroaching 
onto the sphere of judicial sentencing discretion authority. Ackermann J dismissed 
this argument because, in his view, “both the legislature and the executive share an 
interest in the punishment to be imposed by the courts, both in regard to its nature 
and severity.”97 He added that this was because, in his opinion:  
No judicial punishment can take place unless the person to be punished has 
been convicted of an offence which either under the common law or statute 
carries with it a punishment. Even here the separation is not complete, because 
the function of the legislature is checked by the Constitution in general and by 
the Bill of Rights in particular, and such checks and balances are enforced 
through the courts.98   
In addition, the Constitutional Court’s view on the constitutionality of the mandatory 
sentence legislation is also shared by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas.99 
In this case, it was held that the courts’ constitutional authority to determine an 
appropriate sentence is not encroached by the legislature when enacting the 
minimum sentence legislation. In the court’s view: 
…if the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular 
case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would 
be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, so that 
an unjust would be done by imposing the sentence, it is entitled to impose a 
lesser sentence.100  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Matyityi once again considered the constitutionality 
of this legislation in the context of the separation of powers doctrine. In this case, 
Ponnan JA dismissed the constitutional challenge, and remarked that: 
Our Courts derive their power from the Constitution and like other arms of State, 
owe their fealty to it. Our constitutional order can hardly survive if courts fail to 
                                                          
97  Dodo para 23. 
98  Dodo para 22. 
99  Malgas para 25: “If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular 
case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be 
disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice would 
be done by imposing the sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.”  
100  Malgas para 25. 
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properly patrol the boundaries of their own power by showing due deference to 
the legitimate domains of power of the other arms of State. Here Parliament has 
spoken. It has ordained minimum sentences for certain specified offences. 
Courts are obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly convincing 
reasons for departing from them. Courts are not free to subvert the will of the 
legislature by resorting to vague, ill-defined concepts … or other equally vague 
and ill-defined hypothesis that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer’s 
personal notion of fairness.101 
This judgment advances the notion of parliamentary supremacy which seems to 
stand in stark contrast to the values of constitutional supremacy contained in section 
2 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Ponnan JA supports the constitutionality of the 
minimum sentence legislation and the view that it does not encroach on judicial 
independence. These latter interpretations were also the sentiments of an earlier 
decision by this court in S v Jimenez.102 
This above state of affairs, Kavanagh argues, could have led to the perception that 
the separation of powers is not only “fraught with ambiguity” but also that “separation 
can vary in form and in degree. It can be absolute or partial.”103 Moreover, this 
ambiguity seems to be making it challenging for one branch of government to 
confine its conduct within the constitutional boundaries. While each branch of 
government is distinguishable according to its core function, the reality is that, what 
Kavanagh terms the “one-branch - one function”104 task, forms part of the confusion 
because in her view the judiciary have to maintain charge in the courts and its 
resources, but “the courts also exercise legislative functions when they make rules 
governing court proceedings and the costs of litigation.”105 In addition, she argues 
                                                          
101  Matyityi para 23. 
102  S v Jimenez 2003 (1) SACR 507 (SCA) paras 30-31: “[30] Finally, section 51 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 imposed minimum sentences for certain serious offences 
including inter alia, dealing in cocaine. The section provides that a regional court or High Court 
that has convicted a person of such offence may sentence the person, in the case of  
(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years; 
(ii) a second offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; and 
(iii) a third or subsequent offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years. 
The maximum sentences imposed by the 1992 Act remain intact. 
[31] In my view, it is proper for a court considering sentence to have regard to the legislative 
policy as expressed in legislation dealing with sentences. If it were not so, legal and social 
confusion would ensue, leading to a conflict between the legislator and the courts. In imposing 
sentences for drug-related crimes, courts must take cognisance of the persistent policy of the 
legislature that these crimes must be viewed in a most serious light and heavy sentences 
imposed. (See also S v Gibson 1974 (4) SA 478 (A) at 481h, per Holmes JA.)” 
103  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 223. 
104   Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 223. 
105  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 225. 
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that litigation is a form of legislating because in litigation the courts may redefine 
and rewrite the laws even though it might be within ascertainable boundaries.106 
Gwyn seems to be in accord with the view expressed by Kavanagh as he argues 
that because of the ambiguity of separation of powers doctrine, the powers assigned 
to each branch of government are unfixed and distinctly “multifunctional”.107 In 1880, 
Folger J of the State Supreme Court of New York advanced that: 
Though the Constitution confers upon specified courts general judicial power, 
there are certain powers of a judicial nature which by the express terms of the 
same instrument, are given to the legislative body.108 
Brook, on the other hand, seems to be in accord that the fundamental character of 
the law-making system is in principle a judicial procedure, and that this results in 
most laws not being produced by the legislature.109 This ambiguous state of affairs 
results in the separation of powers doctrine remaining an unsettled issue confronting 
the South African jurisprudence, especially its scope; context and meaning in the 
relationship between the courts and the legislature.  
The divergent courts’ decisions on the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum 
sentences legislation is but one classic example of this ambiguity, and shows how 
far the South African judiciary has come in developing and shaping the separation 
of powers doctrine. The formation of a manifestly South African version of this 
doctrine by our courts was the vision of Ackermann J in one of the earliest decisions 
of the Constitutional Court.110 Ackermann J111 acknowledged that developing a 
unique South African doctrine would be a process that is not only initiated by the 
courts but that it would take some period of time. Consequently, one of the inquiries 
of this study will be how far South Africa has come in developing its separation of 
powers doctrine, as well as probing the challenges that have confronted the relevant 
branches of government in this area over the past decades. The application, 
development and meaning of this doctrine - in light of the constitutional judicial 
independence and judicial authority principle as guaranteed by section 165 of the 
                                                          
106  Kavanagh The constitutional separation of powers 225. 
107  Gwyn 1989 William and Mary LR 266.  
108  People ex rel Hatzel v Hall 80 NY 117 (1880) 122.  
109  Brook 1956 Fordham LR 280. 
110  De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 60 (hereinafter De Lange). 
111  De Lange para 60, where Ackermann emphasizes that South African courts will develop a 
unique South African model of power of separation over time. See also Chapter 2 footnote 234.  
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1996 Constitution, and the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act - also 
remain unclear. These are but some of the innovative legislative policies that still 
create uncertainty, and remain a mystery on the development of our separation of 
powers jurisprudence. The separation of powers doctrine is in all probability the 
most known doctrine that has been a defence against autocratic governments over 
centuries, and forms the foundational principle of most twentieth century 
democracies. However, the abovementioned ambiguities surrounding this principle, 
and its development by our courts attest to the fact that it is still the most frequently 
misunderstood and misapplied constitutional ideal. 
Our new Constitution provides courts with the authority to re-examine and develop 
laws with the objective of aligning them with the values protected in the Constitution 
when courts consider such development to be in the interests of justice.112 The 
question however is whether the interests of justice approach is a useful guide in 
deciding whether to develop laws? Moreover, the interests of justice test also forms 
the discretionary framework for the admissibility of hearsay evidence in terms of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act.113 When developing and reforming the hearsay 
rule in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission rejected adopting a 
legislative approach which includes the interests of justice discretionary framework, 
and instead has adopted the submission of Ewaschuk J of Canada, that: 
…the test of ‘in the interests of justice’ for the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
is too open-ended and too subjective. It permits of personal value-judgement 
and is often referred to as ‘palm-tree justice’.114  
Hence, the application of this broad and vague test which enjoins the courts to 
rearrange and develop South African laws under section 173 of the South African 
Constitution also seems not to be immune to similar disapproval as shown in the 
report by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission. 
Moreover, section 39(2) of the Constitution also provides courts with the power to 
extend and rearrange laws in an ill-defined and obscure language with no further 
                                                          
112  Section 173 of the SA Constitution; see footnote 29 above. See also s 39(2) of the SA 
Constitution which provides that: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objectives of the Bill of Rights.” 
113  Act 45 of 1988.  
114  Yan-lung Hearsay in criminal proceedings para 8.20.  
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interpretative requirements when defining the Constitution. This may be done as 
long as the court, through its personal, economic and ideological views, concludes 
that such rearrangements of that law would enhance “the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.”115 Section 2 of the Constitution, on the other hand, which is 
widely interpreted as forming part in the application of section 39(2), guarantees the 
supremacy of the Constitution, and enjoins the courts, amongst other things, to 
determine and subsequently invalidate contested questions of constitutional law and 
public policy. The relevant section reads: “This Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Republic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid…”. According to this 
provision in the Constitution, the courts are the branch of government that seemingly 
have unrestrained powers to make the determination whether certain laws are 
incompatible with the Constitution, and whether certain conduct of the other 
branches of government should be invalidated. 
A brief overview of the South African Constitutional Court’s decisions shows a shift 
in the authority to make laws, and a notable rearranging of South African laws 
through courts’ decisions. In Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and 
Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another, Amicus Curiae),116 the 
accused was convicted of the rape of a minor girl who was nine years old for 
wrongfully and unlawfully having had anal sexual intercourse with her without her 
consent. The common-law definition of rape excluded acts non-consensual sexual 
penetration of the male penis into a female’s anus. The Constitutional Court applied 
sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution, and found it to be in the interests of 
justice to develop the common-law definition of rape to include acts of non-
consensual sexual penetration of the male penis into the anus of another person.117 
This was effected “to ensure that it reflects the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights”.118 However, when considering the language used by the Court in 
reaching this decision, it becomes apparent that in developing this area of law the 
Court acted with some measure of restraint. It painstakingly decided to embark on 
the review of the law being fully aware of its constitutional function and limitations, 
                                                          
115  Section 39(2) of the SA Constitution.  
116  2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) 465d-g (hereinafter Masiya). 
117  Masiya paras 436b-i. 
118  Masiya paras 435c-d. 
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and, moreover, acknowledged that it would be huge setback for victims of rape 
should the court not intervene to extend the common-law definition of rape.119 
The court also embarked on this course as it was aware that the Sexual Offences 
Amendment Bill 2003 - wherein reforms into the common-law definition of rape was 
considered - was about to be promulgated.120 Snyman has questioned the 
correctness of the court’s decision, because in his view, when reaching this 
conclusion: 
…the court assumed that the term ‘developing’ included incremental 
developing. However, it is submitted that ‘developing’ in s 39(2) does not include 
any power to extend the scope of existing crimes to encompass situations not 
covered by the existing definition.121  
Snyman adds that the Constitutional Court not only went beyond the scope of its 
constitutional function in this case, but it also breached the principle of legality which 
reflects the notion that courts may not develop offences. This is because, in his view, 
“the function of a judge is not to create new law, but to interpret existing law.”122 
Consequently, this court’s decision has, according to Snyman, resulted in a breach 
of the separation of powers doctrine.123 
In Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another,124 the 
applicant asked the Court to declare sections 9 and 10 of the Judges’ Remuneration 
and Conditions of Employment Act125 unconstitutional on grounds that it constituted 
                                                          
119  Masiya paras 461c-f. 
120  Masiya paras 455e-f. 
121  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
122  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
123  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
124  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another CCT48/02 para 14 
(hereinafter Satchwell). 
125  Act 47 of 2001. Section 9 provides: “(1) The surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court judge 
who on or after the fixed date was or is discharged from active service in terms of section 3 or 
4 or who died or dies while performing active service, shall be paid with effect from the first day 
of the month immediately succeeding the month in which he or she dies an amount - 
(a) in the case of a surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court judge or a judge who was so 
discharged from active service, equal to two thirds of the salary which was in terms of 
section 5 payable to that Constitutional Court judge or judge; or 
(b) in the case of a surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court judge or judge who died while 
performing active service as a Constitutional Court judge or judge, equal to two thirds of 
the amount to which that Constitutional Court judge or judge would have been entitled in 
terms of section 5 if he or she was discharged from service in terms of section 3(1)(a) or 
(2)(a) on the date of his or her death. 
(2)  The amount payable to the surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court judge or judge in 
terms of subsection (1) shall be payable with effect from the first day of the month 
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an unfair discrimination as it prohibited the provision of benefits to permanent same-
sex life partners of judges.126 A determination of such nature by the Court would in 
all likelihood have an impact on the redistribution and administering of funds, and 
the financial system of the state. The Court did not only declare this legislation to be 
unconstitutional but it also read-in certain words, a process which would be 
rearranging and rewriting legislation.127 Gibson examined section 52(1)128 of the 
Canadian Charter which contains a similar provision to section 2 of the South African 
Constitution, in that it provides for the supremacy of the Constitution, and that laws 
inconsistent with the Constitution must be invalidated. He argued that the 
questioned laws must be developed instead of being invalidated by the courts. He 
reached the latter conclusion, because in his view, nullifying laws which benefit 
certain groups while at the same time seems to discriminate against another group 
is a ‘destructive’ redress, because, “courts cannot invalidate legislation when to do 
so would take away existing benefits that are not in themselves unconstitutional.”129 
Duclos and Roach do not fully agree with the latter view by Gibson. However, they 
argue that the difficulty when a court strikes down laws it considers unconstitutional 
is that such decision constitutes an act of overreach. In doing so, the courts 
encroach onto the conventional function of the legislature, because in their view, 
such decision fall outside the courts’ separation of powers’ duty.130 
According to Macfarlane, the Canadian Supreme Court has, through the provisions 
of the Charter, reconstructed its role in that it: 
                                                          
immediately succeeding the day on which he or she died, and shall be payable until the 
death of such spouse.” 
Section 10 provides: 
“If a gratuity referred to in section 6 would have been payable to a Constitutional Court judge or 
judge who died or dies on or after the fixed date had he or she not died but, on the date of his 
or her death, was discharged from active service in terms of sections 3 or 4, there shall - 
(a) if such Constitutional Court judge or judge is survived by a surviving spouse, be payable to 
such surviving spouse, in addition to any amount payable to that spouse in terms of section 
9; or 
(b) if such Constitutional Court judge or judge is not survived by a spouse, be payable to the 
estate of such Constitutional Court judge or judge, a gratuity which shall be equal to the 
amount of the gratuity which would have been so payable to such Constitutional Court 
judge or judge had he or she not died but was, on the date of his or her death, discharged 
from active service as aforesaid.” 
126  Satchwell paras 8-9. 
127  Satchwell para 14. 
128  Section 52(1) provides: “Any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect…” 
129  Gibson 1989 Alberta LR 182. 
130  Duclos and Roach 1991 McGill LJ 13.  
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…evolved from a largely legal, dispute-resolving body into a policy-making 
institution whose decisions have far-reaching implications for virtually all areas 
of Canada’s political, social, cultural and economic life.131  
In other words, the supremacy of the Constitution concepts has, amongst other 
things, resulted in making the courts the most powerful government branch which 
can no longer only decide disputes between litigants, but also has the power to 
make public policy.  
Moses, on the other hand, questions what she finds to be an intolerable state of 
affairs displayed in the working of the United States Supreme Court, because the 
court makes decisions which surpasses the litigants’ issue in dispute, and decides 
its own issues outside those presented by the litigants. In her view, this is a court 
which acts with no constitutional limits, and is functioning as what is termed the ‘least 
dangerous branch’. When judges are free to invalidate the legislature’s policies or 
legislation while such issues are not forming part of the litigants’ cases, the courts’ 
decisions can no longer fall within the courts’ constitutional requirements.132 Moses 
further argues that “although the ‘Framers’133 recognised that judges would have 
some leeway of interpretation, they argued that the judiciary was too weak to 
exercise that leeway to usurp legislative authority.”134 
Tremblay135 again suggests that the primary conundrum is that judicial review of the 
legislature’s actions lacks the authority over laws enacted by a legislature, which is 
elected by the majority and represents the views of the majority, and are as such 
“democratically legitimate.”136 Tremblay also argues that judicial review embraces: 
…judges who are able to nullify legislation democratically enacted in 
accordance with the majority rule, and yet these judges neither are the people 
nor are they elected by them; neither represent the citizens and nor are they 
held accountable for their decisions.137  
The latter view on the legitimacy of the legislature in the sphere of governing or 
making laws in the United States are evident in the reasoning of Marshall CJ in 
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Marbury v Madison.138 Marshall reiterates that the legislature derives its legitimacy 
to rule over citizens from the citizens themselves. It is this constitutional principle 
that makes the legislature the most powerful branch of government.139  
In questioning the legitimacy of judicial review, Tremblay confirms that the concept 
runs counter to the will of the majority, and amounts to what he terms: 
…a counter-majoritarian force … those who claim that this institution is legitimate 
have the burden of showing that it can be reconciled with the underlying 
assumptions of democratic governance.140  
Democratic governance, according to Tremblay, recognises the constitutional 
limitations for each branch of government, and it also contains deference or judicial 
self-restraint.141 Posner argues that judicial self-restraint has expired, and judges no 
longer consider themselves “restrained in invalidating legislative action as 
unconstitutional”,142 because, amongst other things, the phrase ‘judicial self-
restraint’ has numerous meanings. According to Kramer, the termination of judicial 
self-restraint was caused by the idea that courts were better than the other branches 
of government to construct and invalidate legislation, and to pronounce on the 
meaning of constitutional principles enacted by the legislature.143 He suggests that 
judicial supremacy might be the result of constitutional supremacy. This idea is 
similar to that of Carson (see para 1.1 above) who exclaimed a “judicial monopoly 
over the constitution”, which, in his view, has contributed to the current state of 
affairs.144 After conducting a detailed overview of the United States Supreme Court’s 
data between 1937 and 2009, Epstein and Landes, however, question whether 
there was “ever such a thing as judicial self-restraint?”145 They question the 
correctness of Posner’s view above, and argue that judges instead seem to have 
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adopted ‘selective’ self-restraint, in that they still maintain a certain level of restraint 
in some cases, and not that the notion of judicial self-restraint has ended, as was 
claimed by Posner.146 Moreover, Burton, another advocate of the judicial review 
doctrine, argues that the constitutional power given to courts to examine and 
invalidate laws enacted by the legislature are decreed by the rule of law, and helps 
the electorate to hold their elected representatives answerable to their laws.147 
The above-mentioned decisions of the South African Constitutional Court, that is, 
the Masiya and Satchwell cases, make it difficult to comprehend whether judicial 
deference is part of the South African constitutional law adjudication process, 
especially in the light of the text and context of section 173 of the Constitution which 
enjoins the courts to develop laws. Mojapelo J, when examining the doctrine of 
separation of powers as applied and interpreted by the Constitutional Court, 
concludes that the principle of judicial deference forms an integral part of the South 
African constitutional-law adjudication.148 These sentiments are also evident in the 
reasoning of Ackermann J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs, where he remarked that: 
The other consideration a court must keep in mind, is the principle of the 
separation of powers and, flowing therefrom, the deference it owes to the 
legislature in devising a remedy for a breach of the Constitution in any particular 
case. It is not possible to formulate in general terms what such deference must 
embrace, for this depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In 
essence, however, it involves restraint by the Courts in not trespassing onto that 
part of the legislative field which has been reserved by the Constitution, and for 
good reason, to the legislature.149 
Furthermore, the doctrine of judicial deference as part of the constitutional review 
jurisprudence by the Constitutional Court is also in accord with the views of 
Chaskalson JP in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal).150 
Chaskalson remarks that it would be outside the Constitutional Court’s constitutional 
boundary to make an order that the state provides a patient with dialysis treatment 
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which could have been very costly because, in his view, “this was not a judgement 
a court can make”.151 
This attitude is also evident in Chaskalson JP’s reasoning in another decision of the 
Constitutional Court, that of Ferreira v Levin NO.152 In this case, he pronounced that 
the courts’ task was not to endorse or reject financial and reallocation of facilities as 
well as social state benefits policies enacted by the legislature, but to guarantee the 
carrying out of such decisions and constitutional compliance. Moreover, Chaskalson 
JP points out that: 
In a democratic society the role of the Legislature as a body reflecting the 
dominant opinion should be acknowledged. It is important that we bear in mind 
that there are functions that are properly the concern of the Courts and others 
that are properly the concern of the Legislature. At times these functions may 
overlap. But the terrains are in the main separate, and should be kept 
separate.153 
The determination of the proper boundaries of their constitutional function within 
which courts can decide public law or constitutional law as regards disputed 
questions, remain one of the considerable tests confronting courts.154 Kavanagh 
concedes that while judges have legal schooling and skills, they occasionally decide 
cases under questionable circumstances. However, unlike the legislature and the 
executive, their decisions might lack full consideration of economic and social 
background.155 Moreover, Kavanagh also asks the question:  
Should their relative lack of democratic legitimacy urge judges to be restrained 
when reviewing the decisions of the elected branches for compliance with 
fundamental rights.156  
Amongst the issues raised by Kavanagh with regard to judicial restraint is a question 
of ‘self-restraint’ which will enable “courts to define the limits of their role in 
constitutional adjudication and to determine the constitutionally appropriate degree 
of restraint.”157 This fundamental notion plays a significant role in constitution 
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adjudication and judicial review, and seems to be unstable, unpredictable and 
subjective. 
It appears that judicial restraint is not fully entrenched into section 2 of the South 
African Constitution.158 This could be the influence of the Canadian courts’ 
interpretation and construction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on 
the South African constitutional jurisprudence, as Du Toit argues.159 As discussed 
earlier, section 52 of the Canadian Constitution contains similar provisions as 
section 2 of the South African Constitution. Critics argue that it is because of these 
latter provisions of the Charter that the Supreme Court of Canada has continuously 
modified and brought up to date rights and freedoms contained in the Charter. 
Furthermore, the Charter as provided for in the Constitution is considered a ‘living 
tree’ by the Supreme Court of Canada, a factor which has led the court to include 
their own ‘adornments’ which occurred through modification and construction based 
on the courts’ personal, general, pecuniary and party standards.160 These authors 
also contend that because they are not similar to the legislature, the courts lack the 
facilities, fact-finding processes and the public consultations sessions needed to 
inform its decisions. Therefore, the argument continues, the courts are also not in a 
state of preparedness to undertake a full review of the numerous public policies, a 
position that the legislature can lay claim to.161 In addition, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decisions on disputed issues, namely, abortion, euthanasia and lesbian 
and gay rights were, according to the REAL Women of Canada, not determined 
according to the law, but very often on judges’ theoretical and philosophical views.162 
These outcomes were reached because, amongst other things, the constitutional 
supremacy of the Constitution principle has created an unrestrained judicial 
supremacy through its vague and far-reaching terms. 
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According to its critics, the Canadian Supreme Court possesses ‘absolute power’ 
which origin can be traced back to the provisions of section 52 of the Charter. When 
the Charter was enacted in 1982, it was never the intention of the legislature that 
the courts would possess such power, but that: 
…judges of the Supreme Court of Canada were invited aboard the Ship of State 
to join with the legislators, both provincial and federal, to co-pilot the Ship 
through our nation’s perilous waters.163  
The legislature never contemplated that the courts would be the final adjudicators 
of the accuracy of the legislature’s policies and decisions. It was envisaged, 
however, that judges would acknowledge the policies enacted by the elected public 
representatives, and be part of government.164 What has caused this change in the 
court’s thinking? The cause of this state of constitutional dilemma may be described 
in the following terms: 
Once on board the Ship, however, the courts quickly changed this 
understanding and took over. Judges relegated the legislators to the lower deck 
to ‘stoke the engines’ of government by passing legislation to move the Ship 
forward - but only on the basis that the legislation be subjected to the approval 
of the appointed judges.165 
It has been argued that the belief that only the courts can decide on the correctness 
of the elected representatives’ decisions must be rejected because judges have no 
exceptional skills and training better than the legislature to interpret and construct 
the human rights values contained in the broad and poorly detailed Charter.166 It is 
difficult to see how the South African Constitutional Court can be immune from 
similar attacks because section 2 of the Constitution, as was shown above, enjoins 
judges, to interpret or know the constitutional values section 2 seek to guarantee. 
For this task, they need to be equipped with training and skills to decide on the 
correctness or validity of legislation properly enacted by the elected legislature.  
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Lincoln’s167 view comprehensively disagrees with the South African Constitutional 
Court’s standpoints in the Masiya and Satchwell decisions regarding its powers to 
invalidate laws enacted by the legislature. Lincoln’s views also question the nature 
and constitutionality of our separation of powers doctrine, and what is considered to 
be the legitimate role of the judiciary. 
 
1.6 Summary  
In this chapter, the need for the separation of powers doctrine and its place in South 
African jurisprudence were outlined. This chapter also put forward an outline of the 
determined research problem; the hypotheses upon which the questions of the 
study are based, and the objectives of the study. 
The doctrine of separation of powers is a term used to describe a concept where 
governments’ powers are divided amongst three branches, which are the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. However, this doctrine is ambiguous and 
contains unrealistic features, as discussed especially in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 
above. One of the ambiguities surrounding this doctrine is, as expressed by Verkuil, 
that there are so many different origins of the doctrine, that it is difficult to trace its 
historical lineage.  
In South Africa, despite the fact that the term ‘separation of powers’ does not appear 
in the Constitution, according to the Constitutional Court in In re: Certification of the 
Constitution, the doctrine forms part of our new constitutional system. This 
perception is also shared by O’Regan who states that the doctrine not only forms 
part of the South African constitutional system but the Constitution also provides 
suitable checks and balances which, according to her, still need to be further 
developed. Mojapelo J supports the view that the Constitution provides and 
guarantee the concept of separation of powers. He argues that the doctrine’s origin 
can be traced back to John Locke despite overwhelming evidence that 
Montesquieu’s writings on the doctrine was its origin. 
                                                          
167  Entin 1990 Ohio State LJ 215. See also Chapter 2 footnote 247.  
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In South African jurisprudence, the concept of separation of powers has been tested 
in various ways. For example, the Constitutional Court, per Ackermann J in the Dodo 
case, has decided that mandatory minimum sentences which take away the courts’ 
sentencing discretion were compatible with this doctrine, as well as the 
constitutional judicial independence of the courts as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
This notion is also shared by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Malgas case, as 
well as other cases briefly mentioned in paras 1.2 and 1.5.5 above. Nevertheless, 
South African courts have reached divergent views on the constitutionality of the 
mandatory minimum sentences, where the mandatory minimum sentencing 
legislation was criticised as not only overstepping the limits of the political branches, 
but also because it was articulated that the legislature has reduced the court to be 
its ‘rubber stamps’.  
Section 173 of the South African Constitution provides that the courts have the 
power to develop laws when in the courts’ determination such an extension of the 
law would be in the interests of justice. However, the development of the law by 
making use of the interests of justice approach has been rejected by the Hong Kong 
Law Reform Commission as being too open-ended and too subjective, as evidence 
in paragraph 1.5.5. Moreover, section 2 of the South African Constitution - which 
guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution - also enjoins the courts to decide the 
validity of laws enacted by the legislature. Similar provisions in the Canadian 
Constitution have been disapproved of as giving the courts too much power to 
invalidate legislation enacted by a majority-elected legislature, and giving the courts 
the power to readjust Canadian laws so as to suit the judges’ own philosophical and 
ideological views. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison had decided in 1803 
that the courts, as a government branch, have the task to state what the law is. This 
decision by the court has, according to some critics, created the impression that the 
Supreme Court is seen as the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution. This view 
has not been accepted across the board. Similar to the United States, in Canada 
there has been disapproval of the constitutionality of the courts’ powers to invalidate 
laws enacted by the legislature. According to some advocates of judicial restraint, 
judges as appointed by the political branch should not have the power to rewrite 
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laws based on their personal subjective opinions because they do not have any 
superior or special understanding and insight as to public policy that the elected 
legislators do not possess.  
Section 52 of the Canadian Constitution does not provide that courts, while 
determining that all laws are compatible with the Charter, should do so with restraint. 
This ambiguity, it is further argued, was occasioned by what could be the broadly 
and vaguely drafted ground-breaking constitutional provisions in the Charter, as 
section 52 had unintendedly put the courts in control of setting public policy – so 
much so that courts can be regarded as a second-level legislature. These latter 
criticisms of section 52 can without any doubt also be levelled against our own 
section 2 of the Constitution which seems to be crudely drafted while providing the 
courts with far-reaching powers. 
This chapter briefly touched on the historical background of the separation of powers 





SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL FUNCTION: 
ORIGINS AND CHALLENGES 
2.1 Introduction 
The introductory chapter briefly dealt with the ambiguity of the separation of powers 
doctrine which divides governmental functions amongst three branches: the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Amongst these different arms of 
government, the judiciary is distinct in that it is consciously selected, it is cautiously 
preserved, and also in that its members are not nominated by majority vote.1 The 
unrepresentativeness of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy prescribes its 
powers and demonstrates its restrictions at the same time.2 Given that the judiciary’s 
role is to function as an efficient checker and enforcer of counter-majoritarian 
constitutional values as opposed to the representative branches, its morality and 
independence must be protected from being weakened by those branches.3  
It is submitted that judges alone seem not to pose any threat to the ideal of freedom, 
but judges who are not insulated from the other branches of government present a 
danger to constitutional rights. At the core of what seems to be judges’ primary 
impediment is the fact that, because they are unelected, their powers are limited, 
resulting in a weakened constitutional role.4 However, since the judiciary is an 
                                                          
1  Redish 1989 DePaul LR 302. By ‘unrepresentativeness’ is meant that the judiciary does not 
reflect the makeup of society. 
2  Redish 1989 DePaul LR 302. See Redish and Drizin 1987 NYU LR 17: “The judiciary is … 
obligated to invalidate actions of the majoritarian branches that exceed constitutional limits.” 
Redish and Drizin add that: “The judiciary derives no logical authority to invalidate the actions 
of the legislative or executive branches on grounds other than inconsistency with constitutional 
dictates.”  
3  Redish 1989 DePaul LR 302. According to Hamilton The Federalist Papers No 78 236: “It proves 
incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of 
power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is 
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks … from the natural feebleness of the 
judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate 
branches”. The warning at 236 is that although the judiciary does not present any threat to the 
political rights of the constitution, this can only continue if the judiciary remains truly separate 
from both the legislature and the executive.  
4  Redish 1989 DePaul LR 302. 
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unrepresentative branch, it is significant that its role and purpose be circumscribed 
to the performance of the conventional judicial function of adjudication, in order to 
avoid the judiciary to be in a position to take over the role and authority of the political 
branches.5 
The discussion in this chapter will probe the origin, rationale and scope of the 
separation of powers doctrine, especially focussing on the judicial function. This will 
firstly necessitate an examination of the values and tenets which this doctrine seeks 
to safeguard, and its function in the constitutional democratic system of the 
government that produced it. Furthermore, the chapter will also review the inherent 
weaknesses and ambiguities which are embedded into this doctrine in the South 
African jurisprudence, and its scope and meaning in the context of judicial function. 
The discussion will also examine the extent of the application of this doctrine by 
South African courts, as well as its development during the past decades. Lastly, 
this research will investigate whether the judicial functions as provided in the South 
African Constitution are comprehensible and conclusive, and interpreted correctly. 
Foreign jurisprudence on this doctrine, and judicial constitutional review will be 
examined in order to provide a holistic view on the doctrine’s role in a constitutional 
democracy. What follows is a discussion of the historic origins and development of 
this doctrine, and how this has moulded the South African constitutional 
interpretation. 
2.2  The origins and rationale of the separation of powers doctrine 
At the outset, the first question is how and why the notion of separation of powers 
came about. In this regard, its biblical origins will be considered. Furthermore, three 
                                                          
5  Redish 1989 DePaul LR 302. Hamilton expressed a concern that the judiciary should not replace 
the will of the politically accountable legislative and executive branches with its own. He 
observed that “the courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to 
exercise will instead of judgement, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their 
pleasure to that of the legislative body” Hamilton The Federalist Papers No 78 236-237. Madison 
seems to be in accord with these views expressed by Hamilton where he quotes the French 
philosopher Montesquieu: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body … there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. … 
Were the power of judging with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor” See Madison 
The Federalist Papers No 47 103. 
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foreign countries, viz. the United States, Canada and Britain will be observed as to 
the development and formulation of their separation of powers doctrine. Finally, it 
will also be examined how this doctrine was adopted into the South African legal 
system as part of British law, as well as the reason for its existence. South Africa, 
Canada and the United States have historical ties to Britain, and as a result have 
inherited Britain’s common law. Hence the origins and the development of this 
doctrine in these countries will be examined. 
In order to answer the questions above, it is inevitable to deliberate on the major 
phases of the historical origins of the separation of powers doctrine, and its 
development which seem to have moulded its contemporary relevance and 
application. 
2.2.1 The biblical origins of the separation of powers 
Levinson traces the historical origins of the separation of powers back to the Bible, 
and argues that the input of the Bible “to law and public debate”6 and to the 
development of this doctrine cannot be disputed. He further points out that the legal 
premise of the Book of Deuteronomy provides a framework for the administration of 
the state where separation of powers guarantees the delineation and determination 
of the different branches of state. He asserts that the legal framework enshrined in 
Deuteronomy guarantees an independent judiciary, while at the same time 
determining the legal boundaries within which the monarch’s authority can be 
exercised. Levinson considers this legal framework to be unparalleled in history 
because: 
Two of its cornerstones are fundamental to the modern idea of constitutional 
government: (1) the clear division of political powers into separate spheres of 
authority; and (2) the subordination of each branch to the authority of the law. 
This legislation was so utopian in its own terms that it seems never to have been 
implemented; instead, idealism rapidly yielded to political pragmatism. 
Nevertheless, Deuteronomy’s draft constitution provides an important corrective 
to standard accounts of constitutional legal history.7 
                                                          
6  Levinson 2006 Cardozo LR 1854. 
7  Levinson 2006 Cardozo LR 1853. Levinson adds that at 1858: “In literary terms, the core of 
Deuteronomy is found in the legal corpus of chapters 12-26, which contains a blend of religious, 
political, civil, and criminal law. That legislation is embedded in a literary frame, in which 
chapters 1-11 recall events of the exodus, including the revelation at Sinai and the proclamation 
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Levinson also points out that Moses did not only set out the extent and scope of the 
idea of constitutional government in this book, but has, in addition, stipulated the 
attributes of a judicial officer as “men who are wise, discerning, and 
knowledgeable”.8  
2.2.2 The historical origins and structure of the separation of powers in Britain 
The British thought that they have been bequeathed what certain classical Greek 
and Roman philosophers termed a “mixed regime”.9 Vile describes a “mixed regime” 
as one that incorporates components of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy with 
the objective of utilising the “best features of each of those pure regime types while 
avoiding the worst”.10 According to the proponents of a mixed regime, rule by a single 
person had the benefit of presenting strength in foreign policy, in conducting a war, 
and in resisting influential internal matters.11 However, rule by one person had the 
drawback that it commonly declined into dictatorship.12 Rule by a small number of 
people had the advantage that the most enlightened and high-principled might rule.13 
At the same time, rule by a small number of people had the disadvantage that it 
could unquestionably decline into a “self-interested and corrupt oligarchy”.14 Rule by 
all of the people had value in that it advanced independence, and at the same 
maintained sound judgement into policymaking.15 However, it had the shortcoming 
that it as well could decline into a mob government, which constitutes a “tyranny of 
the many”.16 Aristotle is considered the first constitutional proponent to argue 
                                                          
of the Ten Commandments. Following the legal corpus, Deuteronomy continues with 
ceremonies to ratify the covenant and to enforce obedience to it (26:16-28:68); the 
commissioning of Joshua as the successor of Moses with emphasis upon the legislation of 
Deuteronomy as a covenant equal in importance to that of the Ten Commandments (29:1-
32:52); and finally, a poetic blessing of the twelve tribes of Israel as a form of last will and 
testament by Moses, along with a prose account of the death of Moses (33:1-34:12)”.  
8  Levinson 2006 Cardozo LR 1870. See Deuteronomy 1:13 where Moses said: “Choose wise, 
understanding, and knowledgeable men from among your tribes …”. 
9  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 529. See Bederman The classical foundations of 
the American Constitution 220-221; Richard The founders and the classics 123-57; Wood The 
creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 11. 
10  Vile Constitutionalism 33-52. See also Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
11  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
12  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
13  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
14  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
15  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
16  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
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prescriptively for the idea of a mixed regime. He was in favour of a constitutional 
structure where social class held dominance.17 Aristotle recognised a mixed regime 
as the true forms of government where authority was invested in “the one, or the 
few, or the many, [that] govern with a view to the common interest”18 as being the 
best regime that would realistically be obtainable. 
The benefit of a mixed regime that incorporates the control of the one, the few, and 
the many was that the three distinct social groups denoted by the monarch, the 
aristocrats, and the commoners, could monitor and balance each other, with a view 
of enhancing the prospects that each social group would govern justifiably.19 
Governing authority was separated in a mixed regime instead of such power being 
consolidated into the hands of one social group.20 It was for this reason that Aristotle, 
Polybius, Cicero, Aquinas, and Machiavelli all highly rated the notion of a mixed 
regime.21 The mixed regime, with its components of checks and balances, became 
the origin of the separation of powers doctrine.22 The separation of powers idea and 
the mixed regime theory both share a similar proposition that “power tends to corrupt 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.23  
During the seventeenth century, the notion of the mixed regime seemed to be 
eminent in political beliefs.24 From 1640 and until the eighteenth century, many 
British thought that Britain was a form of Aristotelian mixed regime. It was believed 
that the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons individually stood for 
the three huge domains of the British social order – “the one, the few, and the 
                                                          
17  Aristotle Politics 49, 57. 
18  Aristotle Politics 61. 
19  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
20  Calabrasi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530. 
21  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 530 -531. Classical Sparta, the Roman Republic 
(509 BC - 44 BC), Venice (697 AD - 1797 AD) were regarded as prime examples of mixed 
regimes. 
22  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 531. Aristotle may have anticipated the separation 
of powers when he wrote that: “All constitutions have three elements… When they are well-
ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they differ from one another, constitutions differ. 
There is one element which deliberates about public affairs; secondly that concerned with the 
magistrates – the question being, what they should be, over what they should exercise authority, 
and what should be the mode of electing to them; and thirdly that which has judicial power” 
Aristotle Politics 100. Aristotle never really develops this insight nor does he talk about the 
importance of keeping these three functions separate and balanced with one another.  
23  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 531. See also Dalberg-Acton Essays on freedom 
and power xi, xv, xlviii; 364. 
24  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 532. 
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many”.25 All three domains were inferior under the law to the classical constitution of 
King Edward, the Confessor. Supreme power remained in the ‘king-people’ as a unit 
which could make decrees.26 It was because of this legal order that the king or his 
judges had no authority to dispute, to remove or judicially review laws enacted by 
parliament, as the king-in-parliament had absolute power when laws were 
accepted.27 
It was this government that Montesquieu observed on his visit to Britain in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. He based his government constitutional 
structure, which is built on the rule of law, on this scheme of discerned British 
government.28 In order to fully appreciate the nature, meaning and development of 
his doctrine, further discussion is necessitated.  
2.2.1.1 Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers 
Montesquieu, in L’ espirit des lois (The spirit of laws), illustrates his well-known 
tripartite codification of power, and theory of checked separation in a section titled 
‘Of the Constitution of England’.29 Montesquieu claimed that government’s authority 
must be partitioned amongst political actors in such a way that the power of these 
actors to irrefutably determine their own authority is curtailed. The “direct end”30 of 
such an establishment was distinctly political liberty, through which Montesquieu 
                                                          
25  Aristotle Politics 61; Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 532.  
26  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 532. See Goldsworthy The sovereignty of parliament 
9, where he argues that the idea is that the King acted together with the aristocracy and the 
common people. The King-in-Parliament was sovereign because it represented the three great 
estates of society. Today in Britain, the Monarch is a cipher, as is the House of Lords; the 
sovereignty of the Queen-in-Parliament means, in practice, the sovereignty of the House of 
Commons. At 25 Goldsworthy adds that: “The King’s power to make Acts of Parliament, with 
the assent of the Lords and Commons, is ‘the most sovereign and supreme power above all 
and controllable by none.’”  
27  Calabresi et al 2012 Northwestern Univ LR 532. 
28  Shackleton Montesquieu: a critical biography 285: “the inclusion in L’Esprit des Lois of the essay 
on the British constitution involved a physical incorporation of one manuscript, on different paper 
and in different hands, in the other. … Most of the chapter as it now stands was written soon 
after Montesquieu’s return from his travels, and under the immediate inspiration of British 
political life”. 
29  Montesquieu offered the first widely recognised articulation of the separation of powers doctrine 
as it is understood today.  
30  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 195-196, 198-199, 212. Montesquieu states that: “…political 
liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom” (196) and “The political liberty of the subject is 
a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this 
liberty, it is a requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of 
another” (198).  
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signified freedom from the fear that power will be exercised arbitrarily.  
Montesquieu inscribed that: “In every government, there are three sorts of power”.31 
The power to make laws stretched out to all law-making inclusive of initial making 
of law, reforms, and abrogation. The executive authority consisted of two distinct 
parts, namely, which he termed the executive under international law (“things 
dependent on the law of nations”) and the executive under domestic law (“matters 
that depend on the civil law”).32 The first-mentioned constituted the government’s 
powers on defence and foreign affairs. The last-mentioned, which was later called 
the power of judging, permitted decisions on determining punishment for criminals 
judging disputes.33 Montesquieu’s identification of executive power talked only of the 
considerations in which administration and implementation of government’s 
authority included separate decision-making.34 Consequently, he re-categorised the 
three types of power as the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.35 
In Britain, during that period in time, the three types of authority were performed 
largely by various actors. The ruler had no authority to give out unilateral laws or 
edicts controlling future behaviour.36 Legislative powers rested with the elected 
representatives of parliament.37 The executive power rested with the monarch.38 The 
power of adjudicating disputes rested with the juries.39 
Montesquieu’s unique discernment, which progressed from Locke’s legislative-
                                                          
31  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 198.  
32  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 198. 
33  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 198-199. 
34  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 200-201, 206-208; Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
421, 422, 424. 
35  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 198. Though Montesquieu still viewed the legislative and 
executive powers as the two major branches of the government, he argued for a politically 
independent judiciary whose personnel would not be drawn from the legislative or executive 
branches of the government.  
36  Blackstone later noted that the monarch’s power of decree (which he called proclamation) was 
limited to subordinate provision for implementing enacted law. See Blackstone Commentaries 
on the laws of England 271.   
37  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 205-206. Montesquieu elaborates that: “a representative should 
be elected by the inhabitants” (202), and: “The legislative power is, therefore, committed to the 
body of the nobles, and to that which represents the people; each having their assemblies and 
deliberations apart, each their separate views and interests” (204). The legislative body consists 
of two houses or parts that “check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting” (209). 
38  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 205. 
39  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 97, 208. 
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executive dichotomy,40 was that judging disputes is a unique forerunner to executing 
law, and in Britain that forerunner rested in the unattached realm of the juries. It was 
in these latter customs that the three tasks of legislating, executing and judging were 
“fundamentally distinguishable”,41 and Montesquieu could claim that their basic use 
in Britain had been partitioned. 
The representatives or functionaries of the monarch were empowered to administer 
law, yet in the event of disagreement about facts, the juries were gathered to use 
their power of adjudicating. Adjudicating did not entail complicated law; it included 
determining which litigant was truthful. Judging was different from making laws 
specifically because it did not entail enacting rules for forthcoming cases.42 
Montesquieu’s own judging knowledge in France resulted in him not conceding that 
British courts, as part of their function, might have to decide “disputes about what 
the law meant”.43 He, however, observed that under monarchies, laws might not be 
plain and certain, and then judges might be tasked, as part of their function, to 
investigate their spirit. Yet the “nearer a government approaches towards a republic, 
the more the manner of judging becomes settled and fixed”.44 At the time, the British 
system of government was transforming from a monarchy “in which a single person 
governs by fixed and established laws” to a republic “in which the body, or only a 
part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power”.45 Montesquieu pointed out 
that: 
In republics, the very nature of the constitution requires the judges to follow the 
letter of the law; otherwise, the law might be explained to the prejudice of every 
citizen, in cases where their honour, property, or life, are concerned. At Rome, 
                                                          
40  See Locke Second treatise of government 62-71. Locke envisioned a two-fold division of 
government powers between the executive, which had the executive and foreign affairs powers, 
and the legislature, which had law-making power. See Locke The second treatise 72-73. 
41  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 422. 
42  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 421-422. 
43  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 422. As the présidents à mortier of the Parlement 
of Bordeaux, a youthful Montesquieu had adjudicated some disputes, which he found mind-
numbing. Unlike the British common law, the French civil law customs provided not much scope 
for judging inventiveness, and left Montesquieu with the impression that judging is largely fact-
finding, and an application of decided and clear rules to the facts so established. See Claus 
2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 420-421; Shackleton Montesquieu: a critical biography 
17-19. 
44  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 96-97. 
45  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 9. This transformation ensued because of an already growing 
disapproval of a system where the same government agent would have various powers which 
extended beyond what it should be as regards its function within the context of the separation 
of powers. See Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 424-425. 
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the judges had no more to do than to declare that the person accused was guilty 
of a particular crime, and then the punishment was found in the laws, as may be 
seen in diverse laws still extant. In England, the jury give their verdict, whether 
the fact, brought under their cognizance, be proved or not; if it be proved, the 
judge pronounces the punishment inflicted by the law, and for this he needs only 
to open his eyes.46 
The British legislator was an elected and delegated body, and in this way “the 
national judges are no more than a mouth that pronounces the words of the law, 
mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour”.47 
Montesquieu also observed that:  
…though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such 
a degree, as to ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the 
private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society without exactly 
knowing the nature of their obligations.48 
The principle of legal certainty, which is a fundamental concept in British law, seems 
to be part of Montesquieu’s observations of the British legal system. Judges’ 
decisions were not intended to be premised on judges’ private opinions, but on the 
“letter of the law”.49 This judicial function comprised in determining the facts, and 
was partitioned from the executive, and given to juries. The employment of the term 
‘judge’ to portray the executive agent who administers the law when adjudging 
contested facts was more a matter of consideration than of characterisation.50  
For Montesquieu, the brilliance of the British scheme of government rested in 
integrating separation with monitoring because: 
Political liberty is to be found in only moderate governments; and even in these 
it is not always found. It is there only where there is no abuse of power: but 
constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to 
abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though 
true, to say, that virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is 
necessary, from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power. A 
government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things 
to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the 
law permits.51 
                                                          
46  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 97. 
47  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 208. Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 423 agrees: 
“This was as it should be”. 
48  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 201. 
49  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 97. 
50  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 437-438, 445. 
51  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 197. 
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A scheme of government founded on separate systems engaging in principally 
distinct governmental activities was preferable, as long as there was only one 
mechanism available for each of the activities.52 There would be no threat of legal 
confusion if there was only one way of legislating or making laws. So long as there 
is a single executive authority, the law would be carried out, and effected equally 
and fairly. In order to show that the British legal system rendered power to various 
actors directly, and not according to hierarchy, Montesquieu believed that he had to 
portray the acts of those actors as “essentially different”.53 However, the British 
separation of powers seemed maintainable because it did not offer more than one 
conclusive manner for whichever specific type of power to be used. It was solely 
parliament that had law-making power, even though parliament was monitored by 
the monarch’s authority to veto legislation, which provided a form of safeguard for 
the separation of law-making and executive authority.54 Only the monarch had the 
autonomous authority to enforce and administer law, but his executive authority was 
kept in check by parliament, largely by parliament’s unique authority to tax, and to 
seize the revenue to finance the executive’s tasks.55 The separate and independent 
power of judging was equally checked, as Montesquieu noted that: “It is possible 
that the law, which is clear-sighted in one sense, and blind in another, might, in 
some cases, be too severe”.56 The concept of judicial power thus seems to have 
been subjected to checks and balances by the other branches of government at this 
time. 
Montesquieu commented on the exercise of the core function of judicial power in 
the context of constitutionally restrained judicial law-making, and its nature within 
the idea of separation of powers as follows: 
There is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative 
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. 
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and 
oppression.57 
                                                          
52  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 426. 
53  Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 426, 442. 
54  Montesquieu The spirit of laws, 198, 204. 
55  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 204, 209-210; Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 426. 
56  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 208; Claus 2005 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 426. 
57  Montesquieu The spirit of laws 199.  
48 
 
In addition, the justification for the partitioning of power was, according to 
Montesquieu, to safeguard the litigants in the disputes before the courts.58 
Supposing that the judge can make the law, then the litigants would be subjected to 
arbitrary control, because the judge or arbitrator “might change the rules of the fight 
mid-way”.59 Supposing that the arbitrator was vested with executive powers, then 
the litigants in the dispute involving the executive branch of government might be 
without any remedy. However, these apprehensions seem to have been foreseen 
and safeguarded against when chapter 39 of the Magna Carta was drafted, 
providing that the barons would be subjected to a jury system, and forfeitures only 
by the judgement of peers or the law of the land.60 
As claimed by Montesquieu, the justification for Britain’s separation of powers in the 
midst of numerous actors was to optimise freedom.61 The more impediments that lie 
in the way of whichever actor’s use of authority, it would not be so probable that the 
authority will be abused: “a fortiori the less likely power is to be exercised badly”.62 
The separation of powers may consequently restrain any actor from unanswerably 
extending the scope of his own powers.63 Similarly, the more integrity of an intended 
use of authority, the more probable that use of authority could be constitutionally 
valid and incorruptible. The separation of powers may thus enhance sincerity in its 
use, by finding the solution to disagreements in areas of concern.64 
There has been much debate over Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of 
powers, especially his so-called misapprehensions, and their current application in 
modern-day democracies. A short overview on the critique of Montesquieu’s writings 
on the separation of powers follows below. 
 
2.2.1.2 Critique of Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers 
It has been averred by some critics that Montesquieu misunderstood the British legal 
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principles, amongst others, the nature of the common law and “how the English 
common law had been formed through deference to precedent”.65 Montesquieu’s 
doctrine of separation of powers stems from these misconceptions: 
When Montesquieu wrote L’Esprit des Lois and articulated the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers, he thought he was describing the British Constitution. He 
wasn’t. He described what appeared to be its structure, and failed to notice the 
efficient secret of how the Westminster constitution operated in the real world. 
The American revolutionaries had read Montesquieu, and when they drew up 
the Constitution of the United States of America they faithfully followed his 
constitutional prescription, thinking that it was a guarantee of long term good 
government.66 
Claus argues that there is no truth in Montesquieu’s claim that “this constitution 
could best be achieved, and had been achieved in Britain, by assigning three 
fundamentally different governmental activities to different actors”.67 This 
misunderstanding seems to be rooted in two flaws. The first was speculative; the 
second, both speculative and experimental.68 Firstly, Montesquieu’s reasoning was 
influenced by early eighteenth century teaching that no autonomous or independent 
authority could workably be partitioned. Montesquieu was correct in assuming that 
freedom from dictatorial use of power would be achieved by separating power 
among numerous political branches, subject to “supervisory checks designed to 
protect the primary separation”,69 although he believed that the separation of power 
could be exclusively exercised on essentialist terms.70 This, according to Claus, is 
his biggest flaw. Montesquieu could have more authentically portrayed the British 
separation of power as follows:  
Why did he not simply say that dividing government power among multiple 
actors might promote liberty, especially if every exercise of power ultimately 
depended on the approval of multiple actors? In other words, why did he 
characterize the British model as a checked separation of different kinds of 
power, rather than simply as power-sharing? Why try to distinguish primary 
exercise of power from participatory ones?71  
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Making laws could be divided from executing laws, yet neither of these types of 
power could internally be permanently separated. There was in Montesquieu’s 
analysis a “protective qualification to a primary essentialist separation”,72 where 
government actors in the different branches exercised more than one kind of 
authority. However, he fell short of appreciating that the involvement of several 
government officials in all issues of authority, even though some individuals may be 
involved in more than one kind of power, could constitute “the true protection against 
arbitrariness”.73 The nature of separation of powers in Britain at that time was not 
along strictly essentialist lines. It was only through checks and balances that 
different government employees could be restrained “from conclusively determining 
the reach of their powers”,74 and not the essentialist separation of activities. The 
crucial yardstick for separation of powers is not whether there are different kinds of 
powers, but whether separation will restrain different individuals from decisively 
establishing the extent of their own power.75 
Secondly, Montesquieu identified in France’s monarchical system of government a 
considerable danger that the law might be ambivalent, and that courts’ decisions 
could, in turn, subscribe to that state of uncertainty.76 However, he failed to 
understand the character of the British common law which is premised on the belief 
that at the core of the law, the concept of precedent constituted a foundation for 
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authoritative judicial interpretation of prevailing law.77 This factual misconception has 
resulted in him differentiating and trifling the “British judicial function as merely the 
ad hoc determination of disputed facts”.78 By focusing only on the congregated juries 
function of fact-finding, and that juries had no authority “beyond the case in which 
they served,”79 Montesquieu floundered in understanding the legislative nature of 
British judicial interpretation.80 In other words, Montesquieu failed to understand that 
the British common-law principle of precedent meant that judges are bound by 
previous court decisions when interpreting laws; a process which constitutes law-
making in its own right.81 Judicial law-makers advance their authority demonstrating 
regard for stare decisis.82 Methodical regard for this latter doctrine is what moulds 
judgments into law-making.83 
Finally, it is argued that “separation from the legislature does not stop the rules being 
made up by a judge through exposition. Thus separation of those who adjudicate 
law from formal law making bodies is pointless”.84 Why this distinction is trivial, is 
because:  
In either case the change is retroactive. And either case presents an equal risk 
of unprincipled discrimination, against which other constitutional safeguards 
may be necessary. A judge may be as likely to change the rules mid-stream 
through exposition, and can do so just as readily, whether he also legislates in 
another way or not.85 
While the doctrine of precedent does not subject official legislation to its scrutiny, it 
remains an unsuitable method of adjudication, and informed constitutional 
commentators will reject its use for that reason.86 This doctrine also forms the 
remnants of what could be the pre-realist goal of “fundamental principles of law; 
                                                          
77  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 420, 431. 
78  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 420, 432. 
79  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 432. 
80  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 421-422. 
81  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 433: “If Montesquieu had understood that the British courts decided 
questions of law, and that their answers to those questions constituted law, how would he have 
categorised that function within his tripartite schema?”. 
82  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 435. Claus comments at 435: “Until 1966, the Law Lords did not 
acknowledge that they might ever overrule prior decisions, in striking contrast to the United 
States Supreme Court’s wholesale overruling of Lochner-era precedent during the preceding 
decades. And dual-track lawmakers need no less able craftsmen of precedent than are solely-
judicial lawmakers”. 
83  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 435. 
84  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 434. 
85  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 434. 
86  Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 434. 
52 
 
which, though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe”.87 The 
above misperceptions are reflected in some jurisdictions’ notions about the 
separation of powers; a prime example being the United States. As such, the 
historical origins of the doctrine in selected jurisdictions will be focused on next, 
beginning with the United States. 
2.2.3 The historical origins and structure of the separation of powers in the United 
States 
According to Calabresi et al,88 the American idea of the constitutional separation of 
powers stems from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain, and colonial 
American constitutionalism. During these periods, the British and American 
colonists had much faith in their Constitution, and assumed it to be “world’s best”.89 
The United States settled on what they thought was a colonial form of the mixed 
regime. Each area (states) forming the United States had a royal governor who was 
chosen and assigned by the King of England, who, according to Calabresi et al: 
represented the interest of the One; a Governor’s Council, usually appointed by 
the Governor with King’s consent to advise him, who represented the interests 
of the Few; and a popularly elected lower House of the Colonial Legislature, 
which represented the interests of the Many and most especially the interests of 
those who paid taxes.90 
It was during the period from 1607 to 1776 that the British political system of a mixed 
regime was replicated in the American colonies.91 However, the downfall of 
feudalism ended the notion of the mixed regime here. The American Revolution was 
grounded on “the idea that all men are created equal”,92 and it did not endorse a 
handed-down monarchy, aristocracy, or any other disparities of social grouping.93 
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All governing powers were to be in the hands of the many. After the Civil War in the 
1650s, and up to the period of the writings of Locke and Montesquieu, attempts were 
made by philosophers to establish a substitute for the mixed regime idea. This idea 
focused on the many entrusted with power to rule not to be condensed in any one 
person or institution, which in turn could be easily degenerated.94 The notion that 
emanated was “that it was desirable to separate functionally the legislative, the 
executive, and the judicial powers”.95 Calabresi et al confirm that the idea of 
separation of powers came into being in this jurisdiction as a system to take the 
place of the “Aristotelian and British Mixed Regime as a way of diffusing power once 
the fall of feudalism had made the British Mixed Regime unviable in the United 
States”.96  
Adams,97 a proponent of the British Constitution’s mixed regime, favourably 
appealed in the 1770s-1780s to bring about the adoption of separation of powers 
and a bicameral legislature, as he believed it would result in a contemporary 
democratized form of the mixed regime.98 Under Adams’ envisioned system of 
government, universally chosen presidents and governors would take the place of 
the King as the representative of the one. The Senate and the Supreme Court would 
take the place of the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and the Court of Star 
Chamber as the representatives of the aristocratic or oligarchic few. Lastly, the 
widely-voted-for House of Representatives would take the place of the House of 
Commons as the “people’s special branch with the Power of the Purse”.99 This 
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practical separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers is reflected in the 
United States Constitution of 1787, which Adams had assisted to draft, although it 
was complimented by a Madisonian scheme of checks and balances.100 The 
President was entrusted with the function of law-making because of his veto 
power.101 The Senate was entrusted with implementing the law such as the approval 
of treaties; a power which the British Parliament did not have.102 The Supreme Court 
and the other federal courts were entrusted with the administrative authority to 
“issue writs of mandamus to federal executive officials”,103 powers which only the 
Court of King’s Bench or the Court of Star Chambers performed in Britain. What was 
deemed the power of the many under the mixed regime has manifested in the United 
States as citizens directly electing members for the House of Representatives, the 
Senate and members of the Electoral College, who again elect the President of the 
United States.104 These governmental institutions are formed by officials who are 
chosen at once or indirectly by the people, whereon Calabresi et al remark that:  
In the United States, the Many rule because the Many get to pick the One and 
the Few in our democratized version of the British Mixed Regime.105 
The idea of separation of powers was based on the premise of “checked 
separation”:106  
The powers of government should be divided and balanced among several 
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without 
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being effectually checked and restrained by the others.107 
The framework of government that materialised from Philadelphia in 1787 when 
American founders met, was based on Montesquieu’s narrative of the British 
scheme: 
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated 
Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of 
politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most 
effectually to the attention of mankind.108 
The Philadelphia document duplicated Montesquieu’s doctrine in all systems but 
one.109 Montesquieu preferred that the legislative authority be entirely given to a 
representative branch consisting of two arms, as he envisioned a government 
structure which will replace the nobility with a more representative system.110 The 
executive authority was given to a single person, as Montesquieu had preferred,111 
and in this way the president replaced the king:112 
Montesquieu did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial 
agency in, or no control over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own 
words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, 
namely, Britain, can amount no more than this, that where the whole power of 
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power 
of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are 
subverted.113 
As to judicial power, the American framers resolved that there would be a grading 
of courts, with the Supreme Court vested with the authority of being the upper 
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court.114 According to Hamilton, judiciary power will have an “important constitutional 
check which the power of instituting impeachments in one part of the legislative 
body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give to that body upon the 
members of the judicial department … a complete security”.115 
The power of the legislative to monitor the judiciary was not received well by some 
judicial members. When Congress used its check authority over one member of the 
judiciary, namely, Chase J of the United States Supreme Court, an agitated Marshall 
CJ commented: 
According to the ancient doctrine a jury finding a verdict against the law of the 
case was liable to attaint; and the amount of the present doctrine seems to be 
that a Judge giving legal opinion contrary to impeachment. As, for convenience 
and humanity the old doctrine of attaint has yielded to the silent, moderate but 
not less operative influence of new trials, I think the modern doctrine of 
impeachment should yield to appellate legislature. A reversal of those legal 
opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with 
the mildness of our character than a removal of the Judge who has rendered 
them unknowing of his fault.116 
Marshall CJ was not satisfied with the legislature’s unrestrained power to keep 
check on the judiciary, that is, to conduct trial proceedings and in convicting Chase. 
The judicial authority at issue in this context seems to be the judicial power to 
interpret the Constitution or judicial review. These latter views are also evident in an 
1803 judgment, namely, Marbury v Madison,117 where it is remarked that: “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is”.118 Hamilton initially recommended that the judiciary: 
is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power and can 
never attack with success either of the two … though individual oppression may 
now and then proceed from the court of justice … the general liberty of the 
                                                          
114  United States Constitution Art III. 
115  Hamilton The Federalist Papers No 81 251. Hamilton asserts at 237: “A constitution is, in fact, 
and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the 
legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that 
which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the 
intention of their agents”. 
116  Beveridge The life of John Marshall Vol III177. 
117  5 US (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
118  5 US (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). On this point Claus 2005 Oxford JLS 430 asks: “How was a 
legislative check on the judiciary any more proximate a violation of the “celebrated” separation 
principle than was a legislative check on the executive or an executive check on the legislature? 
Was the judiciary somehow less in need of supervision?”. 
57 
 
people can never be endangered from that quarter, I mean so long as the 
judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.119  
On this idea, he quotes Montesquieu: “Of the three powers abovementioned, the 
judiciary is, in some measure, next to nothing”.120 However, Montesquieu relied on 
the scope of juries’ fact-finding function which was politically significant at the time. 
The use of judicial authority and the power of jury verdicts were for “judiciary matters 
only to the parties in dispute”,121 and the decisions only affected the freedom of the 
litigants in the dispute. Still, Montesquieu believed that even this power warrants to 
have limits and to be monitored. Hamilton again reasoned that the judging function 
did not warrant checks because non-litigants were not affected.122 It is however 
submitted that judging, as part of the tripartite doctrine of separation of powers, 
should have checks and balances among the executive and the legislative branch, 
but “they require cooperative participation in order for a power to be exercised at 
all”.123 Participatory checks and balances, the stare decisis doctrine and the principle 
of precedent all advance separation of powers under common law because: 
If the adjudicators of disputes between the executive government and the 
citizens were not separate from the executive government, then that government 
would conclusively determine the reach of its powers, and could do as it pleased. 
If the adjudicator of disputes concerning the reach of a legislative body’s powers 
were the legislative body itself, or some subset of that body, then the legislative 
body would likewise conclusively determine the reach of its powers, and could 
do as it pleased.124  
But how exactly did this particular United States system of separation of powers 
developed over the centuries into the three branches of government, each with their 
core functions? Congress - the legislative branch - carries out the function of 
“overseeing the execution of the law”125 or administrating the law, instead of law-
making. The extent of this constitutional dilemma is outlined as follows: 
The congressional committees are, in effect, a shadow of parliamentary 
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government that duplicates the presidential appointees in every policy area and 
that competes with the presidential appointees for the loyalty of the career 
bureaucracy. The only reason members of Congress do not demand that they 
themselves be appointed to the Cabinet and the sub-Cabinet is because the 
Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 forbids members of Congress from 
holding executive or judicial offices. … Congress has carved out for itself a huge 
role in law execution through oversight and appropriations processes. This is 
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, which does not specifically provide for 
legislative committees, and it is in important ways extra-constitutional. Congress 
has also claimed for itself extensive quasi-executive and quasi-judicial powers 
to investigate almost anything under the sun, and it claims that it can, in theory, 
have an officer of either house imprison a contumacious witness with no 
prosecution being brought by the Executive Branch and with no adjudication by 
the Judicial Branch.126 
Congress has delegated its law-making function to the President, who makes laws 
through “the issuing of executive orders, proclamations, or signing statements”.127 
The President is assisted in this function by officials of independent agencies, 
controlled through congressional oversight processes, or, alternatively, to legislative 
courts. This conduct by the Congress has resulted virtually in a displacement of the 
separation of powers by concentrating the executive and legislative authority in “a 
few officials who are under the control of a powerful committee or subcommittee”:128 
It is telling that these committees and subcommittees are often captured by 
representatives or senators from districts or states which have a strong local 
interest in the federal policy in question. Thus, we find members of Congress 
from farm states on the Senate and House Agriculture Committees and 
members from Wall Street on the Finance or Ways and Means Committees.129 
Moreover, the judiciary also carries out functions that go beyond its case 
adjudication role. The courts’ judicial review power is “broader than is called for to 
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decide the cases or controversies before them”.130 Judicial review in its current form 
may be traced back to the Marbury v Madison decision; however, it is argued that 
this case “established only that the judiciary would play an important role in 
constitutional interpretation, not that it would play the ultimate role”.131 It is asserted 
that Marshall CJ “claimed only that the Court must obey explicit commands of the 
Constitution in preference to conflicting laws when such commands are directed at 
the Court itself and not to another branch of government”.132 Marbury was intended 
to articulate a judicial review narrative which was limited, and not definitive. 
The Supreme Court’s unrestrained judicial review power is however evident in its 
decision in Roe v Wade,133 where the Court, in interpreting abortion legislation, 
usurped the law-making powers of Congress and the President. This case involved 
a pregnant single woman who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas criminal 
abortion laws on the ground that it improperly violated her rights to reproductive 
choices and privacy.134 The Court held that the abortion laws were unconstitutional 
because it violated the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.135 The Court, in this 
decision, did not only interpret the law, but also created law:  
When the Supreme Court issues an opinion mandating measures beyond the 
minimum requirements of the Constitution, it usurps the policymaking powers of 
Congress and the President. If the Court crafts its own general remedy for a 
constitutional violation, rather than simply declaring that a specific law or policy 
is unconstitutional, it limits the range of options from which Congress and the 
President may choose their own solution.136 
In such cases, it is argued that the courts’ judicial powers must be rejected as it is 
“acting like an oligarchy of the robe”.137 It has been suggested that this court usurped 
a judicial law-making role which has resulted in it becoming a policymaker in matters 
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concerning the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, as well as the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and other common-law rules, a document which the Court has 
composed.138 It cannot be disputed that the United States Constitution has granted 
judicial power to the courts, however, such power was not intended to entrust courts 
with law-making authority, as evident in Roe v Wade:  
The Supreme Court’s oligarchic rule exemplified in Roe v Wade is, is in our 
opinion, an improper reversion to the Mixed Regime antecedent. The current 
Supreme Court wields the oligarchic powers of the Privy Council, the Court of 
Star Chamber, and the House of Lords. This is improper in a true separation of 
powers regime.139 
Growing indecision regarding whether qualified judges, who had executive function 
in the execution of the law, used such law to the facts as determined by the juries 
was evident in American founders’ allowing judges to hold executive function under 
the Constitution.140 
It seems that over two centuries, all branches of government have drifted away from 
the ideal Montesquieu envisioned that would enable citizens’ liberty, and instead 
“they all exercised a blend of separation of powers”.141 While the United States 
Constitution was founded on the premise that government powers would be 
separated amongst the three departments, namely, the executive, the legislature, 
and the judiciary, because of the fear which existed during the founding period “the 
people, and not the institutions of government, are sovereign”.142 Troubled by the 
concentrated authority of the king, the power of government was apportioned. 
Apportioned power meant “fractured responsibility”.143 
It is immediately apparent that the representatives of the people were to be vested 
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with more authority than any of the other departments - as the Constitution starts 
with ‘We, the People’. It was assumed that not even the legislative institution would 
have powers which could extend beyond its constitutional powers to make laws.144 
Each branch was vested with specific powers, and each branch, in turn, obtained 
its “powers from the people, and those powers were subject to the limitation imposed 
by the constitutional grant of authority”:145  
‘We the People’ are the authority that propagates the Constitution, a master law 
which in turn establishes other authorities or offices which in turn propagate 
other laws … The Constitution distinguishes three great offices, powers or 
functions: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; and to them are 
assigned respectively three uses of practical reason: making of laws, the 
executing or administration of laws, and the adjudication of laws. Furthermore, 
the Constitution not only divides these functions but also separates them by 
making the institutions equal and independent.146  
All the different functions seem to have originally been vested with distinct 
comprehensive authority, for example, the judiciary’s core function is adjudicating 
laws, and not making laws. Separation of powers with its consequential checks and 
balances147 - as precautionary measures - were intended to safeguard government, 
and to protect against the misuse of power. Yet it seems that the doctrine “is purely 
negative, overboard, and non-selective. It blocks or hinders any use of power, 
however exercised, for whatever end or purpose, wise or unwise, legitimises good 
or bad”.148 This negativity may be premised on the specific standpoint as regards 
man and power as “it assumed that power corrupts”.149 Separation of powers 
consequently demonstrates a “sceptical opinion of people, government and 
authority which did not completely reconcile with buoyant Utopianism which 
emerged during 1776 when American Revolution has ended”.150 As expressed by 
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There was a great discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate 
the several governmental departments and the actual political practice the state 
governments followed. Its seems, as historians have noted, that Americans in 
1776 gave only a verbal recognition to the concept of separation of powers in 
their Revolutionary constitutions, since they were apparently not concerned with 
a real division of departmental functions.151 
It could be asked why the separation of powers is of so much importance. Why is it 
worth fighting for?152 Madison regarded the doctrine of vital significance: 
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary 
to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the 
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is 
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.153 
Madison envisioned a government with checks and balances with its origin in what 
could be termed a mixed regime in which “the King, the Lords, and the Commons 
all checked and balanced one another”.154 The framers of the United States 
Constitution had envisioned to substitute the oligarch and the mixed regime with a 
democratic government, but they had since changed mainly because of the 
unelected courts’ supremacy over the other branches of government. On the 
historical origins of the separation of powers, and the difficulties encountered over 
the past 200 years in the application of this doctrine, Calabresi et al conclude:  
Just as the Founding Fathers revolted against hereditary Kings and Lords, so 
too must present-day Americans revolt against rule by congressional 
committees, by independent agencies, and by judges. Americans did not fight 
and die in the Revolutionary War to be governed by an oligarchy. We need to 
revive the functional separation of powers.155 
The current state of separation of powers that vests judges and congressional 
committees with unrestrained powers in performing their functions; powers which 
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amount to rule over the people, attests to the flaws within this tripartite ideal. These 
criticisms levelled against the dysfunctional state of separation of powers in the 
United States can without any doubt be directed to its application, and the enormous 
powers given to judges under the South African Constitution, as it will be shown in 
the paragraph 2.2.5 below. Before the discussion on the separation of powers as 
found in South Africa, the jurisdiction of Canada will be focussed on. 
2.2.4 The historical origins and structure of the separation of powers in Canada 
In 1867, the British North American Act - which constituted the basis of the current 
Canadian Constitution - was passed, establishing the Dominion of Canada as a self-
governing part of the British Empire.156 The Act joined the provinces of Upper and 
Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick together into a single federal 
union. Other provinces would later join the Dominion.157 The federal legislature was 
mandated to legislate on all matters not explicitly assigned to the provincial 
legislatures. The British North America Act was an Act passed by the British 
Parliament, and could not be amended by the Canadian government - amendments 
had to be requested from Westminster.158 
On 11 December 1931, after decades of negotiations between Britain and the 
Dominion, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster, which 
transformed British rule over the Dominions, and put the Dominion of Canada on 
equal footing with the British parliament. This Statute put into effect the Balfour 
declaration of 1926, which affirmed that each dominion was both equal to the United 
Kingdom, and independent of it.159 This Statute marked the beginning of full 
legislative independence for the Dominion of Canada.160  
It took more than 50 years after gaining legislative independence for Canada to 
finally codify its current Constitution in 1982. The parliament of Canada and the 
provincial legislatures are able to amend the Constitution. The Constitution of 
Canada, which is also known as the Canadian Act 1982, codified and affirmed many 
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common-law rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This Charter had a 
pronounced effect in developing the separation of powers principle in Canada, which 
will be elaborated on below. 
Canada is a parliamentary system. According to the Constitution, the Canadian 
government is responsible to the House of Commons. The executive power is 
formally vested in the Queen, and is carried out by the Governor-General who is 
appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister.161 The legislative branch 
(parliament) formally consists of the Queen, the Senate, and the House of 
Commons. The highest court in Canada is the Supreme Court, which consists of 
nine justices. The Court was not created by the Canadian Constitution, but 
established by a separate Act.162 
The Constitution of Canada was designed on the British tradition of unwritten 
principles and conventions governing the exercise of legal authority to produce a 
constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy, and well as the American 
model of constitutional supremacy embodied in written legislative provisions.163 
There is “no general separation of powers in the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867”.164 
Yet, in recent years, the Canadian Supreme Court has elevated and developed the 
separation of powers to the level of a structural constitutional principle.165 The Court 
has, however, yet to formulate a comprehensive and sound account of the meaning, 
scope, and standardising effect of this principle.166  
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The path of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has changed direction significantly 
on the separation of powers issue.167 In the Provincial Court Judges Reference168 
case, Lamer CJ, writing for the majority of the Court, stated that the separation of 
powers - as a fundamental principle of the Canadian Constitution - “requires, at the 
very least, that some functions must be exclusively reserved to particular bodies”.169 
A year later, in approving its advisory jurisdiction in the case of Quebec Secession 
Reference,170 the Court maintained that  
…the Canadian Constitution does not insist on a strict separation of powers. 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures may properly confer other legal 
functions on the courts, and may confer certain judicial functions on bodies that 
are not courts. The exception to this rule relates only to section 96 courts.171 
In 2001, in Ocean Port Hotel, McLachlin CJ declared that the “traditional division 
between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary … [and the] … preservation 
of this tripartite constitutional structure”172 did not compel the extension of the 
constitutional guarantee of judicial independence to administrative tribunals.173 Yet, 
in 2002, in Babcock v Canada (Attorney General),174 McLachlin CJ found that the 
principles of rule of law, judicial independence, and the separation of powers had to 
be balanced with principle of parliamentary sovereignty: 
It is well within the power of the legislature to enact laws, even laws which some 
would consider draconian, as long as it does not fundamentally alter or interfere 
with the relationship between the courts and the other branches of 
government.175 
Binnie J, writing for the Court in Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid,176 held that 
the relationship between the legislature, the executive and the courts is a significant 
issue in the Canadian constitutional equilibrium.177 He went on to declare that 
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parliamentary privilege “is one of the ways that the fundamental constitutional 
separation of powers is respected”.178 
The operation of the principle of responsible government in a parliamentary system 
constitutes the crux of the view that the separation of powers does not extend to the 
legislative and executive branches of government in Canada. Any comparison with 
the United States Constitution is premised not only on the provisions of that 
Constitution, but also on certain assumptions as to how or how completely the 
principle of separation of powers operates amongst the three branches of the United 
States government.179 The principle of responsible government means that  
…the executive can only remain in power and fulfil its agenda while it has the 
support from a majority of the elected members of Parliament. If that support is 
lost, the executive falls and a new election is called. The continued operation of 
the government depends on legislative support of the executive agenda.180 
The question could be asked as to why the separation of powers remains an 
emerging constitutional principle in the recent jurisprudence of the Canadian 
Supreme Court. The preamble of the 1867 Canadian Constitution declares that 
Canada is to have a Constitution which would be similar in principle to that of the 
United Kingdom, which encompasses the principle of responsible government 
within the framework of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.181 
During the nineteenth century, Bagehot considered the description of the English 
Constitution - as dividing the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers, and 
vesting each branch “to a separate person or set of persons that no one of these 
can interfere with the work of the other”182 – to be erroneous. He went on to declare 
that the British Constitution could rather be described as “the close union, the nearly 
complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers”.183 He further added that a 
cabinet is a combining committee, a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the 
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legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state.184 In the case of Canada 
Assistance Plan Reference,185 Sopinka J, writing for an unanimous Supreme Court, 
expressly quoted Bagehot’s ‘hyphen-and-buckle’ metaphor to underline “the 
essential role of the executive in the legislative process of which it is integral part”.186 
Yet in the Canada Assistance Plan Reference187 case, Dickson CJ stated: 
It is of no avail to point to the fusion of powers which characterizes the 
Westminster system of government. That the executive through its control of a 
House of Commons majority may in practice dictate the position the House of 
Commons takes … is not … constitutionally cognizable by the judiciary.188 
In another case, that of Fraser,189 Dickson CJ confirmed that the separation of 
powers between the three branches of Canadian government - the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary - does exist.190 This assertion was acknowledged by 
Lamer CJ in Cooper,191 where he characterized the separation of powers as “one of 
the defining features of the Canadian Constitution”,192 and also in the case of 
Provincial Court Judges Reference, where the Court described the separation of 
powers as a fundamental principle that commands, amongst other things, “that the 
different branches of government only interact, as much as possible, in particular 
ways”.193 
The 1867 Constitution distinguishes between the ‘Executive Power’, the ‘Legislative 
Power,’ and the ‘Judicature’.194 Yet, whatever the Constitution gives in relation to the 
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separation of powers, it also takes away since the executive power is, by virtue of 
section 9, entrusted to the Queen. In terms of sections 17 and 91, the Queen is also 
a significant actor in the exercise of legislative authority.195 Under these provisions 
Her Majesty is one of the three bodies forming the Parliament of Canada, and it is 
the Queen under section 91 who makes laws for the peace, order, and good 
government of Canada, albeit by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and 
the House of Commons.196 
Since the advent of a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights, Canadian 
judges have become more knowledgeable in comparative constitutional law and the 
separation of powers.197 Further guidance was also provided by the codification of 
the 1982 Canadian Constitution, which recognised many common-law rights in the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.198 McLachlin J (as she then was) stated in 1993 in 
the New Brunswick Broadcasting case that the Canadian government’s branches 
consist of the Crown, the legislature, the executive and the courts: 
Our democratic government consists of several branches: The Crown, as 
represented by the Governor General and the provincial counterparts of that 
office; the legislative body; the executive; and the courts. It is fundamental to the 
working of government as a whole that all these parts play their proper role. It is 
equally fundamental that no one of them overstep its bounds, that each show 
proper deference for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other.199 
According to her, the Crown and the executive are different branches of government 
as a matter of constitutional law. The Crown is, in fact, the executive branch. Still, 
the idea of the separation of powers is clear in that each branch of government is 
urged to perform its proper function, and not to exceed its boundaries, thereby 
displaying appropriate deference for the other branches’ rightful domain of activity.200 
This excerpt demonstrates the necessity of maintaining a delicate balance in a 
constitutional democracy. That is the fundamental attraction of the principle of the 
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separation of powers, and the rationale why it would be useful to develop a more 
coherent theory of the separation of powers principle as it applies in the context and 
particularities of the Canadian constitutional system, which is a crossbreed of the 
United Kingdom’s and the United States’ models of constitutionalism.201 
The development of the doctrine of separation powers in Canada after the 
introduction of the Charter of Rights is also evident in the remarks of Lamer CJ in 
1997 where he stated that: 
What is at issue here is the character of the relationships between the legislature 
and the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. These 
relationships should be depoliticized. When I say those relationships are 
depoliticized, I do not mean to deny that they are political in the sense that court 
decisions (both constitutional and non-constitutional) often have political 
implications, and that the statutes which courts adjudicate upon emerge from 
the political process. What I mean instead is the legislature and executive 
cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political pressure on the judiciary, and 
conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise reserve in speaking 
out publicly on issues of general public policy that are or have the potential to 
come before the courts, that are the subject of political debate, and which do not 
relate to the proper administration of justice.202 
The de-politicisation of these relationships is very fundamental to the separation of 
powers. Hence, the provisions of the Canadian Constitution, such as section 11(d) 
of the Charter, must be interpreted in such a manner as to protect this principle.203 
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The pre-Charter courts were characterised by deference on the part of the judiciary 
towards elected politicians. On the contrary, the post-Charter courts drastically 
increased the frequency, scope, and strictness of judicial intervention in the sphere 
of legislative and executive action.204 The executive and the legislative branches 
adopted numerous policies that have the effect of hindering certain powers 
entrusted to the judiciary. The political branches have questioned the judiciary’s 
discretionary power through legislative enactments. Some attempts have been 
made to confine controversial issues to the executive branch through the expanded 
application of executive bodies and administrative-law functions. There have been 
more covert and long-term campaigns to redesign Canada’s decision-making 
bodies by manipulating the process in which decision-makers are appointed.205 
These strategies endanger the separation of powers, since they seek to centralise 
power, and remove what could be limited checks and balances within the Canadian 
system.206 
While separation of powers was not provided for in the British North America Act, 
1867; the 1982 Canadian Constitution seems not to have remedied this impasse. 
Furthermore, the recent development of this principle by the Canadian Supreme 
Court are somewhat marred by confusion, as the political branches and the 
Supreme Court have not formulated and articulated a coherent and comprehensive 
separation of powers’ principle. The Court’s jurisprudence has also veered 
significantly on this issue over the past decades. Such confusion is also replicated 
in the origins of the South African separation of powers, which will be discussed 
next. 
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2.2.5 The historical origins and structure of the separation of powers in South 
Africa 
Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers did not form part of the pre-
constitutional era in South Africa, despite its British colonial influence.207 Hence, the 
first stipulation where this doctrine is guaranteed in South Africa is found in 
Constitutional Principle VI of the South African Interim Constitution:208   
The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises the functional 
independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of 
checks and balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the 
constitutional order, as a totality, prevents the branches of government from 
usurping power from one another. In this sense, it anticipates the necessary or 
unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another. No constitutional 
scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the scheme is always one 
of partial separation. In Justice Frankfurter’s words, ‘the areas are partly 
interacting, not wholly disjoined.’209 
O’Regan argues that the Constitutional Principle VI not only grants separation of 
powers between the three government branches, but it also provides “appropriate 
checks and balances”.210 The belief that checks and balances can provide sufficient 
safeguards in the working of the separation of powers doctrine and guarantee an 
effective government has previously been derided by the United States President 
Woodrow Wilson: 
The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a living thing 
… No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and 
live. On the contrary, its life is dependent upon their quick cooperation, their 
ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable 
community of purpose. Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of 
men, with highly differentiated functions, no doubt, in our modern day of 
specialisation but with a common task and purpose. Their cooperation is 
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indispensable, their warfare fatal.211 
It is impossible for a government operating under the separation of powers doctrine 
with checks and balances to be separated in the carrying out of its functions, and 
not to cooperate with one another. O’Regan avers that the objective of the 
separation of powers as envisaged by Montesquieu and Madison was that it would 
restrain authoritarianism, and safeguard freedom and independence. However, it 
should be asked whether, in promoting freedom and preventing oppression, “the 
separation of powers must necessarily cause inefficiency?”212 Although the doctrine 
restrains governments by setting limits to their power, and as such, making it harder 
for them to act, the system is also positive:  
Separation of powers also helps to energise government and to make it more 
effective, by creating a healthy division of labour … A system in which the 
executive does not bear the burden of adjudication may well strengthen the 
executive by removing from it a task that frequently produces public disapproval. 
If the president does not adjudicate, he is able to pursue his task unconnected 
by judicial burdens. Indeed, the entire framework enables rather than constrains 
democracy, not only by creating an energetic executive but more fundamentally 
by allowing the sovereign people to pursue a strategy against their government 
of divide and conquer.213 
The Constitution further based its notion of separation of powers on the British 
parliamentary system (Westminster system), rather than on the presidential scheme 
put to use in the United States and France.214 According to Langa CJ, the South 
African separation of powers stems from the British system of government because:  
The Union of South Africa, founded in 1910, was modelled on the Westminster 
system of government. There were two Houses of Parliament – the House of 
Assembly (Lower House) and the Senate (Upper House). The executive was 
responsible to and formed part of the legislature, while the judiciary occupied an 
independent position … Until 1983, the structure of South African government 
closely resembled that of the United Kingdom, from which it had inherited most 
of its governmental institutions. Like the United Kingdom, the executive and the 
legislature were closely linked. The 1993 Constitution, however, brought some 
changes, one of which was in respect of the position of the President who, as 
head of state, ceased to be a member of parliament. The interdependence 
between Executive and the Legislature however continued.215 
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While there is the widespread view that the South African Constitution provides for 
the idea of separation of powers, there seems to be uncertainty on whether this idea 
is adequately formulated and expressed in in the Constitution.216 The South African 
model of separation of powers constitutes government branches which “are not 
hermetically sealed from one another”.217 It is also submitted that “the doctrine is not 
static but continues to evolve”.218 Under the Constitution, the President (the head of 
the executive), who, according to Montesquieu’s model of separation of powers, 
forms part of the executive branch, is in actual fact chosen by the National Assembly 
(one of the two houses of Parliament), which in turn is a legislative branch, in the 
midst of its members at its first session after an election.219 The Chief Justice 
officiates this election.220 On the occasion of the President’s election, he or she 
discontinues being a member of the National Assembly.221 However, it remains the 
National Assembly’s prerogative to remove the President from office.222 
The procedure of making law demonstrates an interweaved connection between the 
executive and the legislature.223 Members of the executive (Cabinet) draw up 
legislation or begin legislative processes,224 which is at that time presented either 
into the National Assembly or the National Council of Provinces for consideration 
and approval. After a legislative bill has been approved by Parliament, it can be 
signed by the President.225 The tasks vested on the legislature demonstrate the 
distinct characteristics of the South African idea of separation of powers.226 The 
Constitution draws attention to the fact that the National Assembly’s authority is not 
only to legislate “but to ensure government by people under the Constitution”,227 as 
provided in section 42(3): 
The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure 
government by the people under the Constitution. It does this by choosing the 
President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by 
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passing legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action. 
Section 52(2) further holds: 
The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms to – 
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it; and 
(b) to maintain oversight of  
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation; and  
(ii) any organ of state. 
It is clear from these provisions the legislature’s function in administering executive 
undertakings and holding the executive answerable for the exercise of its duties is 
a significant feature of the separation of powers under the Constitution.228 On the 
other hand, the judiciary’s authority under the Constitution is clearly vested in the 
courts which are:  
…independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must 
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.229 
In addition, no person or organ of state may encroach on the functions of the courts 
and:  
…organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and 
protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility 
and effectiveness of the courts.230 
When considering the exact tasks of the judiciary under the Constitution, its authority 
and duties need to be examined. Firstly, the judiciary must defend the Constitution. 
Secondly, citizens are empowered to look to the courts to safeguard their 
constitutional rights.231 Section 172 of the Constitution enjoins a court determining 
constitutional questions to pronounce nugatory any law or conduct incompatible with 
the Constitution:232  
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – 
 
(a) must declare that law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and  
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including – 
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(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of 
invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and 
on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the 
defect. 
(2) The Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa or a court of 
similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an 
Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order 
of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court. 
(a) A court which makes an order of unconstitutional invalidity may grant a 
temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the 
proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity 
of the Act or conduct. 
(b) National legislation must provide for the referral of an order of constitutional 
invalidity to the Constitutional Court. 
The court seems to be the only government branch vested with the powers to review 
the conduct of the other arms of government, and at the same time conclusively 
establish the constitutional validity of legislation approved by the legislature and 
conduct of the executive or President. While this is one of the most influential 
functions given to our courts, the use and application of this power has attracted 
numerous criticisms in South Africa and in other jurisdictions.  
The Constitution, however, does not provide, as is the case with common law, that 
the separation of powers should be developed by the courts.233 Montesquieu’s idea 
of separation of powers, as was discussed in paragraph 2.2.1.1 above, does not 
provide for such an understanding, nor does it provide any historical evidence that 
the idea of separation of powers was originally intended to be developed, and its 
scope be redefined by the courts. The idea that the judiciary is entrusted with the 
authority to develop a uniquely South African design of separation of powers also 
forms part of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, as is evident in its decision in 
De Lange v Smuts.234 Ackermann J maintains: 
I have no doubt that over time our courts will develop a distinctively South African 
model of separation of powers, one that fits the particular system of government 
provided for in the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed 
both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need, on 
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the one hand, to control government by separating powers and enforcing checks 
and balances, and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power so completely that the 
government is unable to take timely measures in the public interest.235   
The judge also acknowledges that the separation of powers doctrine is a difficult 
“matter which will be developed more fully as cases involving separation of powers 
issues are decided”.236 However, the court’s decision can be criticised for the lack of 
sufficient details regarding the nature and scope of such development of this 
doctrine by the judiciary, rather than by the legislature: 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the decision to slowly and incrementally 
develop a distinctively South African doctrine of separation of powers ‘over time’ 
is therefore that its content is not clear to anyone, legal elites included, while, 
over decades, this process unfolds.237 
Twenty years after this Constitutional Court’s decision, it is questionable whether 
the vision of developing a South African model of separation of powers was ever 
realised.238 There has been inadequate jurisprudential clarity by our courts which 
has resulted in a state of confusion surrounding this doctrine. Separation of powers 
still remains a mystery in South African law, which is especially evident in Mogoeng 
CJ’s dissent in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly.239 
In this case, the role of state institutions within the context of the separation of 
powers doctrine was at issue. This case concerned the lack of rules or mechanisms 
authorising the legislature to hold the President (a member of the executive) 
accountable, which was held to be a violation of section 89 of the Constitution.240 It 
can be reasoned that the Constitutional Court failed not only to articulate a 
comprehensive separation of powers doctrine, but also to formulate such a doctrine, 
which has resulted in “the mysteriously appearing and disappearing doctrine of 
separation of powers”.241 This lack of clarification has led to public confusion about 
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the doctrine and the role of key state institutions, since “what is not understood and 
described by judges and lawyers cannot be conveyed to members of the public in 
simple terms”.242  
The Constitution grants the courts functions and powers which constitutes judicial 
review. This predicament has provided many challenges to jurisdictions underwriting 
the separation of powers doctrine. What follows is a discussion of the challenges 
experienced with the separation of powers and the functions of the judiciary.  
 
2.3  Challenges in the separation of powers doctrine: different perspectives 
on judicial review 
The discussions in paragraph 2.2 above have provided background to the origins 
and framework of the separation of powers doctrine in Britain, the United States, 
Canada and South Africa. It was also established that the United States followed 
Montesquieu’s prescriptions as regards the separation of powers, but these views 
were somewhat flawed because of misinterpretations Montesquieu made as 
regards the British separation of powers. The main flaw concerned Montesquieu’s 
unawareness of the British system of precedents that allowed the judiciary to 
indirectly make laws. In the United States, this judiciary function is mainly found with 
judicial review. Judicial review is defined as the authority of a court to determine 
unconstitutional, and consequently unenforceable, any law, any authoritative 
undertaking based on the law, or any other action by a government official judged 
to be inconsistent with the Constitution.243 This constitutional ideology is believed to 
have fundamentally granted the Supreme Court a monopoly in United States’ 
constitutional law. This monopoly stems mainly from two types of reasoning:  
The political argument holds that judges must control the Constitution to protect 
individuals and groups from the tyranny of the majority in the legislature. The 
legal-historical argument asserts that judicial supremacy in constitutional 
matters is grounded in American constitutional history and justified in Supreme 
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Court doctrine, especially in the landmark case of Marbury v Madison (1803).244 
Determining the extent and power of judicial review is an issue which has caused 
some confusion in this jurisdiction as well as others, as it is not known whether 
judicial power is measured only by its formal powers; for example: 
…a court with the authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment on 
substantive grounds is ipso facto more powerful than one that may only 
invalidate statutes, which in turn is more powerful than a court that can do 
either?245 
The considerable scope of judicial supervision has allegedly spread across 
government’s management structures: 
This unprecedented use of judicial power is not a response to specific and 
limited necessity or emergency. The power is exercised in every state and on a 
wide variety of social issues. Even a relatively “conservative” Supreme Court 
seems transfixed; recent decisions, such as those dealing with the legislative 
veto and political gerrymandering, illustrate the Court’s continuing insistence 
that almost no public issue should be excluded from judicial oversight. Heavy 
reliance on the judiciary – in various ideological directions – is fast becoming an 
ingrained part of the American system; already it is difficult for many even to 
imagine any alternative.246 
Similar apprehensions were expressed in the November 1996 First Things 
symposium on the United States’ democracy and the courts, where it was asserted 
that the United States’ constitutional order was being put at risk so deeply “by judicial 
usurpation that conscientious citizens may begin to wonder about the extent of their 
political obligation”.247 The objections to this theory seems to be an age-old viewpoint 
which was already asserted by Lincoln, as discussed in paragraph 1.5.5, as early 
as 1801 where he resolved: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are 
to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be 
binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while 
they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases 
by all other departments of the Government … At the same time, the candid 
citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme 
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Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal 
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent 
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.248 
The primary concern with this constitutional theory seems to be the usurpation of 
powers by the courts from the elected public representatives; which at the same 
time disempowers the citizens. In 1804, Jefferson described this constitutional 
impasse as following: 
Nothing in the Constitution has given the judges a right to decide for the 
executive, more than to the executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are 
equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them … The Constitution 
meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the 
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, 
and what are not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for 
the Legislature and executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a 
despotic branch.249 
Judicial review is also criticised by Waldron on two major grounds, as firstly, “there 
is no reason to suppose that rights are better protected by this practice than they 
would be by democratic legislatures. Secondly, quite apart from the outcomes it 
generates, judicial review is democratically illegitimate”.250 Waldron argues that 
democratic values take a precarious stand when faced with any ideal that relegated 
elected representatives to function only in sufferance of unelected judges.251 He 
claims that “legislatures are more legitimate, egalitarian and participatory than 
courts, so to embody crucial democratic rights and values to an extent that is 
impossible for the latter to imitate”.252 These are also the views of Bickel,253 as stated 
in the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty”.254 Bickel claims that such a 
‘difficulty’ can be diminished by demonstrating that current legislative methods do 
not completely express the popular or majority preference. Nevertheless, he 
maintains: 
…nothing in the further complexities and perplexities of the system, which 
modern political science has explored with admirable and ingenious industry, 
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and some of which it has tended to multiply with a fertility that passes the mere 
zeal of the discoverer – nothing in these complexities can alter the essential 
reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy.255 
Waldron claims that in countries where the laws do not allow judicial review on this 
scale, “the people themselves can decide finally”256 through the usual legislative 
methods. The people can make decisions amongst themselves about the laws they 
would like to have to punish certain conducts. In the event that they fail to agree on 
these matters, they can choose their representatives who would consult, debate and 
make decisions on these issues by voting in the legislature.257 In other words, 
deliberations on issues the people could not agree on would be best handled by the 
legislature after following the usual legislative procedures. Waldron concludes that 
this has taken place, for example, in Britain during the 1960s, when parliament 
deliberated on the amelioration of abortion law, the decriminalisation of homosexual 
conduct among consenting adults, and the repealing of the death sentence.258 In 
each of these issues, extensive legislative debates and public consultations were 
undertaken by the House of Commons.259 It seems evident that the calibre of those 
deliberations (and similar debates in other countries) makes absurdity of the 
standpoint that legislatures are not capable of engaging constructively and sensibly 
on such issues. Furthermore, the “liberal outcomes of those proceedings”260 throw 
uncertainty on the widespread idea that majorities are not capable of defending the 
rights of minorities. By contrast, Waldron claims, the people or their elected 
representatives in the United States can debate and consult on these issues if they 
so choose, yet they cannot be certain that their views and resolutions would triumph. 
In the event that someone disputes the legislative decisions, they could take the 
matter to the United States Supreme Court; the decision that will ultimately triumph 
“will be that of judges”.261 Waldron finds this strong concept of judicial review to be 
in accord with Dworkin’s standpoint, an advocate of judicial review, who argued that: 
…on intractable, controversial, and profound questions of political morality that 
philosophers, statesmen, and citizens have debated for many centuries [the 
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electorate merely have to] accept the deliverances of a majority of the justices, 
whose insight into these great issues is not spectacularly special.262  
In sum, Waldron questions the justification for courts in democratic societies to be 
vested with “the authority to strike down legislation when they are convinced that it 
violates individual rights”.263 At the core of Waldron’s concerns against the legitimacy 
and constitutionality of judicial review is its impact on the will of the majority through 
usurping the people’s elected representative’s powers, and vesting it with the courts. 
Examining the divergent views on the scope and meaning of judicial review, it comes 
as no surprise that the above criticisms seem to have attracted some discussions 
for and against judicial review. Gerber finds Waldron’s criticisms on judicial review 
to be “philosophically indefensible”.264 He comments: 
…history and political science make plain that the Constitution establishes a 
republic, not a democracy. In a republic, decision-makers are elected –or, in the 
federal judiciary’s case, appointed by those who are elected - to govern the 
polity. Consequently, Professor Waldron’s “core case” against judicial review is 
issued against a straw man. Or, as a philosopher might put it, his “core case” is 
based on an “invalid premise” about the nature of the American constitutional 
order.265 
Kaufman and Runnels argue that because judicial review limits the authority of the 
majority through institutions that are vested with the power to protect individual 
rights, its function is “to make democratic self-government possible”.266 Advocates 
of judicial review, such as Dworkin, for example, argue that judges’ decisions in civil 
cases should be established by examinations of principles that protect rights, not 
examinations of procedures that consider outcomes.267 Defending rights is 
warranted by “notions of autonomy and the common good”,268 and not by the 
outcome it generates. It is also argued that rights guaranteed in Constitution should 
be administered by the judiciary because these are ethical rights against the state, 
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the justification not being that the judiciary is more probable to defend these rights.269 
As seen, the defining standard of democratic government is not absolute loyalty to 
the predispositions of the majority, but to some extent the part-taking of the people 
in the “process of self-government”.270 While Kaufman and Runnels concede that 
Waldron has made out a robust account of the argument against judicial review, 
they believe that it “focuses on the most abstract elements of this argument”,271 and 
argue that “his case against judicial review is actually a case against constitutional 
protection of rights”.272 This conclusion is reached as these critics assert that 
“democracies should assign the power to resolve questions regarding the nature 
and extent of individual rights to the people’s elected representatives and not to the 
judiciary”.273 As such, Waldron’s argument against judicial review fails because of its 
extremely restricted perception of what protection of rights in democracies actually 
entails. Contemporary examples of genocide from Eastern Europe and Africa have 
shown the need for courts to play a role in, amongst other things, the protection of 
individual rights, an element of democracy.274  
It is also not necessary for democracy to be equated with the majority: “democracy 
is not wholly synonymous with majoritarianism, and judicial review is not inherently 
countermajoritarian in the first place”.275 In contemporary political structures, judicial 
review is only one of numerous veto points. Veto points are unavoidable even in the 
context of majoritarian democratic political structures because: 
No matter how good we make the scheme of representation in a given chamber, 
no matter how many of our good thoughts about election, representation, and 
deliberation we have already taken on board, it is always possible to improve 
things by complementing that scheme of representation with another.276 
Judicial review seems though to have a benefit over other veto points: 
…a democratic theory that takes power and institutions seriously cannot place 
its hope in as simple, single institutional fix to the problem of inequitable power 
relations, as no such ‘bulwark’ can reliably exist.277  
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Disputing the justification for judicial review is Bellamy who questions the capability 
and legitimacy of judicial review as a reinforcement of democratic government.278 It 
is further argued that established rights must be changeable political processes by 
the majority to show developmental differences.279 The principles that warrant the 
protection of rights should also warrant the refusal to protect rights through judicial 
review.280 In short, giving courts the authority to “strike down legislation enacted by 
a representative legislature is inconsistent with the democratic idea of government 
by the people”.281 For example, during 2006, the United States Supreme Court in 
Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, Inc.282 held that the ruling that 
law schools and their faculties could not prevent the military from enrolling students 
from their campuses and remain entitled to receive government funding, was 
constitutionally sound.283 This decision by the Forum for Academic Institutional 
Rights is viewed by some critics as incorrect.  
Critics still “insist that judicial review is bad policy”,284 or that judicial review, at least 
as applied and perceived by the contemporary judiciary system, “is without 
foundation”.285 A call is made to employ a philosophy of judicial review where courts 
would be restricted to particular issues raised in a case, and that broad questions 
such as the legalisation of abortion, for example, should be left to the people and 
the legislature to decide through a system of “deliberative democracy”.286 Tushnet 
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appeals that the court’s power to invalidate any law or conduct of the other branches 
of government should be comprehensively legislated by the legislature, and not 
driven by the courts. He proposes a constitutional amendment reigning in and 
overruling Marbury, to be replaced by “populist constitutional law … a constitutional 
law that is defined outside of the courts by the people themselves, ‘whether we act 
in the streets, in the voting booths, or in legislatures as representatives of others’”.287 
In a call to either limit or completely eliminate judicial review, Kramer argues the 
original perception of judicial review “was to protect the structural integrity of the 
judicial process and the national political process, rather than to safeguard individual 
rights”.288 Gerber concludes that the independence of the judiciary plays an 
important role in the preservation of individual rights, and that: 
Judicial review is, of course, the ultimate expression of judicial independence - 
no judge without secure tenure and a salary that can’t be diminished would dare 
to invalidate the decisions of the political actors who control his or her livelihood 
– and it represents the federal judiciary’s only significant check on the power of 
Congress, the president, the states … and the people themselves.289 
Judges cannot be influenced by the legislature, which accordingly produces efficient 
judicial review. This argument is, however, not convincing. Vesting judges with 
secure tenure and salaries might not necessarily translate into judicial reviews that 
will guarantee constitutional rights, as it will prove later in this discussion. 
Levy believes that some form of constitutional review was deliberated on and 
approved in the American states during the 1770s and 1780s.290 It was during this 
period that Jefferson was opposed to a Constitution that would bind generations 
because he believed “no legislature could bind its successor”291 and that “the dead 
have no rights.”292 Madison was similarly opposed to constitutional power which 
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gives the judiciary superiority over the legislature.293 Because the judiciary was not 
elected by the majority, Madison believed it lacked legitimacy to decide that 
legislation enacted by the elected legislature were unconstitutional.  
Judicial review which vests the courts not only with power to interpret the 
Constitution but also to read words into what could be a vaguely drafted Constitution 
seems to present a problem for the genuine need for judicial review.294 In a rights-
orientated judicial review, it is not the legislature or the people deciding the terms of 
the legislation but rather whichever side has the votes amongst the judges. This is 
“inappropriate for reasonably democratic societies whose main problem is not that 
their legislative institutions are dysfunctional but that their members disagree about 
rights”.295 
Johanningmeier maintains that the concept of judicial review “has been the 
dominant answer in legal scholarship for the danger of majoritarian tyranny in any 
democratic system”,296 and “the primary counterpoint to democratic majority 
despotism.”297 However, while judicial review - to a certain extent - might legitimately 
remain within the sphere of the courts; he insists that politics should be left to the 
legislature to decide because “the Founders chose representation”.298 In 
Johanningmeier’s opinion, representative democracy not only includes the 
legislature but also the courts which were tasked with safeguarding the people from 
oppression by the majority.299 Judicial review, as a process keeping harmful majority 
practices in check, can only be appropriate, and would work best if:  
…broad formal standards of judicial review actually instructed courts about the 
degree of substantive deference to give a particular minority in a particular 
situation – or if we knew what that judicial protection of minorities would actually 
accomplish relative to the coerced feeling and backlash it generate in the hearts 
and minds of the majority.300  
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Judicial review on certain issues does not always transform public views on those 
issues, for example, the court’s decision in Romer v Evans301 “did not end anti-gay 
bias in Colorado”.302  
It is conceded that courts are by no means better that the legislature at delineating 
rights, and doing this accurately, but the critical question is not which system is less 
likely to get it wrong, “but which kinds of errors are most important to avoid”.303 In 
this regard, it is argued that Waldron erred as he assumed that “courts may be better 
than legislatures at resolving disputes about individual rights correctly”.304 There is 
no evidence in support of his assertion, and also no propositions as to the 
postulation’s implementation and checking by institutions. Fallon does not 
necessarily dispute Waldron’s claim, but maintains that both the courts and 
legislatures must be involved in protecting fundamental rights. It is more moral and 
better if both institutions concurrently over-enforce these rights instead of under-
enforcing them.305 Fallon further asserts that judicial review is based on: 
…a number of premises that seem to me likely to be true and that Waldron has 
not refuted, but would be difficult and in some cases perhaps impossible to 
establish with knock-down, rationally irresistible arguments.306  
There are conceptual and factual suppositions involved in judicial review, however, 
Waldron’s criticisms rest mainly on moral considerations. The most significant but 
disputed supposition underpinning judicial review is that: 
…courts have a perspective that makes them more likely to apprehend serious 
risks to some kinds of fundamental rights; that errors that result in the violations 
of fundamental rights are typically more morally disturbing than errors that 
results in the erroneous overenforcement of fundamental rights.307 
Fallon concedes that while some of the grounds applicable in the working of judicial 
review might be disputed, courts might err in its protection of fundamental rights, but 
courts - by the nature of its core function - have more understanding that makes 
them more inclined to perceive grave dangers to some types of basic rights: “judges 
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are likely to produce better decisions about rights than legislators”.308 The ideal 
system of judicial review would as such be one where: 
…the total moral costs of the overenforcement of rights that judicial review would 
likely produce will be lower than the costs that would result from the 
underenforcement that would occur in the absence of judicial review.309 
Waldron’s assumption that judicial review is unjust and unlawful is also incorrect, 
because: 
…the fairness and political legitimacy of procedural mechanisms depend on the 
ends that they serve. If judicial review is reasonably designed to improve the 
substantive justice of a society’s political decisions by safeguarding against 
violations of fundamental rights, then it not … unfair, nor is it necessarily 
politically illegitimate.310  
The legitimacy of political processes can emanate from many sources.311 Political 
legitimacy cannot only consist of judicial review which is vested in the legislature. 
Even if judicial review could be deficient in political legitimacy, this impasse could 
be resolved in some measure by means of “the democratic character of other 
elements of a political regime”.312 The influence of judicial review can consequently 
also compensate for any deficiency in political legitimacy in safeguarding 
fundamental rights.313  
Hutchinson disagrees with Fallon’s defence of judicial review which is, according to 
him, speculative and based on “both outcome-related and process-related 
arguments to warrant a ‘multiple veto-points’ approach to retaining some form of 
judicial review”.314 The ‘multiple veto-points’ structure suggested is one where both 
the courts and the legislature are vested with judicial review powers”.315 It is Fallon’s 
conviction that “a well-designed system of judicial review would produce a morally 
better pattern of outcomes than a political democracy without judicial review”.316 
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Hutchinson questions whether there are “available and reliable epistemological 
grounds for reaching correct decisions on rights disputes”.317 These assumptions 
are dubious, and have to be rejected as they are “not merely claims about the legal 
indeterminacy around rights disputes, but about the existence of moral truths and 
the identity of rights as objective moral entities”.318 It is difficult to comprehend how 
the philosophical “moral truths”319 about rights will be determined. There is 
furthermore no established benchmark to which outcomes can be measured. As 
there is no yardstick of accountability to measure judicial review against, Hutchinson 
supports Jefferson’s proposal of a system of democracy: 
…whereby every decade all fundamental laws and institutional arrangements 
could lapse and periodic assemblies could be convened so that each generation 
had the ‘right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most 
promotive of its own happiness.320  
This is the only manner in which citizens can lay claim to the Constitution, and seize 
accountability for their government structure, and their society. This substantial 
responsibility is currently vested in the courts’ function of judicial review, and should 
be entrusted to society themselves: “citizens can govern best when they govern 
themselves”.321 It is primarily on this premise that Hutchinson finds that democracy 
bears no such role for judges, and hence he rejects judicial review. 
Judicial review does not “as is often claimed, provide a way for society to focus 
clearly on the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights”.322 It results 
in a limited and unelected group of judges usurping considerable powers from the 
elected legislature to determine citizens’ rights. This is against the democratic 
values of equality and representation. The fact that judges are unelected, is 
according to Lever not a determinant of judges’ capability to safeguard constitutional 
rights or their legitimacy to decide on these matters, or that it might weaken judicial 
review. Lever also questions Waldron’s assumption that because judges are not 
democratically elected, they are not democratic, and insists that:  
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Waldron overlooks the possibility that courts and legislatures might have ways 
of being democratic or undemocratic that are distinctive to themselves, given 
their respective functions and powers, as well as ways that they share. What 
distinguishes democratic from undemocratic judicial bodies, one might think, is 
not that the former are elected and the latter are not. Rather, the differences 
reside in such things as the content, purpose and likely consequences of the 
rules that bind them, of the rights that they seek to enforce, and of the manner 
in which they seek to do so.323 
It is contended that judicial review can be justifiable on the democratic results that it 
safeguards, and specifically with the capacity of judges to safeguard “core 
democratic rights”.324 In this way, the United States Supreme Court “can act 
democratically by overriding majoritarian decision-making when the core values of 
democracy are at stake”.325 It is the aim of judicial review to safeguard democratic 
outcomes, by especially protecting popular participation in democratic processes;326 
consequently the judiciary manifests the democratic principles, and are, as such, 
inclined to advance them.327 Judicial review may be seen as a practical way “to 
promote non-majoritarian representative democracy; not surprisingly, it is becoming 
increasingly popular in democratic political systems throughout the world”.328 These 
latter views are dismissed by Lever because, in her view, it is not democratic merely 
on substantive justifications or with regard to the democracy-promoting 
consequences that it is anticipated to safeguard.  
Eisgruber attributes a great deal of significance in democratic procedures to the 
“democratic pedigree”,329 which according to him, guarantees that judges, at the very 
least in the United States, are selected by elected representatives mainly on 
political, instead of legal justifications. Brettschneider claims that judges are suitably 
equipped to apply welfare rights.330 This standpoint is not accepted by all: 
There is nothing wrong with the fact that unelected justices decide questions 
about (for example) federalism or gay rights or economic justice on the basis of 
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controversial judgements of moral principles.331 
Nonetheless, it is deemed that judges should refer to the legislator issues that need 
broad deliberate opinions, and limit themselves to their core function, namely, the 
determination or adjudication of disputes.332  
Contrary to Brettschneider and Eisgruber, Lever argues that judicial review can be 
considered democratically legitimate on substantive grounds,333 despite the fact that 
judges may not in any way be better than legislators at safeguarding rights. 
Bellamy’s predisposition toward the legislative branch above the judiciary because 
it represents commitment to representative political participation in a democracy, or 
the avoidance of oppression by the majority, is therefore misleading.334 This is 
because:  
There are many ways to specify the ideal of democratic government, even if one 
values political participation, because there is no uncontested account of the 
relative powers of legislatures vis à vis family, churches, trade unions and 
business associations, or individuals. Hence, democratic concerns for 
accountability, equality, participation and procedural fairness can all be 
consistent with judicial review, although judges can be as disappointing as 
legislators whatever one’s ideals.335 
No form of political participation can weaken the legitimacy of the judiciary through 
judicial review. In other words, the mere fact that judges are unelected, and are not 
the legislative representatives of the people do not impact on their determination of 
individual rights within the context of judicial review. Lever’s claims seem to be 
premised on this latter assumption, and she concludes that “the procedural case 
against judicial review fails”.336 
Judicial review may be either strong or weak, but it is the first-mentioned form which 
is not democratically compatible.337 This is because judicial review gives 
embodiment to the power of the citizens to provide added input into the political 
system. Consequently, the existence or lack of judicial review is not a substitute for 
peoples’ convictions regarding the considerable morality and flaws of legislators and 
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judges.338 According to Lever, a strong judicial review system may invalidate certain 
statutes or legislation through the process of stare decisis, while weak judicial review 
constitutes the evaluation of legislation by the courts ex-ante: 
…in order to determine whether or not it is unconstitutional, or violates individual 
rights, but courts may not decline to apply it (or moderate its application) simply 
because rights would otherwise be violated.339 
After the integration of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into 
British law (by means of the Human Rights Act of 1998), Britain adopted a weak 
form of judicial review.340 Lever adds that even strong judicial review which 
empowers judges with the authority to invalidate laws is compatible with democratic 
government systems. Opponents of judicial review have found this “outrageously 
undemocratic”,341 however: 
This outrage reflects a picture of electoral and legislative politics in which 
existing bars to political participation are negligible, and in which there are no 
obstacles of time, money and political will to refighting old battles. Hence 
Waldron’s assumption that judicial review is unwarranted except where ‘other 
channels of political change are blocked’.342 
But one has to remember that blocked access is not similar to unequal access, or 
no access at all. The last two options were, for example, seen in 1918-1928 in 
Britain, where men were allowed to vote at a younger age than women.343 If we are 
concerned about democratic government, Lever adds, we should be concerned over 
such unjust political authority, not simply the deficiency of authority itself. The 
elected legislature, with all its skills and resources, can get it wrong in the application 
of safeguards to individual rights.344 Lever concludes that: 
Judicial review can be justified democratically, even if its benefits are uncertain: 
for the same might be said of democratic government itself, though we have 
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every reason to cherish that, and to share in the costs of maintaining it.345 
It has also been asserted that Waldron’s critique of judicial review is premised on a 
“methodological flaw”.346 The primary dispute, according to Roux is:  
…that the moral justifiability of judicial review is a mixed normative/empirical 
question that cannot be satisfactorily answered by confining the empirical 
component to a set of very broad assumptions and then proceeding in a purely 
normative vein.347 
Waldron believed that strong judicial review subverts and weakens “political values 
of democratic self-government”.348 Democratic self-government seems to be both a 
joint right that the people put to use collectively, and also the totality of their rights 
as individuals to take part in decision-making processes that concern them.349 Any 
political system that vests judges with the power of judicial review weakens 
democratic self-government, by relegating these rights to a body of unelected 
individuals.350 Roux argues that: 
In an ideal Waldronian world, we would (1) institute a system of judicial review if 
democratic institutions were not in reasonably good working order, (2) monitor 
the changing equality of democracy, and (3) dispense with judicial review once 
democratic institutions reached the required performance threshold.351  
Waldron’s case against judicial review fails to answer the following:  
Would democratic institutions be in reasonably good working order if judicial 
review were not in place? What would happen to the functioning of democratic 
institutions if judicial review were removed?352 
Roux asserts that the best alternative would be to create a structure where judges 
could have the capacity to adjust the intensity of their review authority to the 
transforming functioning of democratic institutions, without the necessity of an all-
                                                          
345  Lever 2009 Pub Law 816. 
346  Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative constitutionalism 203. 
347  Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative constitutionalism 203. This may be applicable to 
new or young democracies, where representative institutions’ problems may make it difficult to 
assess the judging of rights by either the judiciary or legislature. Roux thinks that judicial review 
“is not an institution whose moral justifiability can be meaningfully assessed in abstract 
normative terms” (219). 
348  Waldron 2006 Yale LJ 1353-1359. Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative 
constitutionalism 219 believes whether or not judicial review “impairs the right to democratic 
self-government is a mixed normative/empirical question that may only be answered in the 
context of the particular conditions of the society at issue”. 
349  Waldron 2006 Yale LJ 1353. 
350  Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative constitutionalism 207. 
351  Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative constitutionalism 215. 
352  Roux The Cambridge handbook of deliberative constitutionalism 206. 
93 
 
embracing determination of whether those institutions had exceeded a fixed margin 
level.353 The primary benefit for vesting judges with judicial review, Roux argues, is 
that judges, in principle, have the ability to adapt their functions in the democratic 
process in accordance with the scope of its functioning. In the event that democratic 
self-government by the people is endangered by the absorption of political authority 
in one political party or the development of anti-democratic parties, judges may 
adjust their beliefs to attend to these “pathologies”.354 Judges’ function is to perform 
some form of check and balance role on the function of the legislatures and 
executive, and where these latter institutions falter, judges can adjust their principles 
and control functions in these institutions. While Roux’s proposition seems 
convincing, he fails to explain the extent of his idea of judicial review, and what kind 
of special skills or training the legislatures lack which would qualify judges to better 
protect individual rights without illegitimately usurping the core functions of the 
legislature. Still, Roux points out that: 
Judicial review is also an inherently adaptable institution, the strength of which 
can be adjusted at the point of application to the actual performance of 
democratic institutions. Systems of judicial review should be designed so as to 
support this feature, but the politico-legal dynamics of judicial review in any case 
encourage the adjustment by judges of their powers in this way.355 
Roux’s fails to establish the legal scope of judicial review’s adaptability. The problem 
is also how this adapted judicial review would be comprehensively assessed and be 
judged as to whether it remains legitimate within the courts’ core function in a 
democratically elected government. 
The establishment of constitutional courts in various countries has led to a “bullish 
mood concerning the role and success of judicial review”,356 and has resulted in 
political backlashes. In Hungary, for example, a new Constitution came into effect 
in 2012 which removed significant jurisdiction from the constitutional court and 
severely imperilled the judicial independence in that country.357 At the same time, 
President Zuma made an announcement that the scope of the authority of South 
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African Constitutional Court should be re-examined, and how its decisions had 
influenced social transformations.358 It was the opinion of the Secretary General of 
the African National Congress (ANC) that some of the Court’s members acted as 
“counter revolutionaries”.359 A constitutional court’s functions normally consists of 
three general categories: “formal rules and powers; legal and judicial practice; and 
the immediate political context in which it operates”.360 Each grouping has to interact 
mutually in order to form the various constituents of the constitutional court’s specific 
powers; which include “the nature, scope, and content of the constitution it enforces, 
the jurisdictional and remedial amendment, and its composition and tenure”.361 
It is through section 172(1)(b)(ii) of the South African Constitution that the 
Constitutional Court has been vested with a strong form of judicial review powers 
which empowers the court to invalidate or suspend legislation or conducts of the 
other branches of government.362 This power was utilised by the Court in Minister of 
Home Affairs v Fourie,363 a same-sex marriage case. In this decision, the Court 
declared the 1961 Marriage Act invalid, giving Parliament one year to pass new 
legislation re-addressing the breach of the right to equality, or in the absence of 
legislation, the Court would read words allowing same-sex marriage into the current 
Marriage Act. The Fourie judgment, according to Gardbaum, seems to have 
generated tension between the Court and the government, and resulted in the 
making of verbal attacks on the Constitutional Court by the then-deputy president 
Jacob Zuma, an upfront critic of same-sex marriages.364  
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Such attacks challenging the independence of the judiciary seem to be more likely 
to happen when courts exercise a strong-form of judicial review.365 Strong judicial 
review presents a tension to the “fragility of judicial independence in new 
democracies”,366 while a weak judicial review may not only lessen the tension 
between the court and other branches of government, but may also present other 
advantages:  
First, by giving final legal authority to the political institutions, whether exercised 
or not … it holds out the promise of lowering the risk of direct political attacks, 
once instigated; often end in wholesale reductions in judicial independence … 
Second, where courts have lesser powers of constitutional review, it is easier to 
resist the call for the type of indirect democratic accountability that a political 
appointments process is thought to bestow. In this way, weak-form of review 
may result in both more impartial and independent judges and judicial reasoning, 
and more direct democratic accountability for ultimate resolutions of 
constitutional issues.367 
A weak form of judicial review is also in opposition to “politically tinged and, at the 
time they are made, wholly unaccountable judicial decisions”368 which are absolute 
under the principle of judicial review. By lessening the power of constitutional review, 
the elected legislature can be held accountable directly by the electorate while, at 
the same time, judges’ independence and equity remain intact. Dixon insists that 
weak judicial review can be advantageous because it bears an unquestionable 
legitimacy as it vests courts with the ability to “counter legislative blockages”.369 In 
her view, strong constitutional review seems to suffer from the lack of constitutional 
legitimacy while a weak form of review could resolve issues which “constitutional 
institutions and doctrines should still be designed to respond to these legislative 
blockages in different constitutional systems”.370 
Whether one argues for or against judicial review, the problems remains that this 
principle in either its weak or strong forms still leaves courts with restricted capability 
to protect constitutional rights, because “the existence of independent courts does 
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not increase the probability that governments will respect constitutional rights”.371 
The other problem which may impede the courts’ abilities in this area is that “courts 
are ill-equipped to deal with certain types of rights violations like torture and social 
rights”.372 Hence, it is argued that the trust conferred on judicial review as a legitimate 
process is misplaced because the courts are not better placed to protect 
constitutional rights than the legislatures.373 
It is also asserted by some critics that judicial review vests courts with limited 
powers, and it is also a vague and enigmatic concept.374 According to Barron, the 
United States’ judiciary became so powerful over time as there was a growing sense 
of futility which resulted in the people losing their trust in the political branches of 
government. Despite that, he insists that the very inconclusiveness of the judicial 
procedure has also contributed to the growing power of the judiciary.375 The Dred 
Scott case376 is held as an distinct demonstration of the failings, deficiencies and 
limitations of judicial review as a constitutional principle. In this case, Taney CJ held 
that slaves were the property of their owners, and that the provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment which guaranteed their owners’ rights was constitutionally sound. It was 
also Taney’s view that slaves, whether freed or not, could not become citizens of 
the United States. In so finding, Taney CJ made it clear that certain provisions of 
the United States Constitution were not intended to protect slaves. Not only was the 
Dred Scott case an appalling court decision, it also displays the unpredictability, 
deficiencies, limitations and erratic nature of judicial review.377 It is in the workings 
of judicial review of the Dred Scott case, amongst others, which cautions against 
the trust placed in the courts to protect constitutional rights, and at the same time, 
the resultant uncertainty and limitations embedded into this particular principle.  
                                                          
371  Chilton and Versteeg 2018 Univ of Chicago LR 299-316. 
372  Chilton and Versteeg 2018 Univ of Chicago LR 293. See also footnote 265 above. 
373  Kaufman and Runnels 2016 Brooklyn LR 178-179. 
374  Barron 1970 Duke LJ 591. 
375  Barron 1970 Duke LJ 591. 
376  Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).  
377  Barron 1970 Duke LJ 596-597. See also Jackson The struggle for judicial supremacy xi where 
he points out that “struggles over power that in Europe call out regiments of troops, in America 
call out battalions of lawyers”. Jackson wrote at 29-30 that Taney CJ “more than any other” had 
played “the tragic part” in causing the conflict [courts’ decision which failed to support the 
constitutional rights of slaves]. Jackson believed at 24 that the Dred Scott case was a factor in 
“precipitating the Civil War.”  
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2.4  Conclusion 
This chapter examined the nature and scope of the separation of powers doctrine 
as well as its historical development. Furthermore, this chapter also highlighted the 
inherent weaknesses in the current state of the law with a view of establishing the 
meaning and scope of our doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine of 
separation of powers has vested different kinds of functions to the three branches 
of government, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The 
legislature’s core function is to make the law, while the executive is to enforce the 
law. The judiciary, on the other hand, adjudicate disputes making use of the multiple 
pieces of legislation which are passed by the legislature. In order to safeguard the 
people’s freedom or their constitutional rights, the judiciary should be independent 
from the other branches of government. Montesquieu’s idea of separation of 
powers, while it is assumed to be forming the origin of this doctrine, has been 
disputed by some authors, who trace the origin of this doctrine from the Bible, or to 
the writings of John Locke. The doctrine is also thought to be originating from the 
mixed regime, an idea of government that was in place during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries where social class was thought to hold dominance. The people 
could not choose the rulers under this government system nor did they have 
constitutional rights. It is assumed that the American Civil War was fought because 
of the disgruntlement with the mixed regime’s social classes’ system and autocratic 
rule by the monarchy. The people wanted to elect their rulers, and to safeguard their 
constitutional rights. As a result, the executive powers of the monarch were vested 
in the president. The legislature as the representatives of the people was vested 
with powers to make laws, and the judiciary was vested with powers to adjudicate 
disputes, making use of laws that were enacted by the legislature.  
Law-making was not the function of the judiciary in Montesquieu’s separation of 
powers doctrine. Montesquieu argued that if judges were to make laws, these 
judges could change the laws to suit the particular parties to a court case. This would 
produce arbitrary outcomes. While Montesquieu based his doctrine on British law, 
he failed to understand that the British common law vested the judiciary with the 
powers to make laws under the precedent principle. As a result, Montesquieu’s 
understanding of British law and the correctness of his doctrine have been criticised.  
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While the separation of powers has vested certain functions to different government 
branches, accountability was achieved by means of checks and balances on the 
conduct of the different branches. If one branch exceeded its powers, another 
branch may use its particular constitutional powers to bring the encroaching branch 
back into line. While all the branches of government would be empowered to check, 
it was assumed that it was the judiciary who would be vested with the authority to 
determine the constitutionality of the other branches’ conduct.  
While in South Africa the separation of powers doctrine forms part of the 
constitutional government system, its scope and extent seem not to be fully 
provided. It is however assumed that it is not absolute, and still needs to be 
developed. This development seems to be taking place by means of courts’ 
decisions. The South African Constitution not only vests the courts with power to 
adjudicate disputes, it also enjoins the courts to declare laws passed by the 
legislature unconstitutional. This constitutional authority amounts to judicial review, 
a concept that has been criticised for being unlawful and unconstitutional. Critics of 
judicial review proclaim that the legislature is more appropriate for this task, as the 
legislature is democratically elected, and more participatory than courts. It has been 
asserted that judicial review has resulted in the people being ruled by the courts 
instead of through their elected representatives.  
Still, during the adoption of the South African Constitution, it was not stated that the 
intention was that it would be the courts’ duty to develop a distinctly South African 
model of constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and not the legislature. The 
decision by the Constitution Court, as per Ackermann J, that this was in fact the 
original understanding regarding the development of this doctrine is questionable. It 
has also been determined that the courts have failed to fully explain and develop 
this principle over the last two decades.  
Judicial review is not only also a vague and enigmatic concept, but it also does not 
specifically safeguard constitutional rights and democracies. There have been many 
conflicting and constitutionally unsound court decisions produced by means of 
judicial review, for example, the United States’ Dred Scott case in 1857. A weak 
form of judicial review, however, seems to be not too intrusive into the other 
government branches’ core functions.  
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The courts under British common law, as also in South Africa, have always 
developed laws through the judicial review precedent principle. Hence, in the 
succeeding chapter the nature and legitimacy of judicial law-making in the United 




THE ROLE OF COURTS IN DEVELOPING CRIMINAL OFFENCES 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion in this chapter will probe the courts’ role in developing laws and 
public policy under the constitutions of the United States, Canada and South Africa. 
The nature and scope of the constitutional authority vested in the courts to develop 
laws will be researched in order to fully comprehend the role, rationale, and 
legitimacy of such powers in a constitutional democracy. In addition, the limits of this 
constitutional provision will also be explored with a view to fully understand how far 
a court can go in developing laws and public policy without overstepping its 
constitutional boundaries within the separation-of-powers doctrine.  
In order to better appreciate this latter aspect, the discussion will investigate whether 
the South African Constitution is comprehensive on the nature and limits of its 
provisions which guarantee the courts’ constitutional authority to develop laws, as 
well as how our courts have applied this provision. This chapter will also endeavour 
to also analyse the weaknesses in our current legislation in the area of the courts’ 
law-making role and constitutional interpretation. Conceivable deficiencies in the 
current state of South African law, namely, sections 39(2) and 173 of the 
Constitution, will be examined. These provisions do not only provide for the 
development of South African law by the courts through the interests-of-justice 
framework,1 but they also place emphasis on the courts to exercise this role while 
promoting “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.2 
 
                                                          
1  Section 173 provides: “The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Court have 
the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, 
taking into account the interest of justice”. 
2  Section 39(2) provides: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights”. 
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Through these constitutional provisions, the courts seem to possess unrestrained 
powers to develop laws making use of the interests-of-justice test in the promotion 
of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The weaknesses of this test will 
be looked into as to whether it constitutes an effective and reliable framework as 
legislative tools in the hands of unelected judges. This chapter aims to question how 
judges can discern what the interests of justice could possibly constitute when 
developing South African laws, and whether it is a discernment which the other 
political arms of government might lack? Commenting on this issue, Scalia 
remarked: 
What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they 
become Justices of this Court, that enables them to discern that a practice which 
the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people 
have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional? … The 
Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy 
designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize.3 
In most democracies, as in South Africa, judges are former lawyers. This criticism 
against judges by a United States Supreme Court judge, questioning judges’ ability 
to decide which century-old laws are constitutional or unconstitutional, is the focus 
in this chapter’s discussion, as the South African courts might not escape similar 
critique.  
The chapter will further investigate how judges judge cases and interpret the 
provisions of the Constitution (or any law) when making law, as provided for by the 
Constitution. This will be done in a comparative manner, utilising especially 
common-law legal systems. English common law still permeates a primary part of 
the South African and the United States’ legal systems. The United States law is 
premised on the assumption that courts, under a common-law tradition, “have 
engaged in developing the law against the tension of rhetoric and practice”.4 It has 
been averred that judges and early English legal philosophers insisted “historicity 
as the source of authority of the common law”5 judicial enterprise. When making 
                                                          
3  Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v Umbehr 518 US (1996) 668, 
668-689, 711. 
4  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 527. See also Meyler 2006 Stanford LR 554-558 where the history 
of the common law tradition is outlined. 
5  Meyler 2006 Stanford LR 581. 
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decisions, judges take into account ancient laws originating in time immemorial.6 As 
such, judges “read existing law into the remote past”.7 On the law-making role of the 
courts and the common law, Lehavi claims:  
The common law thus constantly looked both backward to history and 
precedents, and forward to allow common law rules to develop so as to meet 
the changing needs of society. The extent to which this backward-forward 
nature of the common law was authentic or merely a pretext for granting judges 
more power to design the law remains contested, but it is clear that in practice, 
English common law courts have been constantly engaged in judicial law-
making.8 
This was the system that also characterised the expansion of common law in the 
United States’ colonies, and afterwards. While Jefferson and Adams intended to 
locate the ‘true’ common law to their classic English past, the common law had 
already advanced and changed amongst the many colonies (later states).9 It was 
only in the writings of Holmes and the twentieth century realists that the idea that 
judges under common law were making law, and not simply uncovering and 
determining it, that it became unqualifiedly established in United States’ 
jurisprudence:10   
...it is only in this century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to 
knowledge that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law, and that each state has 
its own.11 
This law-making role has been understood as occurring in a great number of 
settings, such as when judges develop new principles in the conventional common-
law realm, or interpret a principle which seems unclear or not fully defined or 
inconclusive, or take part in the construction of “capacious”12 constitutional 
language. It is maintained that when the United States Constitution was adopted, 
courts did not have the power to change the common law, but as from the nineteenth 
                                                          
6  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 527. 
7  Pocock The ancient constitution 31. 
8  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 527. See also Meyler 2006 Stanford LR 588, 592-593. 
9  Meyler 2006 Stanford LR 567-571. Explaining how Jefferson dated the “true” common law to 
the era before the Magna Carta and how Adams dated the “true” common law to the “ancient 
constitution”. Lehavi at 575 adds that: “The treatment of the common law – and divergences 
therefrom – in the early states further substantiates further the founding generation’s recognition 
that regional common law in America deviated in parts significantly from the English model”. 
10  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 528. 
11  Scalia Common law courts in a civil-law system 9-12. 
12  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 528. See also Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 886-888. 
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century, courts “did assume the power to change the common law”.13 
While it is acknowledged that courts do make laws, the foundation of the present-
day government would be truly weakened if the extent of the legitimacy, procedure 
and practice of judicial law-making or judicial legislation14 remain incomprehensible 
and vague.15 While courts are seen by some as “the senior partner among the 
governmental entities in the crafting of the law”,16 it is less problematic “to leave 
common law, and the process of developing the common law, where it is”.17 The 
exercise of this power by the courts in construing legislation and interrogating 
constitutional provisions must be questioned. There is much controversy on whether 
the common dispute-based practice is the appropriate approach to formulate a set 
of legal rules which predictably and meaningfully prescribe future legal affairs within 
a particular area of law.18 Even though courts are conscientiously knowledgeable of 
the inherent ‘distorting effect’ that particular litigation disputes may present on the 
wider legal virtues that they are developing,19 it remains questionable whether courts 
would or should “be able to perfectly mimic the abstract process and substantive 
products of statutory law-making”.20  
Courts may lack reliable information about society and broader-based facts that 
might justify a change of law.21 Even if courts are given full confidence as policy 
                                                          
13  Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc v Florida Department of Environmental Protection et al 560 
US 702 (2010) 2592, 2606. 
14  O’Scannlain 2015 Virginia LR Online 33 describes the term ‘judicial legislation’ as follows: “the 
phenomenon of judges displacing democratic policy choices in the name of their own policy 
preferences couched in amorphous constitutional clauses interpreted without the aid of text, 
structure, and history”.  
15  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 529. 
16  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 529. See also Barak 2002 Harvard LR 33-36. 
17  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 529. See Scalia Common-law courts in a civil-law system 12. 
18  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 529-530. 
19  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 530. See also Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 897-898, 
discussing such potential distortions, including the fact that judges may be captivated by the 
way that a certain case is framed. 
20  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 915 considers facial challenges to statutes. A facial challenge 
(in United States law) occurs where a plaintiff alleges that a statute or legislation is always 
unconstitutional, and consequently void. This is in contrast to an as-applied challenge, where it 
is alleged that a particular statute’s application is unconstitutional. Schauer maintains that a 
facial challenge requires judges to imagine the total array of possibilities as to how the statute 
could be applied, but these judges’ perceptions are probably skewed by the facts of these cases 
before them. This does not mean that legislature is free of the influence of special interests. But 
legislature is generally considered to represent what he terms “abstract reasoning” in norm-
making, detached from the details of a specific dispute. See Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 
912-913. 
21  Barak 2002 Harvard LR 32-33; Komesar Law’s limits 60-70. 
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makers so that they can incorporate societal values, such as redistribution of 
resources, or otherwise engage in pushing forward broad-based social reform within 
the contours of common-law doctrines, courts lack both the ‘purse’ and the 
organisational mechanisms – that is, governmental bureaucracy or agencies – to 
guarantee the initial feasibility and the future implementation of the legal reform.22 
Most importantly, the ability of the courts to update, revise, or entirely overturn a 
piece of legislation is dependent on having a case before it.23 Unlike the legislative 
agency that can initiate a rule change or control its timing, courts must depend on 
an exogenous factor – a relevant dispute brought before them.24 Courts’ role in law-
making is thus limited, and might not bring about a widespread development or 
reform of a rule. 
These views highlight the seemingly inherent deficiencies embedded in any form of 
legal development which might be exercised by the courts. Courts are consequently 
vested with restricted preferences in which they can develop law, and at the same 
time “remain part of the law-making process”.25 In what follows, an attempt will be 
made to assess, explain and illustrate the scope and workings of judicial law-making 
or policy making within the context of the separation of powers. 
3.2  Common-law judicial law-making and judicial activism 
The power of judges to make laws is a controversial issue, not only in South Africa, 
but also in the legal systems of foreign jurisdictions. This section will examine the 
origin and development of judicial law-making in the United States, Canada and 
South Africa, in order to evaluate the viability and legitimacy of such function. 
3.2.1  Judicial law-making in the United States 
While writing in 1870, Holmes stated that “it is the merit of common law, that it 
                                                          
22  Rosenberg The hollow hope 423 claims that litigation steers activists for change to an institution 
that is unable to help them, and divert crucial resources away from the realm that matters: 
politics. See also Abraham 1986 Political Science Quarterly 278: “To be sure, like the Pope, the 
judiciary possesses no armies, and its sole power is the power to persuade”. 
23  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 913-916. 
24  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 915-916. See also Barak 2002 Harvard LR 33-36. 
25  Lehavi 2011 Minnesota LR 531. 
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decides the case first and determines the principles afterwards”.26 From this 
statement, it is evident that under common-law there is a law-making process that 
occurs within the context of judicial judgments. Making law is what Holmes refers to 
as “determining the principles”,27 and amounts to the hallmark of the common-law 
concept. Common-law practices and theory were created during the period when 
common-law judges viewed themselves to be discovering the law instead of making 
it. Holmes, however, comprehensively understood that common-law judges were 
making law when deciding cases, and this notion still remains nowadays.28 
It is believed that law-making taking place in the context of courts’ judgments results 
in good quality laws, as real court participants, representing the actual disputes that 
law must find the solution to, are involved.29 Furthermore, the United States 
Constitution shelters judges from external influences by securing life tenure and 
salary protection for judges in Article III, Section 1: 
The judiciary, in other words, is specifically designed to be nonresponsive to 
political pressures; thus, it should not be charged with effectuating broad-based 
policy change.30 
Yet the opposite may also be true: judges can still be influenced, and court cases 
are more often distorting that enlightening. The use of such actual cases may create 
“inferior law whenever the concrete case is nonrepresentative of the full array of 
events that ensuing rule or practice will encompass”.31 Common-law judges may 
hardly appreciate such distortion as: 
The distortion of the immediate case may systematically condemn common law 
lawmaking not only to suboptimal results, but also to results predictably worse 
than those that would be reached by making law in a less dispute-driven 
fashion.32 
The reliance in the integrity of what Schauer terms “a crystalized dispute between 
specific parties”33 as a method for making law is so great that much trust is still 
placed in the common law as the preferable method of law-making, but also in the 
                                                          
26  Holmes 1870 Am LR 1. See also Menand The metaphysical club 338. 
27  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 883. 
28  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 883 
29  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 883 
30  O’Scannlain 2015 Virginia LR Online 37. 
31  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 884 
32  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 884 
33  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 884. 
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United States Constitution’s “case or controversy” stipulation.34 Owing to the 
increased reliance on common-law judges to develop the law, Schauer maintains 
that it no longer remains contentious to suggest that judges create law.35 Yet he 
proposes that it may perhaps not only be “great cases and hard cases that make 
bad law, but simply the deciding of cases that makes bad law”.36  
Law was made in the case of McPherson v Buick Motor Co,37 where the court held 
that a user of a product that was not intrinsically hazardous could bring a claim 
against the product’s maker for negligent construction, in spite of the fact of lack of 
privity between the product’s maker and the user.38 So too when the venue for 
making law is not only the creation of common-law rules, but the courts’ 
interpretation of a doctrine against the background of indeterminate authorising 
legislation. Yet, whether in the circumstances of a basic common-law ruling or 
alternatively in the interpretation of indeterminate language in legislation or the 
Constitution, it seems to be difficult to deny that judges often or ‘always’ take part in 
the procedure of making law.39 As Holmes emphasises, judges develop law in 
conjunction with judgments of “actual controversies before the lawmaking court”.40  
It is definitely correct that at times a court will settle a firm and established rule, as 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v Arizona,41 or the court’s numerous 
anti-trust rules,42 and, at times, the courts will make known a wide and not so much 
determinate principle.43 Courts could consequently develop law by stating a rule or 
                                                          
34  Article III consists of “a preference that law be made in the context of a concrete dispute between 
genuine adversaries, rather than on the basis of ‘abstract’ speculation”. 
35  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 886. See also Cardozo The nature of the judicial process 
124-125 who states that: “The theory of the older writers was that judges did not legislate at all. 
A pre-existing rule was that there, imbedded, if concealed, in the body of the customary law. All 
that the judges did, was to throw off the wrappings, and expose the statute to our view. Since 
the days of Bentham and Austin, no one, it is believed, has accepted this theory without 
deduction or reserve, though even in modern decisions we find traces of its lingering influence”. 
36  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 885. 
37  McPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916) 1054-1055. 
38  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 887. 
39  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 887-888. Kennedy 1973 J Legal Stud 378 argues that judges 
employ choice in every decision, even when they are merely applying the law. 
40  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 888. 
41  Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) 467-474. 
42  United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co 310 US 150 (1940) 222, holding that price-fixing per se 
violates anti-trust laws. 
43  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 888. 
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by proclaiming a standard as the reason for their decisions.44 These rules or 
standards - as established by a court’s pronouncement - serve as restraining norms 
for future disputes: it acts as a precedent for all cases to come as a rule established 
by the court:  
Once a court announces a reason for its decision, and once that stated reason 
is something that future or lower courts are expected to take seriously as a 
reason, then the troubling question still arises as to whether the general 
statement that is the reason is better or worse by virtue of it having been initially 
announced in the context of a concrete dispute that a court is expected to 
resolve.45 
It is clear that in the United States, it is not only courts’ decisions that amount to law-
making, the rationale and grounds for such decisions also become law. Schauer 
differentiates between common law-making judges and the official lawmaker, 
namely, the legislature. He argues that the common-law judge makes law through 
the lens of a “concrete token type of case”46 that presents actual controversies, 
where the lawmaker can see the direct consequence of making a certain law instead 
of another. One justification for preferring the common law is that the: 
…rulemaking and law-making are better done when the rule maker has before 
her a live controversy, a controversy that enables her to see all of the real world 
implications of making one rule rather than another.47  
The courts craft law specifically to suit the circumstances of the current case, as well 
as other future similar cases.48 On the other hand, the legislature develops rules 
and law “without hearing before them in the same immediate way a particular token 
of case-type that the rules encompass”.49 It is thus argued that this law-making body 
creates more general law on the basis of how future cases ought to be decided – it 
is not pressurised to decide such cases instantaneously (as in a court case). 
Consequently, the argument is that when law is developed without there being real 
                                                          
44  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 888-889. See also Dworkin Taking rights seriously 22-28, 
stating that rules are “all-or-nothing”, while principles may not apply in a particular case and yet 
remain valid. See also Sullivan 1992 Harvard LR 22,26-27, and Kennedy 1976 Harvard LR 
1685, 1776, who argue that Dworkin fostered an inconsiderable amount of confusion by 
distinguishing rules from principles, and then defining rules as precise and absolute, and 
principles as vague and revocable. 
45  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 890. 
46  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicaog LR 892. 
47  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 892. 
48  Calabresi A common law for the age of statutes 165 states that courts’ function is to provide 
“continuity and change by applying the great vague principle of treating like cases alike”. 
49  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 891. 
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parties involved in a dispute, the entire law-making process is speculative, and 
inclined to be misguided as it not premised on “real world events”.50 By establishing 
constitutional norms and rules in the circumstances of real disputes, and not on the 
premises of theoretical conjectures, it is reasoned that judges are more capable of 
making better laws and rules.51  
However, both types of lawmakers need to assess as to which future instances their 
laws need to apply to, and how these cases should be resolved. This process 
involves projected future decision-making instances, however, the common-law 
rule-maker faces a substantial risk that the particular case before the court may 
unduly influence the maker of the rule.52 Judicial lawmakers could also consider the 
case before them as representative of a larger group; whilst it is not. This could lead 
to making laws for a specific case, and not the larger group. Cases do differ, but 
judges must make rational and objective decisions, not only suitable to the case 
before them, but applicable to an entire future group. This is a difficult task, 
especially as many judges are captivated by the salient case before them, and tend 
to judge only “a subset of available information, to overweigh that information, and 
to under weigh unattended information”.53 Deciding on the correct outcome for each 
distinct case with its specific contextual equities, with the added burden of making 
law, may produce an unrepresentative ruling. 
An example of the above predicament transpired in New York Times Company v 
Sullivan,54 a defamation case. The United States Supreme Court had not 
                                                          
50  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 892: “Litigants, after all, are the ones who actually experience 
the effects of legal rules”. Shavell 1995 J Legal Stud 379 states that “appeals courts sometimes 
can learn about opportunities for law-making only from disappointed litigants”. 
51  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 893. 
52  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 894. 
53  Schauer 2006 Univ of Chicago LR 896. 
54  378 US 254 (1964). Hereinafter New York Times Company. Epstein 1986 Univ of Chicago LR 
786-787 explains this defamation case as follows: The defamation allegedly made by the New 
York Times was an advertisement sponsored by 64 prominent citizens under the heading “Heed 
Their Rising Voices”. The ad, which appeared on 29 March 1960, contained a description of 
events in Montgomery, Alabama, at the height of Alabama’s racial and political unrest. The ad 
said that the police had surrounded the campus, when in truth they were only deployed nearby. 
It stated that padlocks had been used to keep all students out of the dining hall, when in fact a 
few had been excluded because they were not properly registered. Also that students sang “My 
country ‘tis of thee”, when they actually sang the national anthem. It said that Martin Luther King 
had been arrested seven times and charged with felony while he had only been arrested four 
times and charged with a misdemeanour. According to the ad, the police had assisted King’s 
enemies in bombing his house when in fact they were looking for the perpetrator. The plaintiff, 
Sullivan, was a Montgomery City Commissioner, whose individual responsibilities included 
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adjudicated in such a type of case before, and libel was not covered by the First 
Amendment.55 In spite of its lack of experience in this area of common law, the court 
in Sullivan is thought to have been compelled to reach a judgment in the context of 
the safeguarding the civil-rights movement against “crippling civil judgments”,56 
lodged by the plaintiff, a powerful public official using litigation to wield his official 
authority. The court held that the criticism of the government was deemed protected 
from both private and criminal lawsuits; that the plaintiff must prove that the 
statement published was false, or that it was made “with reckless disregard whether 
it was false or not”.57 These parameters of the common-law defamation concept 
were formulated in this specific case, and it was held that: 
…the US Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in 
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.58  
This qualified privilege was made actionable solely in publications containing ‘actual 
malice’, a rule Epstein regards as “a compromise between the strict liability and no 
liability positions”.59 When interpreting the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the court found that the first amendment was applicable when 
construing the scope of common-law defamation. The court extended the definition 
of defamation, and what the plaintiff had to prove in order to succeed with his claim 
for damages. Still, the political background to the case, as was shown above, 
captivated the court. The Alabama courts’ verdicts expressed no more than their 
juries’ desire to punish the so-called Northern Agitators.60 Epstein also regards this 
case as a “fortuitously distorted decision”:61     
…the particular facts of the case produced a rule almost certainly different from 
what the same justices of the same Court would otherwise have done were they 
asked simply to make a public figure libel rule, and different from what every 
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other open libel democracy in the world has subsequently decided to do. 
While Epstein concedes that the first amendment does concern common-law 
defamation, he has an issue with subjecting the common law to constitutional 
scrutiny by the court.62 He maintains that there was nothing wrong with the common-
law rule of defamation’s balance between speech and reputation, which was shaped 
over hundreds of years.63 There was also no constitutional duty that the Supreme 
Court constructs an amended law of defamation. Lastly, the liability required for 
common-law defamation is strict liability. However, the ‘actual malice’ rule created 
by the court lies in-between strict liability and no liability, which begs the question: 
“what public interest can justify the deviation from these ordinary standards of 
liability?”64 The decision was tactical – in order to save the Times from possible 
financial ruin.65 The United States Supreme Court had to show that Alabama had 
misapplied their law of defamation, and violated a federal constitutional law rule. 
Accordingly, it became crucial to constitutionalise a part of common-law defamation. 
Epstein strongly believes that the New York Times v Sullivan decision is dubious 
and wrongly decided:66 it “shows that it is as easy to pervert common law rules as it 
is to pervert direct regulation”.67 
The problem with the New York Times case, as well as with many other cases, 
seems to be embodied in “case-based law-making”68 as highlighted in Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service v Chadha, in that the “unrepresentative nature of the 
particular facts before the Court had produced the wrong result for the larger class”69 
of cases. In this regard, Epstein comments as follows as regards the New York 
Times case: 
It is one thing to condemn the common law of defamation as it was applied in a 
single case, and it is quite a different thing to condemn the basic set of common 
law principles in their entirety.70 
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Schauer and Zeckhauser question the ability of cases to make laws.71 The authors 
acknowledge that “judges serve, at least in part, as law-makers and policy-
makers”.72 Courts create laws and establish policies all the time, which in their view 
is: 
…an inevitable consequence of the indeterminacy and open-endedness both of 
the common law and of the vague language in which many constitutional and 
statutory provisions are drafted.73 
Schauer and Zeckhauser argue that courts create laws and policies for future 
litigants in similar cases where there might not be a distinctly established law or 
policy, yet their “necessary and usually desirable focus on the particular litigants and 
their particular actions is a flawed platform for more broad-based policy-making”.74 
Policies are by nature vague, broad and indefinite, both by definition and 
necessity.75 Policies are vague because policy-making entails framing a policy that 
will deal with numerous conducts or acts by numerous individuals in numerous 
places at numerous times.76 As “a course of action”,77 a policy, in essence, 
constitutes a total resolution of what ought to be acceptable and agreeable across 
a variety of occasions.78 Yet, in order to make this total resolution, the well-informed 
policy-maker must be capable of surveying at first what these occasions, in future, 
are inclined to be. This involves extensive research and resolutions that are usually 
put in place when the legislature considers law reforms. Courts, however, “are 
especially structurally ill-equipped to assess the full field of potential applications of 
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any ruling”.79 They are lacking: 
…an investigate arm and often even the rudiments of non-case-specific factual 
research capabilities, can actually go out and find the information it might need 
to understand the full import of one of its rulings.80 
The ideal policy-maker is one who surveys a multiplicity of acts from different actors, 
and predicts how the intended policy can both be relevant and implemented, as well 
as what the benefits and costs resulting from applying its alternatives could be.81 
The manner in which this survey must take place is legion – there is no one practical 
survey and prognosis that will be relevant for all policies or to all kinds of policies.82 
Yet, the objective of each survey is distinct, and that is to ascertain not only what 
actions are occurring, but also what modification in those actions will be attained by 
some policy, or even by some transformations in society.83 It is in the light of all 
these inherent difficulties embedded in policy-making that the dangers of using 
litigation as a form of policy-making can be highlighted because litigation illustrates 
notable perils of misrepresentation.84 
Law-making is evident in appellate judicial interpretation “for to give reasons is to 
make a claim about a type or category that is necessarily broader than the particular 
instance that the reason is a reason for”.85 The impact of reasons given by courts 
for their judgments in a specific case extends beyond that case, and has the 
capability to influence numerous future cases. When an appellate court pronounces 
what could be deemed a rule, the influence of its decision is even greater: 
…than simply giving a reason, for a rule, even more than a reason, necessarily 
and by reason of its generality encompasses instances other than the one that 
initially inspired the announcement of the rule.86  
The difficulty with this kind of rule or policy-making seems to be the unrestrained 
influence of a court judgment which was reached in one specific case, and the ease 
with which its scope extends over a multiplicity of cases while it emanated from 
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different and peculiar circumstances. The problem with making use of a particular 
case for creating law is the manner in which that specific case, the specific facts and 
the specific parties of the case are probable to control a judicial survey and 
consideration of the material landscape. Courts may be too quickly in assuming that 
a policy created for one case or practice will cover all future cases or practices, as 
if the current case is similar to and representative of all future disputes.87 It is 
submitted that this assumption is incorrect, and a recipe for distortion, and may lead 
to “ineffective and perhaps harmful policy”.88 The problem is further exacerbated by 
the fact that many cases where rules are created, are unrepresentative or celebrity 
(newsworthy) cases, as, for example, the New York Times case. Yet, as Schauer 
and Zeckhauser point out: 
Over-emphasis on unrepresentative specific cases in policy-making appears 
across a wide range of regulatory/ rule-making institutions, and is hardly 
restricted to litigation-based policy-making.89 
There is nowadays much rule-making taking place in the United States in response 
to already completed cases, where bills bear the name of the victim of the particular 
case, for example, Megan’s Law (requiring all released sex offenders to register with 
local authorities). These case-generated laws based on celebrity cases can in many 
instances be considered unrepresentative of the greater group. In such cases, the 
legislator who enact the law: 
...may recognize the case-based law as somewhat misdirected, but feel they 
have no choice but to respond to public outrage over a heinous act, and a law 
enshrining a victim, even an uncharacteristic victim, is often the easy path to 
follow.90 
It seems that when United States legislators enact laws, they are progressively 
replicating law-making litigation by replying on specific and mostly unrepresentative 
examples. This can also be seen in current legislative hearings where victims and 
case studies are heeded rather than experts on the relevant fields.91 Wagner also 
points out that regulating through litigation is inadequate because, amongst other 
things: 
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...courts lack democratic legitimacy to resolve inherently political issues about 
the level and appropriateness of government intervention.92 
This view is supported by O’Scannlain who argues that judicial law-making is “a 
troubling trend”93 which is unconstitutional, and threatens constitutional democracy. 
In particular circumstances of constitutional determination, courts are frequently 
requested to analyse and judge the legitimacy of generally enacted democratic 
laws.94 As was the finding of the court in Marbury v Madison, judicial review forms 
part of what Marshall CJ termed “the judicial duty”.95 However, this understanding 
of the judicial role is not the original stance expressed by the United States Founding 
Fathers: 
…federal courts were never thought to be a council of revision with a roving 
commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and 
federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the country.96 
While performing their judicial duty, courts are frequently introduced into 
disputatious diversified social controversies, for example, affirmative action, the 
abolition of the death penalty, abortion, physician-assisted suicide, same-sex 
marriage, and so on. It is a worrying fact that some litigants very often take these 
cases to the courts mainly because they do not want to embark on the democratic 
process, or because they have previously been unsuccessful in the legislative 
sphere.97 In this regard, “recourse to the courts … is seen as a natural move for 
interests disadvantaged in majoritarian legislative politics”.98 This shift has resulted 
in that courts no longer are “outside of the policy process but more typically now 
constitute just another … stage in the … process of policy formation”.99 Political and 
ordinary litigants have noticed that judges have made their courthouses easily 
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Turning to the judiciary in order to accomplish what could be political ends might 
seem attractive. It could be because - as opposed to having to sway a bicameral 
legislature, the President, and electorate constituencies, as represented by these 
elected officials - political litigants can restrict their focal point on one trial judge, or 
two judges out of a panel of the appeal court, or five judges out of the nine on the 
High Court; not any of them elected.101 Moreover, in the United States, it is known 
that the constitutional process decreed for enacting legislation entails 536 political 
actors, making it formidable and burdensome, yet, that is how the system was 
designed to govern.102 As Kavanaugh puts it, “the United States constitutional 
structure tilts towards liberty”.103 The predisposition for liberty and self-rule is 
weakened and subverted when judges open the courtroom with the objective of 
making law. 
When courts exercise the role of the legislature, “they create perverse incentives for 
political actors”.104 As courts show their willingness to legislate, litigants, who are 
termed ‘political litigants’ and interest groups, find litigation less expensive and 
easier than involving the democratic process. As such, their focal point became the 
courts with all their resources.105 This undermines and devalues democratic 
responsiveness, and also weakens the electoral system through which the people 
commonly keep political actors answerable for their acts. Courts should restrict 
themselves to executing their constitutional function; people who seek policy 
changes are compelled to engage the country’s democratic processes for 
change.106  
Where a certain legislative enactment breaches the initial understanding of the 
Constitution, a judge may strike down such an enactment. If done in this 
circumstance, the court’s action constitutes “an end run around popular 
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government”.107 The problem remains how to differentiate between constitutionally 
sanctioned judicial-law making,108 and impermissible judicial legislation. In order to 
safeguard the proper exercise of judicial authority, O’Scannlain advocates 
grounding the practice “on the Constitution’s text, structure and history as 
constraining forces”.109 In the absence of such restrictions: 
Judges are nothing more than politicians in robes, free to tackle the social 
problems of the day based on avant-garde constitutional theory or worse yet, 
their own personal preferences. While such jurists may often be well meaning, 
their approach is inconsistent with our government’s history, structure, and 
framework, and it threatens the ideal of self-rule that we should so dearly 
cherish.110  
Instead of clearing the cautiously constructed ‘veto gates’ that curb and direct the 
legislative procedure, litigants are required only to prevail in litigation to make their 
political predisposition the law.111 Making use of the courts to develop public policy 
might seem easier for political standing in the short term, yet it essentially imperils 
“the foundational premises of our nation and imposes serious long-term costs”112 
Not only does judicial legislation breach the constitutional design and adherence to 
democratic self-rule; in a constitutional sphere it has a tendency to solidify the law 
in place. On the occasion the judiciary strikes down laws as incompatible with the 
Constitution, it is virtually not possible to negate and rescind such judicial veto. The 
legislatures speak for wide and different interests, they possess unrivalled and more 
extensive fact-finding and data-collecting capabilities, and are “sufficiently 
numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude”.113 In contrast, courts 
must adjudge the questions and facts as formulated simply by the particular litigants 
before them. In other words, courts lack the conventional capabilities to determine 
the wide issues of public policy.  
Under the United States Constitution, the constitutional separation of powers was 
originally designed to restrict the role of the courts; assigning the practice of self-
rule by the democratic arms of government to the people. This was designed by 
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allocating the law-making role to the people and their elected representatives, and 
not the judiciary.114 The constitutional separation of powers under the United States 
Constitution vests distinct roles to each government arm: 
The Constitution’s three “vesting” clauses … effect a complete division of 
otherwise unallocated federal governmental authority among the 
constitutionally specified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Any 
exercise of governmental power, and any governmental institution exercising 
that power, must either fit within one of the three categories thus established or 
find explicit constitutional authorization for such deviation. The separation of 
powers principle is violated whenever the categorizations of the exercise of 
power and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not 
specifically permit such blending.115 
Even though the United States Constitution separates the powers of the three 
branches of government, its text does “not purport to tell us how strict the resultant 
separation has to be”.116 It is conceded that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not require that the integrated “departments ought to have no partial agency in, or 
no control over, the acts of each other”.117 This uncertainty about the precise 
boundaries of government powers has resulted in courts overstepping their 
assigned functions. Yet the Framers of the United States Constitution “went into 
great lengths to establish judicial separation from the legislative and executive 
branches.118 The Constitution places the power to legislate or to make law “in the 
people’s representatives and reserves for the judiciary the power to interpret those 
laws”.119  
In Washington v Glucksberg, the court had to decide whether there was a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS).120 The Anglo-
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American common law has punished or condemned assisted suicide for over 700 
years,121 and surveys amongst the Washington voters indicated a rejection of the 
initiative.122 However, during recent decades, much progress has been made in 
medical technology which has resulted in lengthening life. Some states started 
examining different procedures in order to protect the dignity and independence of 
dying persons, which included specific types of PAS.123 In this case, the litigants, a 
group of doctors, three terminally ill patients, and a non-profit organisation that 
counsels people considering PAS, turned to the courts for legislative reform. The 
litigants alleged that Washington state’s ban against ‘causing’ or ‘aiding’ a suicide 
breached the United States Constitution:124  
…the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult 
to perform physician-assisted suicide.125 
This group was demanding that the courts, and not the legislature, change the 
preferences of a majority of Washington voters by developing a historically unknown 
constitutional right.126 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, and found that 
Washington state’s prohibition amounted to a violation of the Constitution.127 On 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court, a panel of three judges held that this decision 
should be reversed as it found that there was no historical premise for the 
constitutional right claimed by the plaintiffs.128 That decision was later heard again 
by another panel of eleven judges of the Ninth Circuit, who reversed the previous 
panel’s decision, and confirmed the decision of the district court. O’Scannlain 
contends that this decision confirming the district court’s finding was erroneous:  
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There was no historically-based constitutional right to physician-assisted 
suicide. The Constitution’s structure demanded that the citizens of Washington, 
not “six men and two women, endowed with life tenure and clocked in judicial 
robes”, decide whether physician-assisted suicide should be permitted in the 
state. Not only was the en banc panel’s decision wrong as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, but the application of its incorrect analysis resulted 
in the rejection of the considered policy choice of Washington voters.129 
Since the contended right, namely, PAS, was not firmly entrenched in the nation’s 
history, customs and constitutional outlook, the practice was not safeguarded under 
the United States Constitution. To put such right into effect would have “reversed 
centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and struck down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State”, which is not the function of a federal court.130 The 
eight unelected judges in this case, by means of very broad legislation, and without 
adequate justification, invalidated the policy preference of Washington voters, and, 
by constitutionalising the issue, withdrew the question from the public sphere.131 
PAS is an issue of tremendous public significance, and: 
…the Founding Fathers did not establish the United States as a democratic 
republic so that elected officials would decide trivia, while all great questions 
would be decided by the Judiciary.132 
By rejecting the views of the voters, the court destroyed the legitimacy of the 
judiciary as an establishment, and endangered the “public’s confidence in the 
legitimacy of judicial nullification of the will of the electorate”.133 The United States 
Supreme Court subsequently reversed the en banc panel’s decision, and “explicitly 
recognized the dangers inherent in disregarding historically grounded constitutional 
inquiry and the impermissibility of judicial legislation”.134 It was up to the citizens of 
Washington to make their preferences and to decide whether there is such a 
constitutional right, and not eight judges or the courts. 
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v Hodges135 held that 
same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,136 and that as a result, “there is no lawful basis for a 
State to refuse to recognize”137 same-sex marriages. Kennedy J, who delivered the 
majority judgment, made “absolutely no effort to root the right to same-sex marriage 
in the original meaning of the Written Constitution”.138 Instead, he made his decision 
by relying on his ‘reasoned judgment’ and a “new insight”,139 on his “understanding 
of what freedom is and must become”,140 and on “a better informed understanding 
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our era”.141 
According to Roberts CJ, Kennedy J’ s decision was premised simply on his 
personal belief “that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a 
fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society”.142 
Yet, Roberts CJ and Scalia J made it clear in their dissent in the Obergefell case 
that the majority’s decision not only breached the rule of law, but that it might be 
viewed to have resulted in an illegitimate judicial law-making process.143 Critics of 
judicial activism and the United States Supreme Court’s rulings on policy issues do 
not regard the courts’ proper function to be that of policy making, in that: 
If one accepts, along with Churchill, that democracy with all its faults is the best 
form of Government – and even the most ardent defenders of judicial review 
purport to accept this – one must reject the notion that some issues of basic 
social policy are better decided by electorally unaccountable officials.144 
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This view disputes the notion that fundamental social policy issues are to be decided 
by electorally unaccountable officials, a standpoint that has been supported not only 
in the United States, but also in Canada, which will be subsequently discussed. 
3.2.2  Judicial law-making in Canada 
The judicial power to effect judicial legislation or invalidate legislation in Canada is 
embodied in section 52 of the Canadian Constitution Act, which was enacted in 
1982.145 However, like in the United States, in Canada these issues present 
confusion. There seems to be a lack of a coherent remedy to invalidate laws, as the 
scope and the extent of the judicial power in this regard remains unpredictable and 
unclear, as will become evident in this discussion. The 1982 Constitution is also 
thought to have entrusted the Supreme Court with a new role, namely, policy-
making,146 where “the court was required to resolve issues that would have been 
regarded as matters of policy for the legislative bodies”.147 
Canadian judges are making decisions that appear to be overstepping onto policy 
and politics – areas that were - in the past - assumed by many to be restricted to the 
elected legislature. This judicial role is criticised in Canada because it is considered 
to be a danger to democracy and good governance.148 Courts are considered to be 
undemocratic. Judges are viewed as an unaccountable branch of government 
because they are appointed, and not elected in the same way politicians are.149 In 
addition, when judges review policy, they are deemed to be “going beyond their 
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went to great lengths to establish judicial separation from the legislative and executive 
branches”. 
145  Section 52(1) of the Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 provides: “The Constitution of Canada is 
the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect”. 
146  Hogg 2001 The Canadian Bar Rev 171. 
147  Hogg 2001 The Canadian Bar Rev 171. See also Anand 2006 Constitutional Forum 87: “It is 
commonly believed that, prior to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
in 1982, judges interpreted the law, and did not take it upon themselves to make law. Thus, 
many people view the Charter as ushering an era of law-making by the judiciary. While there is 
truth in the statement that judges play a role in shaping government policy and legislation today 
than they did prior to 1982, it would be inaccurate to portray the judiciary of the past as not 
engaging in law-making”. 
148  McLachlin Judicial power and democracy 1. 
149  McLachlin Judicial power and democracy 1. 
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proper role”150 because the role of judges, on this assumption, is to construe the law 
and apply it. Law-making by judges overstep the conventional boundaries of the 
judiciary.151 McLachlin, however, questions this criticism of judicial law-making role, 
and claims that this criticism “rests on a simplistic and outdated view of how a 
modern democratic state functions”152 because, she adds, “democracy is a lot more 
complicated than elected representatives making the law”.153 Elected 
representatives have a role to play, and so do judges. Both these government 
branches are crucial to effective and just government.154 The performance of such 
power by unelected judges, in a democratic society, raises questions of 
legitimacy.155 The courts should exercise this role being mindful of the function of 
the other government’s branch, in that it should: 
…do its best to write opinions that leave room for the competent legislative body 
to enact remedial legislation, so that the democratic process, admittedly 
influenced by the Court, has the last word.156 
According to McLachlin, courts play an important and complimentary function. This 
role also entails law-making, albeit in a dissimilar way, and can be illustrated in the 
following terms.157 First, under the common law, courts continue to play an essential 
and significant fundamental role in developing and transforming the law in order to 
meet society’s changing needs in particular circumstances.158 Legislation is wide 
and general, and the elected legislature might not foresee all possible applications. 
In the event that such unexpected cases are brought to court, judges have to 
develop the law in order to cover such circumstances.159 However, this role and 
authority is under the control of the legislature because it can “intervene either to 
‘correct’ what it perceives to be unwise judicial decisions or to enact more general 
codes of rules in particular areas”.160 Second, judges are required to give meaning 
to words or phrases where none appear clear from the legislature’s enacted text of 
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the legislation.161 Not to perform this role would be as ‘activist’ as to do so, and 
judges have to refrain from developing “a legislative purpose to suit the solution 
desired by the judge”.162  
A third function of judges entails law-making relating to the Constitution. Written 
constitutions place two obligations on the courts; firstly, the courts must construe 
the constitution when there is uncertainty regarding its application. Second, the 
courts must, when issues are brought before them, decide whether the legislature 
had the authority to enact the law, or performing a questioned action by the 
executive.163 When a court construes the Constitution in a manner that some people 
might not agree with, or strikes down legislation as invalid, this cannot be avoided 
in a constitutional democracy. This courts’ role is premised on the assumption that: 
…there must be a body that determines whether the legislature is acting within 
its powers under the Constitution. That body must be judicial, since the issue is 
a legal issue.164   
A fourth judicial function overlaps with the three mentioned above, and entails 
individual rights.165 While the legislature is concerned with enacting laws that 
respect individual rights, it may not foresee that there might be applications that 
would breach those rights.166 
Finally, rights are described in ‘wide’ and ‘elastic’ terms, which might necessitate a 
judicial determination of their scope and extent in specific situations. These factors 
might suggest that courts would inevitably be involved whenever rights are at issue. 
Courts, while reviewing unforeseen applications and supervising the work of the 
other branches of government or administrative tribunals, and construing the scope 
of the rights and freedoms, “necessarily find themselves engaged in law-making. 
Much of this law-making could not be done by the legislatures, however, much they 
might wish to do so”.167  
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While the Canadian Constitution is thought to have entrusted each branch of 
government with a specific role, there remains confusion regarding the extent of 
judicial functions, and it is assumed, amongst other things, that “courts are running 
the country, at the expense of parliament and the executive”.168 Furthermore, it is 
argued that it is also incorrect to assume and question whether the Canadian 
Charter has given the courts too much power, as this, according to McLachlin, 
amounts to “the wrong question”.169 Instead, the question should be: “what does the 
Constitution say the three branches of government should be doing?”170 
McLachlin questions Bickel’s concept171 that alludes to the fact that it is only elected 
representatives or elected officials that can legitimately exercise authority on behalf 
of the people they rule. While this claim is powerful and attractive, she adds, “it 
founders on the rocks of reality”172 because the Canadian Charter does not create 
a constitutional democracy which confines authority and entrusts powers totally to 
the elected representatives, but also to the courts. The Canadian courts’ 
constitutional role can be defined in the following terms.173 First, the courts’ role is 
to define the boundaries of the separation of the legislative authorities between the 
federal and provincial governments. Second, the courts determine or rule on 
questionable legislation or legislation considered to be unconstitutional when 
viewed in breach of the Charter’s considerations, and in so doing define the scope 
of constitutional rights and freedoms.174 Thirdly, the courts’ role is to play an 
oversight or supervisory role over administrative tribunals created by the 
legislature.175 The courts have not gone beyond their proper role because of the role 
allotted to them by the Constitution:  
It is not for judges to set the agendas for social change, or to impose their 
personal views on society. The role of the judge is to support the rule of law, not 
the rule of whim. Judges are human beings; but they must strive to judge 
impartially after considering the facts, the law, and the submissions of parties 
on all sides of the question.176  
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When commenting on the Canadian Charter violations and judges’ role, Duclos and 
Roach177 concur with McLachlin that the Canadian Constitution “sets the boundaries 
of permitted legislative action, within the courts patrol”.178 The legislature is free to 
act within it, once these boundaries are determined. The courts are entrusted by the 
Constitution with some power to safeguard the boundaries, but not to overstep 
“within the legislative domain and substitute its opinion for that of the legislature”.179 
However, courts should be restricted in applying the remedies entrusted to it where 
the Constitution sets its parameters.180  
Yet, it is argued that the choice of whether to develop or nullify an “underinclusive 
statute”181 cannot be derived either from the conclusion that the legislation is under-
inclusive, or from constitutional provisions such as sections 24(1) and 26 of the 
Charter, and section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In these and other remedial 
instances, “courts must exercise remedial discretion”.182 However, it is conceded 
that there are difficulties with remedial discretion which courts can apply in 
protecting rights, because: 
In the Charter context, the remedies can nullify state action which is thought to 
invade the new boundaries which protect the individual from the state.183 
In other cases, the remedial discretion might present a problem since the remedy 
merely follows the court’s construction of the Constitution, and the nature of the 
violated right is assumed to command the remedial outcome.184 There are three 
approaches currently applied by the Canadian Supreme Court when determining 
the unconstitutionality of legislation, namely, courts strike out under-inclusive 
statutes; courts make an order regarding the remedy the legislature would have 
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desired; and courts make an order which amounts to the “least disruptive 
remedy”.185 The first approach is criticised because “it erroneously dictates 
invalidation as the only remedial choice”.186 The latter two are criticised because 
“they force courts to speculate on matters best left to legislatures”.187 It is unclear 
which legislature a court would have to look to in order to ascertaining the elusive 
intention when enacting the questioned legislation: 
Should it conduct an historical enquiry into what the enacting legislature would 
have intended or should it second guess what the current legislature would do 
if it responded to this new problem? Given that the legislation that the enacting 
legislature in fact intended is unconstitutional, it is impossible to know what the 
legislature’s intentions would have been if this had been realized.188 
At times, a court may make use of a remedy which is the least disruptive considering 
the costs of numerous government policies, however, this approach, like other 
approaches premised on legislative intention, can be criticised because it “does not 
guarantee progressive outcomes any more than does an approach based on 
legislative intention”.189 In the same way, it is difficult for a court to predict or 
determine how a court can second-guess a legislature’s policy preferences - it is 
also burdensome for a court to try to conduct some budget calculations and weigh 
social costs and benefits.190 Furthermore, these approaches are unable to present 
a constructive relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, one which 
respects the constitutional boundaries and establishment’s roles.191  
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Yet, when commenting on constitutional remedies, Fish claims there are two 
conflicting remedies which assist courts in applying the discretion to resolve a 
conflict between a legislation and the Constitution.192 He terms the first approach 
‘editorial restraint’ where courts are empowered to assume as little power to develop 
or change legislation as possible. The second approach, called ‘purposive 
preservation’, focuses on applying a remedy that does the least damage to the 
legislature’s policy preferences.193 In contrast to Duclos and Roach, Fish maintains 
that it is this latter approach which has been adopted and applied by the Canadian 
Supreme Court.194 What follows is a brief juridical overview of how the Canadian 
Supreme Court has applied these remedial approaches, and defined its law-making 
role as enunciated by McLachlin and other proponents of this idea. 
In Rosenberg and Another v Attorney General of Canada,195 the Income Tax Act 
permitted the registration of a private pension plan with Revenue Canada; only if the 
plan restricts survivor benefits to spouses of the opposite sex. Spousal benefits were 
not available to same-sex couples. In order to be accepted for registration, a 
proposed plan must conform to certain regulations under this Act. If a plan provided 
survivor benefits to same-sex couples, it could not be registered, and these persons 
could not receive tax benefits available to couples of the opposite sex who are either 
married, or living in a common-law relationship of some permanence.196 In the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, Abella JA held that this legislation was unconstitutional 
because it violates the Charter’s right to equality.197 She also found this not to be an 
appropriate case to defer to the legislature, and cited with approval the decision of 
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Iacobucci J in Vriend v Alberta, where it was stated that: 
Parliament has its role … But the courts also have a role: to determine, 
objectively and impartially, whether Parliament’s choices fall within limiting 
framework of the Constitution.198 
Consequently, she found that the definition of ‘spouse’ in the Income Tax Act was 
unconstitutional, and that such a violation can be remedied through “reading the 
words ‘and same sex’ into that section”.199 
In Egan and Another v Canada,200 the appellants were a same-sex couple who have 
lived together since 1948 in a relationship similar to that one expects to find in a 
marriage. Section 19(1) of the Old Age Security Act provides for allowances which 
are available to spouses between 60 and 65 years whose combined income falls 
below a fixed level.201 Even though these benefits were applicable, the appellant’s 
application was rejected on the ground that the couple’s relationship did not fall 
within the definition of ‘spouse’ in section 2, which includes: 
A person of the opposite sex who is living with that person, having lived with 
that person for at least one year, if the two persons have publicly represented 
themselves as husband and wife. 
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
eligibility for the spousal allowance constitutes a violation of the right to equality, 
because the denial of the allowance was premised in an “irrelevant distinction based 
upon sexual orientation”.202 The court went further to insert the following definition 
into the legislation: 
“spouse”, in relation to any person, includes a person who is living with that 
person, having lived with that person for at least one year, if the two persons 
have publicly represented themselves as husband and wife or as in an 
analogous relationship.203 
On 19 December 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court in Gosselin v Attorney 
General of Quebec204 had to determine whether the Charter of Rights included a 
‘social charter’ - requiring that individuals be provided with economic and social 
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security.205 The majority of the court decided against this position in a majority of 
five out of nine judges.206 The case dealt with the Quebec207 social welfare policy, 
which, in the event it was found to be invalid under the Charter, would have resulted 
in the Quebec government having to pay millions of dollars in compensation.208 The 
majority held that Charter Rights (s 7 espousing liberty and security of the person) 
did not include a ‘social charter’ requiring that individuals be provided economic and 
social security.209 Arbour and L’Heureux-Dube JJ, in dissent, concluded that section 
7 of the Charter required that the state provides for a person’s basic needs, which 
they found to include social rights.210 In reaching this conclusion, Arbour J reasoned 
that: 
The right to a minimum level of social assistance is intimately intertwined with 
considerations related to one’s basic health and, at the limit, even one’s survival. 
These rights can be readily accommodated under the section 7 rights to “life, 
liberty and security of the person” without the need to constitutionalize “property” 
rights or interests. Nor should the interest claimed in this case be ruled out 
because it fails to exhibit the characteristics of a “legal right”.211 
In support of her finding, Arbour J went on to decree that “section 7 must be 
interpreted as protecting something more than merely negative rights”,212 or the 
rights embodied in it. This understanding of the Charter is disputed by the majority 
judgment (McLachlin CJ) in that the Canadian jurisprudence hitherto shows nothing 
suggesting “that section 7 places a positive obligation on the state to ensure that 
each person enjoys life, liberty or security of the person”.213   
In the 1992 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter v Canada,214 the 
respondent’s spouse was allowed 15 weeks of maternity benefits under section 30 
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of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.215 He had first applied for benefits under 
section 30 regarding the time he had to take off work, but because section 30 was 
limited to maternity benefits of three weeks, he changed his application to section 
32 benefits, where adoptive parents were allowed 15 weeks’ leave after the 
placement of the child. The respondent’s application was denied. The respondent 
appealed to the Federal Court, and argued that section 32 discriminated between 
natural and adoptive parents, and violated his rights under section 15 of the 
Charter.216 The trial court found a violation of section 15 of the Charter. The 
Employment and Immigration Commission appealed this decision to the Canadian 
Supreme Court. This court confirmed that the differentiation between adoptive and 
biological parents violates the Constitution, however, the court, when considering 
the appropriate remedial option, held that: 
…without a mandate based on a clear legislative objective, it would be 
imprudent for the court to take the course of reading the excluded group into the 
legislation.217  
Furthermore, Lamer CJ reasoned that the finding against reading-in the remedial 
course was premised on the type of benefit and the group size to which the benefit 
seeks to be extended, and this option would have constituted “a substantial intrusion 
into the legislative domain”.218 These latter views are also in accord with McClung 
JA’s finding in the Court of Appeal for Alberta in Vriend v Alberta,219 who suggested 
that ‘reading up’ amounts to an intrusion of the judiciary into the legislative domain, 
which should be prevented whenever possible. In an appeal to the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Vriend v Alberta,220 this court also seemed to be reluctant to 
exercise the reading-in option, and also found that the “responsibility of enacting 
legislation that accords with the rights guaranteed by the Charter rests with 
legislature”.221 Furthermore, it also cautioned that the courts should not “second-
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guess legislatures and executives”222 when performing remedial actions on 
unconstitutional legislation. Yet, the Court found that an appropriate remedial course 
would be that the declaration of invalidity be suspended for one year in order to 
allow the legislature time to bring the questionable provisions into line with the 
Constitution.223  
Marshall J in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v Newfoundland Association of Public 
Employees (NAPE),224 in an unanimous Court of Appeal decision (of three judges), 
found that the provincial legislation denying retroactive pay equalization to a group 
of female employees breached section 15 of the Charter, but it was saved under 
section 1 since it served what was considered to be “a legitimate deficit-reducing 
purpose”.225 When commenting on the role of the judiciary within the context of 
judicial law-making, Marshall J criticised the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
jurisprudence of “undue incursions … into the public domain of the elected branches 
of government”.226 He emphasised that courts and legislatures have different roles 
with regard to public policy, with there being: 
…the doctrine of separation of powers accommodates no role in policy making 
for the judiciary beyond that consequential to passing upon whether executive 
and legislative measures achieved their intended policy through interpretations 
of their scope.227  
To do otherwise would violate the separation of powers doctrine.228 Agreeing with 
Marshall J’s finding in this case, Choudhry and Hunter have chartered the levels and 
scope of judicial activism in the Supreme Court of Canada during the period 1984 
to 2002, and conclude that while there are instances where the courts’ interference 
could have been considered to be legitimate and appropriate, still:  
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Because we are not able to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate 
interferences, we are not able to ascertain whether the levels of appropriate 
interference stay constant over time, or whether there is significant variation in 
the levels of appropriate interference.229 
Since it is not possible to establish appropriate or inappropriate incursions, it is also 
not possible to measure the standards of proper incursions, or whether their 
standards vary over time. McLachlin’s views on the role of Canadian Supreme Court 
comprehensively present a notion that have been termed ‘judicial supremacy’ or 
‘judicial activism’ which has been criticised for entrusting the unelected judiciary with 
more powers than the other branches to determine the constitutionality of laws, or 
conduct of the elected representatives of the people.230 Many critics opposing 
McLachlin’s perspectives question and reject the legitimacy of a court bestowed with 
unrestrained powers to invalidate elected representatives’ policies, in line with 
Bickel’s claim that when a court: 
…declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will of the representatives of the people.231  
As seen in Marshall J’s reasoning in Newfoundland (Treasury Board), Canadian 
judges hold divergent views regarding the meaning and scope of judicial law-making 
or judicial activism as provided by the Canadian Charter and Constitution. These 
different views reflect the viewpoints of many justices in the United States as well. 
In the following section, it will be investigated whether South African courts also 
experience similar predicaments. 
3.2.3  Judicial law-making in South Africa 
During the apartheid regime in South Africa, courts were not allowed to make any 
laws or extend any definition of crimes, as this function fell solely within the 
legislature’s peripheries. Courts could only interpret laws strictly “within the 
framework of the words used by the legislature”.232 The adoption of the South 
African Constitution has changed this role significantly. As a result of the powers 
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derived from the Constitution, the South African judiciary in the post-democratic 
constitutional era has asserted its influence on the development of the law and 
public policy. This is a situation which, according to many, is worrisome, and 
demands closer scrutiny. 
Section 173233 of the Constitution vests the courts with the power to develop the 
common law when such development is deemed to be in the interests of justice. 
This constitutional judicial law-making framework presents a difficulty in determining 
the authority of courts in developing laws or public policy, as its scope, methodology 
and the limits of this process remains inexplicable in the Constitution. Section 39(2) 
of the Constitution enjoins the courts to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights when developing common law or customary law. What follows is a brief 
overview of how this judicial law-making role has been exercised and defined by the 
courts, and in South African jurisprudence.  
The case of Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another234 dealt 
with the constitutional validity of the common-law definition of rape to the extent that 
it excluded anal penetration, and was gender-specific. The accused (applicant) was 
convicted in the regional court of the rape of a nine-year-old girl for unlawfully and 
intentionally having anal intercourse with her, without her consent. The regional 
court had found the common-law definition of rape to be unconstitutional, and had 
extended it to include acts of non-consensual sexual penetration of the male penis 
into the anus of another person. The High Court had agreed with this finding by the 
regional court, and the matter came before the Constitutional Court for confirmation 
under section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.235 While the Constitutional Court (11 
judges sitting) found the common-law definition of rape unconstitutional to the extent 
that it excluded anal penetration, there was, however, no consensus regarding the 
constitutional validity of the definition’s gender-specific qualifications.236 
                                                          
233  For the contents of s 173, see Chapter 1 footnote 29. 
234  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) 
(hereinafter Masiya). See also the discussion in para 1.5.5 of this study. 
235  Masiya 436-437. Section 172(2)(a): “The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of 
similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament 
… but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court”. 
236  Masiya 454f-455d, 451f-g. 
134 
 
In a judgment delivered by Nkabinde J, the majority of the Constitutional Court 
(Moseneke DCJ, Kondile J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Van der Westhuizen 
J, Yaccob J and Van Heerden AJ) described the justification for the definition’s 
development in the following terms: 
…the extension of the common-law definition of rape to include non-consensual 
anal penetration of females will be in the interests of justice and will have, as its 
aim, the proper realisation by the public of the principles, ideals and values 
underlying the Constitution.  
The proficiency of the interests-of-justice test to developing laws remains 
questionable, and has been disapproved in other jurisdictions. For example, as a 
test for the development of hearsay evidence,237 the Hong Kong Law Reform 
Commission has criticised this test as being open-ended, and prone to contributing 
to uncertainty in the law. This Law Reform Commission rejected South Africa’s 
response as regards the ‘interest of justice’ test as being too subjective as: “It 
permits of personal value-judgement and is often referred to as ‘palm-tree 
justice’”.238 Similar concerns were expressed by the Irish Law Reform 
                                                          
237  Section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 of South Africa: “Subject to 
the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as evidence at criminal 
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(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
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(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and  
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account, is of the 
opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice”. 
238  Yan-lung Hearsay in criminal proceedings para.8.20. At para 8.21, it is noted that “In the result, 
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statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter 
stated if, but only if – 
(a) any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, 
(b) any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible,  
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or 




In a minority judgment delivered by Langa CJ, (Sachs J concurring), the two judges 
agreed with the reasoning of the majority that the definition of rape fails to meet the 
spirit, purport and objects protected in the Bill of Rights, however, they found that 
the court’s development should go “further so that it includes the anal rape of 
men”.240 What is interesting with their reasoning is that while the majority of the court 
endorsed the application of the interests of justice as a capable framework to 
develop laws as provided by section 173 of the Constitution, they (the minority) also 
found that this common-law definition should in addition also be developed through 
the section 39(2) framework, namely, ‘the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’. As discussed earlier, like the interests-of-justice test, the scope and extent 
of this latter test is not comprehensively defined in the Constitution. 
Snyman criticises the Constitutional Court’s decision in the Masiya case because 
he finds that the court acted out of its judicial function, and breached the principle of 
legality when extending the scope of rape to include penile penetration of the anus. 
The development of the law to this extent constitutes a role which he finds to be 
within the terrain of the legislature. Secondly, he maintains that the common-law 
rape definition - which is limited to penile non-consensual penetration of a female 
into the vagina - had a sound premise, and did not discriminate against females, 
and in his view, there was no justification for its development.241 
The Court’s judgment did not only violate the common-law principle of legality but 
also section 35(3)(k) of the Constitution, where this principle is constitutionalised as 
it provides that every accused person has a right not to be convicted for an act or 
omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the 
time it was committed or omitted.242 At the core of this principle is the understanding 
that “courts may not create crimes”.243 The general principle, Snyman adds, “is iudis 
est ius dicere sed nod dare: the function of a judge is not to create new law, but to 
                                                          
239  Irish Law Reform Commission Report Hearsay in civil and criminal cases para 5.32. See also 
Mhlanga An analysis of the impact of the admission of hearsay evidence 115-118. 
240  Masiya paras 465h-j. 
241  Snyman 2007 SALJ 677-678. 
242  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
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interpret existing law”.244 Otherwise, such conduct of a court breaches the role of 
the legislature, and also violates the concept that the legislative and judicial roles of 
the state must be partitioned.245 
The Court also premised its power to develop the scope of the crime on the 
constitutional provisions of section 39(2), which provides that a court must promote 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing common law.246 
The Court held that this provision of the Constitution has entrusted it with power 
which included the “incremental”247 development of the law. This understanding of 
section 39(2), is, however, disputed and it is argued that ‘developing’, as provided 
by section 39(2), does not entail any authority to expand the definitional elements 
of any crime to include conditions not covered by the standing definition.248 The 
principle of legality, it is further contended, is not restricted to a prohibition on the 
courts against developing new crimes, but “extends further to include a prohibition 
against extending the legal (abstract) definition or scope of existing crimes”.249  
The judgment is also criticised for constituting “an extension by analogy of the scope 
of a crime”.250 The court has found that penetration per anum should be considered 
as falling under the same genus as penetration per vaginam, because in the court’s 
view, it degraded females and violated their rights to dignity, freedom, and bodily 
security. The problem with this reasoning is that South African law is premised on 
the principle that a provision of criminal law which defines “the outer limits of liability 
should not, without very good reason, be extended by means of analogy”.251 
However, such use of analogy, if it is to the benefit of the accused, “in order to limit 
the field of operation of a criminal definition, is something different, and may be 
permissible”.252 It was not this understanding of analogy that was used in the 
                                                          
244  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
245  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. See also Burchell and Milton Principles of criminal law 94-106; 
Snyman Criminal law 39-50. 
246  See footnote 238 above where the minority judgment is rendered. 
247  Masiya paras 452d-f. 
248  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678. 
249  Snyman 2007 SALJ 678-679. 
250  Snyman 2007 SALJ 679. 
251  Snyman 2007 SALJ 679. See also R v Oberholzer 1941 OPD 48 60; S v Smith 1973 (3) SA 945 
(O) 947. 
252  Snyman 2007 SALJ 679: “The use of analogy to create a new defence is also admissible”. See 
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judgment, as the use of analogy was to extend the definition of a crime.253 
Continental writers are very doubtful regarding the use of analogy to establish the 
outer limits of a crime. They have often referred to the prejudice and dishonourable 
use of analogy by the courts in Nazi Germany to create new types of punishable 
acts:254  
The prohibition of interpretation by way of analogy in criminal law 
(Analogieverbot), which forms part of the principle of legality, means not only a 
prohibition on the creation of new crimes, but also a prohibition on the extension 
(Ausdenhung) of existing ones.255 
The interpreter of the law may not construe a definition in a manner that the 
interpretation surpasses the scope of the definitional components of the definition. 
In such cases, the interpreter construes the definition more broadly than is 
permitted, which is improper as “he may not widen the field of application of the 
definition of existing crimes”.256 To develop crimes’ definitions by analogy, as the 
Constitutional Court did in the Masiya case, could also result in legal uncertainty.257 
What is violated by this kind of interpretation, is the component of the aspect inferred 
in the principle of legality which provides that: 
…law, and more particularly the definitions and elements of a crime, should be 
as certain as possible (ius strictum) and … the interpretation of criminal provisions 
should be strict.258  
This principle has been accepted by South African courts, as in R v Sibiya, where 
Schreiner JA held that, if possible, there should be “a high degree of rigidity in the 
definition of crimes; the more precise the definition the better”.259 Marais J, in S v 
Augustine, found as regards the common-law crime of theft, that one will always find 
those: 
…who invites and favour “extensions” by the Court of the existing principles of 
the common law to encompass situations which they feel “should” be 
encompassed, even if they have not hitherto been so encompassed. I do not 
think the Courts should respond too readily to such invitations. Fundamental 
innovations of this kind are for the Legislature (if so advised) and not the 
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The view is that the role of the courts does not entail the development of the scope 
of existing common-law principles, but that the legislature is the proper branch to be 
involved with such ‘fundamental innovations’. There is another danger in extending 
the definitions of crimes by analogy, in that judges “may be unduly influenced by 
emotional considerations, the public media and pressure groups”.261 Snyman 
argues that the undue influence from pressure groups, public and media was 
apparent in Masiya in the “emotionally charged, and therefore vague, words and 
expressions used by the judges”.262 He provides the following examples from the 
judgment: 
“the crime of rape perpetuates gender stereotypes and discrimination” (para 
36); “humiliating” (para 26); “patriarchal stereotypes” (para 29); “the abhorrence 
with which our society regards these pervasive but outrageous acts” (para 44; 
“degrading, humiliating and traumatic” (para 30); “gross humiliation and 
indignity” (para 79); “feeling of righteousness” (para 9).263 
The court also expressly mentioned the role of pressure groups: 
Due in no small part to the work of women’s rights activists, there is wider 
acceptance that rape is criminal because it affects the dignity and personal 
integrity of women.264 
However, the analysis of claims from pressure groups is thought to be the function 
of parliament, and not that of the courts.265 In other words, the Constitutional Court 
took into account public opinion in making its decision, a decision-making process 
that was criticised and cautioned against by Chaskalson CJ in the Makwanyane 
judgment,266 and it now remains unclear how far courts can go in making reliance 
on public opinion.  
There is another ground why courts are not the correct forum to create crimes or 
extend the scope of an existing one, which is the fact that a court case deals with 
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the fate of a specific accused and a specific complainant.267 It is understood that the 
danger is that a court hearing a specific case may be swayed or influenced by 
emotions which the act of the individual accused, or the ordeal of the individual 
complainant may generate. Deliberations in parliament, on the other hand, are 
inclined to be: 
…more abstract in that they concentrate on the social evil in general; the 
temptation to be aroused by the passions generated by what happened in a 
particular instance with a particular accused or complainant is smaller.268  
This latter scepticism surrounding judicial law-making constitutes what O’Scannlain 
criticises as “judicial legislating”.269 There is a difference between the legitimate and 
vital function of the courts in striking down criminal-law principles which is 
unconstitutional, and the conduct of developing the scope of existing crimes, which 
“founders on the principle of legality”.270 Hoctor concurs with Snyman’s criticisms of 
the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Masiya, and argues that this was the 
approach taken by Appellate Division in Ex parte Minister van Justisie: in re S v J 
en S v Von Molendorff,271 by refusing to extend the ambit of the common-law crime 
of extortion to include non-patrimonial benefit. This court held that it was not the 
function of the courts to extend the scope of a common-law crime, and it be would 
a matter for the legislature to consider if there was a need for such development of 
law.272 
Phelps questions Snyman and Hoctor’s criticisms of the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Masiya case, because, in her view, the principle of legality should be 
seen as having been accounted for in the recognition that courts may develop 
common law by the constitutional provisions. As society is constantly changing, 
courts should develop common law in order to keep the law relevant, and to “prevent 
the common-law definitions of crimes from being relegated into the annals of 
history”.273 Phelps’ second justification for developing common-law crimes is to 
homogenise the common law with the Constitution, particularly as to the 
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fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.274 Furthermore, the separation of powers 
doctrine and the principle of legality are not a bar to this court’s role because: 
In this way the common-law grows, in the spirit of the Constitution, within the 
existing framework of crimes. If behaviour cannot legitimately fit into an existing 
common-law crime, and the existing definitions is nonetheless constitutional as 
it stands, then it is up to the legislature to intervene.275 
Developing common law, and bringing it in line with the Constitution should be 
welcomed, and courts should not: 
…pay lip service to this injunction [because] if courts cannot do the latter then 
the constitutional injunction for the courts to develop the common law in line 
with the Constitution is rendered meaningless.276  
It is difficult to agree with Phelps’ reasoning on the scope of the courts’ constitutional 
role to develop common-law crime definitions. As suggested by Snyman, courts’ 
deliberations suffer from a deficiency, in that they are only limited to the particular 
accused and complainant’s issues, and courts can be unduly influenced by the 
strong feelings generated by pressure groups in the court proceedings, such as in 
the Masiya case. Furthermore, as was argued earlier, courts lack the power and 
resources to implement its judgments - “like the Pope, the judiciary possesses no 
armies, and its sole power is the power to persuade”.277 Phelps’ view also blurs the 
constitutional boundaries between the courts and the legislature, a worrisome trend 
as pointed out by Ponnan JA in S v Matyityi: 
Our courts derive their power from the Constitution and, like other arms of State, 
owe their fealty to it. Our constitutional order can hardly survive if courts fail to 
properly patrol the boundaries of their own power by showing due deference to 
the legitimate domains of power the other arms of State.278 
If the courts’ role is to interpret laws enacted by the legislature, it seems to be correct 
to suggest that courts have a limited role to develop the common law because the 
South African constitutional order will not be able to endure if courts cannot contain 
and control the boundaries of their own power. Checks and balances forming part 
of the separation of powers doctrine require courts to ensure that all arms of 
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government, including the courts, should act within the Constitution and other laws. 
Embedded in this concept is the understanding that: 
Courts must defer to the appropriate branch of government when they cannot 
properly decide a matter without invading their terrain. They must not usurp the 
role of other arms of state and may not compromise their impartiality.279 
Because the courts’ use of its constitutional power under section 39(2) of the 
Constitution might be viewed as “thwarting the will of the representatives of the 
actual people of the here and now”,280 courts performing this role would have to be 
careful not to surpass or misuse these powers as “undue adventurism can be as 
damaging as excessive judicial timidity’”.281 This “counter-majoritarian difficulty”282 
in South African constitutional jurisprudence seems to be “one of the more serious 
problems the courts face when they engage in judicial activism”.283 This 
constitutional role, while it ensures that these branches of government perform their 
role in line with the Constitution, albeit a vital function, does not entrust the judiciary 
with “greater power than any other branch of government”.284 
The Constitutional Court’s case law show that the Court, in its attempt to perform its 
law-making role in terms of section 39(2), has in some cases gone against the will 
of the majority, and at times risked losing public confidence in the courts. In 
promoting the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, the Court has not only 
developed the common-law, but also developed policy issues. In S v Makwanyane 
and Others,285 the Court held that section 277(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act,286 
which allowed for the imposition of the death penalty for persons charged and 
convicted of murder, was unconstitutional because it violated, amongst other things, 
the right to human dignity, the right to life and the right not to be treated or punished 
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in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.287 This Court’s finding was reached despite 
the public outcry (which included a demand for a referendum on this issue), and the 
crime rate which seemed to be on the rise at that time, yet the death penalty and 
this legislation were declared unconstitutional. Chaskalson CJ stated that: 
…public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour.288  
He added that public opinion cannot be the decisive factor in such enquiries, else 
“there would be no need for constitutional adjudication”.289 It is conceded that courts 
should not base their judgments solely on public opinion, yet questions can be asked 
whether due to the magnitude of the policy involved in this specific case, why the 
nine unelected judges did not leave this policy issue to the more that 56 million 
South Africans to decide their policy preference. These latter concerns were also 
expressed by Scalia J in his dissenting judgment in the 2015 United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell, which declared same-sex marriage constitutional, in 
that:  
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans 
coast-to-coast, is the majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.290 
The Makwanyane judgment is thought not only to have abolished the death penalty, 
but Chaskalson JP’s reasoning is also understood to have: 
…attempted to close the back door to the revival of capital punishment through 
the popular will by rendering it almost impossible to justify any reinstatement of 
capital punishment by constitutional amendment.291  
The legitimacy of such kind of judicial power is criticised by Bickel who finds it to be 
undemocratic because, according to him, democracy does not denote perpetual 
reassessments of once-made decisions, however, it does require that “a 
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representative majority has the power to accomplish a reversal”.292 
In the case of Fourie,293 the Constitutional Court declared section 30(1) of the 
Marriage Act294 unconstitutional as it failed to recognise the right of same-sex 
couples to marry. It was contended by the applicants (Fourie and Bonthuys) that 
their exclusion from marrying each other comes from the common-law definition of 
marriage which is “a union of one man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it 
lasts, of all others”.295 In terms of section 30(1), a marriage officer must put to each 
of the parties the following question: 
Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no impediment to your 
proposed marriage with C.D. here present, and that you call all here present to 
witness that you take C.D. as your lawful wife (or husband)?’ and thereupon the 
parties shall give each other right hand and the marriage officer concerned shall 
declare the marriage solemnised in the following words: I declare that A.B. and 
C.D. here present have been lawfully married. 
The reference to wife or husband was said to have excluded same-sex couples. 
Sachs J, who delivered the judgment of the majority, held that section 30(1) should 
be read “as including words ‘or spouse’ after the words ‘or husband’ as they appear 
in the marriage formula”.296 These decisions were met with reservations by the 
general public, however, the legitimacy of the court was not weakened because 
these pronouncements were thought to have assisted in advancing and 
safeguarding human rights, in particularly the rights of minority groups, and 
amounted to progressive judicial activism.297 
The Constitutional Court in Carmichele298 had to adjudicate whether the Court 
should develop the common law of delict to afford the applicant a right to claim 
damages against the police or prosecutor’s negligence. It was held that section 
39(2), read with section 173 of the Constitution, created an obligation on the courts 
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to develop the common law of delict, and the scope of the state’s liability for 
negligence was extended to ensure the duty of the state to protect members of the 
public.299  
In the case of Stransham-Ford,300 the applicant, an advocate of the court, Mr 
Stransham-Ford, a 65-year-old male, was dying of prostate cancer. He instituted 
litigation asking the court to decide whether a doctor could lawfully and 
constitutionally assist him to end his life without running the risk of committing 
murder or any other crime. Fabricius J pointed out that under the current South 
African law, PAS or voluntary euthanasia was unlawful, and continued to find that 
section 39(2) of the Constitution has entrusted the courts with the power to 
determine whether this common-law principle needed to be developed. He also 
pointed out that “a court must keep in mind that the primary responsibility for law 
reform rests with the legislature”.301 Fabricius J approved of the Constitutional 
Court’s judgment in Masiya where the provisions of section 39(2) were interpreted 
to mean that “a court should develop the common law incrementally”.302 
Consequently, he embarked on the incremental development of the common law. 
As discussed above, this is an understanding of section 39(2) of the Constitution 
that is criticised by Snyman because, in his view, ‘developing’ in section 39(2) does 
not include any power to widen the bounds of existing crimes to include situations 
not covered by the established definition.303 This provision of the Constitution, 
Fabricius J held, places an obligation on the courts to protect rights, and “does not 
give the court discretionary powers”.304 Fabricius J also considered the extent of this 
obligation as discussed in the Carmichele judgment. He premised his view of the 
right to life on O’Regan J’s reasoning in the Makwanyane decision,305 and found 
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that a person’s right to end his life is “derived from the rights to physical and 
psychological integrity and dignity”.306 The court also found that the constitutional 
rights to life and dignity implicitly protected a person’s right to PAS; a right which 
existence was not provided for in the Constitution.307 The exercise of this kind of 
judicial power is problematic, and its justification and legitimacy has been 
questioned by O’Scannlain J because it amounts to “constitutionalising the 
question”.308 Furthermore, the judgment in Stransham-Ford can be criticised for 
impacting directly on the country’s policy regarding PAS, because it withdrew this 
question from the public’s sphere.309 These sentiments were expressed by the then 
Minister of Justice, Michael Masutha, who stated, in the aftermath of this judgment, 
that his department (the respondent in the case) remained opposed to the legalising 
of PAS, because no one under the Constitution has a right to kill another person.310 
These latter views by an elected representative of the people, a member of the ruling 
party, also attest to the fact that this is an area of public interest which the public 
should have been remitted to decide, and not only one judge after hearing 
arguments in one specific case. As mentioned in the Stransham-Ford case, 
however, in 1998, the South African Law Commission (SALC), after wide 
consultation with all relevant parties including civil society, recommended that PAS 
be legalised.311 Unfortunately, there has not yet been any official response to its 
proposal, as more pressing issues have since then received attention. 
The respondents in the Stransham-Ford case appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal against the decision.312 The crucial issue before this court was whether a 
cause of action still existed at the time that the order was made, since Stransham-
Ford had in fact died two hours earlier. In a unanimous decision, the court set aside 
                                                          
each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such 
a society. The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence – it is a right to be 
treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. 
Without life, there cannot be dignity”. 
306  Stransham-Ford paras 60d-f. 
307  Stransham-Ford paras 70e-71h. 
308  O’Scannlain 2015 Virginia LR Online 47. 
309  O’Scannlain 2015 Virginia LR Online 47. See also Compassion in Dying 85 Fed 1440 (9th Cir 
1996) 1441-1442. 
310  Manyathi-Jele 2015 De Rebus 7. 
311  SALC Euthanasia (x) – (xi). 




the judgment of the High Court based on the reasons that Mr Stransham-Ford’s 
cause of action died with him,313 and that the High Court’s order was based on an 
inadequate consideration, and a misunderstanding of the law.314 There was 
furthermore inadequate evidence on which to decide the constitutional issue.315 In 
setting the High Court’s judgment aside, Wallis JA criticised the decision for what 
he found to be “an order making a profound change to the South African law of 
murder, without any consideration of applicable principles”.316 On this point, Jacobs, 
when commenting on the social significance and magnitude of PAS, questions the 
justification for one person to make a determination to legalise the conduct as 
certain other factors should also have been taken into consideration, “such as 
doctors’ (including future doctors’) willingness to perform these practices”.317 
In the Satchwell318 case, the Constitutional Court held that the Judges’ 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act319 - which provided for payment 
of certain financial benefits to the surviving spouse of a deceased judge - was 
unconstitutional. The provisions were found to be discriminatory because same-sex 
couples were denied benefits, and consequently in breach of the right to equality 
before the law.320 In order to remedy the defect in the legislation, the Constitutional 
                                                          
313  Stransham-Ford SCA paras19-21. 
314  Stransham-Ford SCA paras 28-29,41, 54,57,69-71,73-74. 
315  Stransham-Ford SCA paras 95, 97 and 100. 
316  Stransham-Ford SCA para 41. 
317  Jacobs 2018 SA J Bioethics L 68: “What would the implications be if PAS were to be legalised, 
but doctors were unwilling to participate in life-ending interventions, or were completely opposed 
to the legalisation of PAS? Secondly, how would the public react to having these practices made 
legal?”. 
318  Satchwell 266. 
319  Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 41 of 2001. 
320  Section 9 of the 2001 Act provides: “(1) The surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court Judge 
or Judge who on or after the fixed date was or is discharged from active service in terms of 
section 3 or 4 who dies or dies while performing active service, shall be paid with effect from the 
first day of the month immediately succeeding the month in which he or she dies an amount – 
(a) in the case of a surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court Judge or Judge who was so 
discharged from active service, equal to two thirds of the salary which was in terms of 
section 5 payable to that Constitutional Court Judge or Judge; or 
(b) in the case of a surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court Judge or Judge who died while 
performing active service as a Constitutional Court Judge or Judge, equal to two thirds of 
the amount to which that Constitutional Court Judge or Judge would have been entitled in 
terms of section 5 if he or she was discharged from active service in terms of section 3(1)(a) 
or (2)(a) on the date of his or her death. 
(2) The amount payable to the surviving spouse of a Constitutional Court Judge or Judge in 
terms of subsection (1) shall be payable with effect from the first day of the month 
immediately succeeding that day on which he or she died, and shall be payable until the 
death of such spouse”. 
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Court ordered that sections 9 and 10 of the Act are to be read as though the following 
words appear therein after the word ‘spouse’ –  
or partner, in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which the partners have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support.  
The reading-in of words as a remedy in the context of legislation has been found to 
be inconsistent with fundamental rights, as discussed above. This remedy has been 
exercised by the Canadian Supreme Court in similar circumstances, and it has been 
criticised as being a form of policy making by the courts which constitutes “undue 
incursions by the judiciary into the policy domain of the elected branches of 
government”.321   
Section 27 of the Constitution, which forms part of the Bill of Rights, provides for the 
constitutional obligation to protect socio-economic rights.322 During the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment on the certification of the 1996 Constitution, there 
was an objection to the inclusion of these rights, in that such inclusion was 
inconsistent with the separation of powers principle as the judiciary would infringe 
upon the domain of the executive and legislature, and would dictate to “government 
how the budget should be allocated”.323 The Court held that, even though the 
enforcement of these rights may result in orders with budgetary implications, the 
enforcement of other rights, for example, civil and political rights, may also have 
similar implications. The objectors also argued that these rights are not justiciable. 
                                                          
 And s 10 provides: “If a gratuity referred to in section 6 would have been payable to a 
Constitutional Court Judge or Judge who died or dies on or after the fixed date had he or she 
not died but, on the date of his or her death, was discharged from active service in terms of 
section 3 or 4, there shall – 
(a) if such Constitutional Court Judge or Judge is survived by a spouse, be payable to such 
surviving spouse, in addition to any amount payable to that spouse in terms of section 9; 
or 
(b) if such Constitutional Court Judge or Judge is not survived by a spouse, be payable to the 
estate of such Constitutional Court Judge or Judge, a gratuity which shall be equal to the 
amount of the gratuity which would have been so payable to such Constitutional Court 
Judge or Judge had he or she not died but was, on the date of his or her death, discharged 
from active service as aforesaid”. 
321  Newfoundland Association of Public Employees para 364. 
322  Section 27 provides that “(1) Everyone has the right access to – (a) health care services, 
including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. (3) No one 
may be refused emergency medical treatment”. 
323  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 77. 
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The Court held that these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.324 
In some cases the Constitutional Court not only provided guidelines on how policy 
issues are to be dealt with but it went as far as to formulate policy issues, for 
example, in its decisions in the Treatment Action Campaign325 and Grootboom.326 
In the Treatment Action Campaign, an NGO challenged the constitutionality of a 
government programme which was put in place to assist with the prevention of 
mother-to-child human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) transmission. The programme 
was administered in two areas; one in rural areas, and the other in urban areas. 
Doctors and patients who were outside these piloted areas could not access 
Nevirapine, which was the preferred anti-retroviral drug. Furthermore, the court also 
ordered that the government put in place and develop a comprehensive programme 
that would assist in preventing mother-to-child transmission.  
The government appealed this decision to the Constitutional Court, where the 
Constitutional Court upheld the High Court’s decision, but acknowledged that 
primary policy should be formulated by parliament and the executive. It was argued 
on behalf of the government that under the separation of powers, the making of 
policy is the prerogative of the executive and not the courts, and that courts cannot 
make orders that have the effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular 
policy.327 In dismissing this argument, the Court held that all government branches 
should take part in respecting the spheres of their boundaries, however, the respect 
for this separation “does not mean that Courts cannot or should not make orders 
that have an impact on policy”.328 In this case, the Court was asked to protect section 
27(1) of the Constitution (the right to health care services, food and water and social 
security). The Court held that the rights which the state is obliged to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil include socio-economic rights in the Constitution.329 While the 
Court found it to be within its constitutional powers to protect this right, and/or to 
make a judgment that would direct the executive to carry out a particular policy, it 
                                                          
324  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 77-78. 
325  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
(hereinafter Treatment Action Campaign). 
326  Government of Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (hereinafter 
Grootboom). 
327  Treatment Action Campaign paras 755a-b. 
328  Treatment Action Campaign para 755c. 
329  Treatment Action Campaign paras 756a-b. 
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also remarked that “there are no bright lines that separate the roles of the 
Legislature, Executive, and the Courts from one another”.330 Consequently, the 
Court made an order which could be seen not only as encroaching on the separation 
of powers principle, but also dictating to the government how the budget should be 
allocated: 
It is ordered that: Section 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the 
government to devise and implement within its available resources a 
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively the rights 
of pregnant women and their new-born children to have access to health 
services to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Government is ordered 
without delay to: permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and to make it available 
for this purpose at hospitals and clinics.331 
As a result of this judgment, the government’s budget allocation was said to have 
increased sharply from R618 million in 2003/4 to R2,4 billion in 2006/7, and grew to 
R3,9 billion in 2009/10.332 The provision of Nevirapine in hospitals and clinics 
constituted a policy-making issue which involves budgetary allocations which fell 
under the government’s terrain. 
In the Grootboom case, the constitutional right at issue was the right to housing. The 
Constitutional Court’s judgment also encroached on the terrain of the executive, 
where the Court directed the government to implement a comprehensive 
programme within its available resources to progressively achieve the right of 
access to adequate housing.333 This judgment, like in the Treatment Action 
Campaign case, was in contrast to the Court’s decision in Soobramoney,334 where 
a single petitioner suffered from chronic renal failure required regular renal dialysis 
to prolong his life. The Court refused lifesaving dialysis treatment to Soobramoney 
because of budgetary constraints. Chaskalson JP, when delivering the Court’s 
judgment, stated that: 
The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in 
KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made 
available for health care and how such funds should be spent. These choices 
involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health 
                                                          
330  Treatment Action Campaign para 755b. 
331  Treatment Action Campaign paras 764h-I, 765d-e. 
332  Heywood 2009 J Human Rights Practice 26. 
333  Grootboom paras 86b-h. 
334  Soobramoney 765. 
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budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. A 
court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the 
political organs medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters.335 
As already pointed out above, budgetary allocations fall within government’s terrain 
and the state was found not to have violated the right to health as provided by 
section 27. It was also held here that any rational bona fide decision made by 
government will not be too readily interfered with by the Court.336  
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in the protection of these rights, namely, 
socio-economic rights in the Treatment Action Campaign, Grootboom and 
Soobramoney, has not been consistent and comprehensive in formulating policy in 
the protection of these rights. It seems, however, to have created certain levels of 
uncertainty regarding the efficiency of the courts’ policy-making role, and the 
enforcement and realisation of these rights. In the Treatment Action Campaign case, 
for example, part of the government’s argument which was premised on budgetary 
constraints, it is submitted; was correctly dismissed by the Court, because it was 
held that there was “a pressing need to ensure that where possible loss of life is 
prevented in the meantime”.337 This line of argument, however, could also have 
been relevant in Mr Soobramoney’s matter “as his life could be prolonged by means 
of regular renal dialysis”.338 In the Treatment Action Campaign case, the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) NGO mobilised people to campaign for the right to health, 
and made use of a combination of human-rights education, HIV treatment literacy, 
demonstration, and litigation. As a result of these campaigns, the TAC achieved the 
reduction of the medicine price, prevented hundreds of HIV-related deaths, and, in 
addition, also forced significant additional resources into the health system which 
was directed towards the poor.339 Mr Soobramoney, on the other hand, who was a 
                                                          
335  Soobramoney paras 776b-c. 
336  Soobramoney para 29. 
337  Treatment Action Campaign para 764a. Bollyky 2002 SAJHR 171 argues that Grootboom is one 
of the cases “in which the constitutional violation –as a product of its qualitative and quantitative 
elements – outweighed the quantitative and qualitative interference in budgetary and policy 
considerations demanded by the relief sought. This result occurs when the remedy requires only 
a modest interference with the state’s budgetary and policy priorities, or where the required shift 
in those priorities is qualitatively simple and, thus, the relief certain.” 
338  Soobramoney para 766d. 
339  Heywood 2009 J Human Rights Practice 14. Heywood adds that: “Increased budgetary 
allocations for HIV and health: As a result of the ‘natural’ pressure of the epidemic on the health 
system, but driven faster by activists’ demands, the allocation in the budget to health in general 
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single petitioner with no army of demonstrators or no petitioners on his behalf, did 
not mobilise people to campaign for his right to health. According to Bruhn, there 
were certain contributory factors that enabled the Court to reach its decision in the 
Treatment Action Campaign decision, in that budgetary concerns were attenuated 
as the drug was offered for free, the government had already provided funds for 
mother-to-child-treatment (MTCT) and Nevirapine was already partially part of 
government’s policy.340 This view seems be contrary to Heywood’s claim that the 
mobilisation of people to campaign, HIV treatment literacy, and human rights 
education of people to campaign for the right to health played a significant role in 
the final Court decision. 
Pillay compares the differences in the court orders in Grootboom and Treatment 
Action Campaign, and their implications on the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. He argues that in the Treatment Action Campaign, unlike the Grootboom 
matter, the court applied a forceful approach which compelled the government to 
act, but the judgment “stopped short of compelling the state to act to remove the 
unconstitutionality inherent in its housing programme”.341 Compelling the 
government to act by means of the mandatory court order issued in the Treatment 
Action Campaign has the repercussion that the Court: 
…retains jurisdiction over the matter if there is non-compliance with the order. 
The applicants are accordingly in a position to approach the Court for relief if 
the various respondents fail to act in the manner in which the order compels 
them. The relief available includes making an application for the committal of 
the relevant government officials for failing to abide by the court order.342  
                                                          
and HIV in particular has witnessed 5 years of expansion. According to the Treasury, ‘Spending 
on HIV and AIDS grew sharply for R618 million in 2003/4 to R2,4 billion in 2006/7 and is 
budgeted to grow to R3,9 billion by 2009/10’ (National Treasury, 2007). In the 2008 budget, 
expenditure was revised upwards to R6,5 billion a year by 2010/11” 26. See also Lehmann 2006 
Am Univ Int LR 175-176: “The government had admitted that the provision of Nevirapine was 
within its available resources, and the court found that the additional costs associated with 
providing testing, counselling, and breast-feeding were not at all significant”.  
340  Bruhn 2011 Michigan J Race & Law 202. 
341  Pillay 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 275. 
342  Pillay 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 275. See Treatment Action Campaign para 135. 
See also Treatment Action Campaign para 106 where the Court went on to state: “We thus 
reject the argument that the only power that this Court has in the present case is to issue a 
declaratory order. Where a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic 
right, a Court is under a duty to ensure that effective relief is granted. The nature of the right 
infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in 
a particular case. Where necessary this may include the issuing of a mandamus and the 
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction”. 
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The South African Constitution has entrusted the judiciary with the power to make 
policy in furtherance of socio-economic rights, as well as in the area of basic service 
delivery where the government fails to realise these rights within its terrain. While 
this type of judicial function might be seen as violating the separation of powers 
principle, it: 
…is a useful and necessary mechanism in instances where the executive fails 
to meet its constitutional mandate of implementing and formulating reasonable 
and effective policy measures to ensure the realization of socio-economic rights 
and thus the delivery of basic services.343 
Thipanyane further adds that this judicial role should be performed “in a very 
responsible manner”344 because the constitutional separation principle should still 
be taken into account. The vital question is, however, not whether these socio-
economic rights are justiciable but how such verdict can be pronounced as the 
efficiency of the current adjudication process is being questioned.345 The justification 
in the reliance being made on the Constitutional Court and other courts’ adjudication, 
enforcement and realisation of these rights is questioned.346 Instead, the successful 
enforcement and monitoring of these rights, it is argued, can only be achieved by 
working together in an interactive process comprising the legislature, the executive, 
the courts, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), NGO’s, 
community-based organisations (CBO), and ordinary South Africans.347  
Unlike Thipanyane, who claims that the courts’ role in the protection of these rights 
is that of a policy maker, Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg argue that the courts’ role 
is in the form of an enforcement mechanism, because sections 167(4)(e) and 7(2) of 
the Constitution “can be interpreted as meaning that the courts can enforce social 
security rights and order state organs to act positively”.348 It is questionable whether 
a court may compel a legislature to pass legislation that would achieve progressive 
                                                          
343  Thipanyane www.ffc.co.za/.../48-13-thipanyane-t-the-courts-vs-policy-makers-who-sets-the-
pace (Date of use: 10 July 2019). 
344  Thipanyane www.ffc.co.za/.../48-13-thipanyane-t-the-courts-vs-policy-makers-who-sets-the-
pace (Date of use: 10 July 2019). 
345  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 87. 
346  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 94-95. 
347  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 95. 
348  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 93. Section 7(2): “The 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”. Section 167(4)(e): 
“Only a Constitutional Court may – (e) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil 
a constitutional obligation”. 
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realisation of these rights against its will. Yet, it has been recommended that courts 
must simply make a declaration that the legislature is compelled in terms of the 
Constitution to pass this legislation.349 The court may issue mandatory orders as an 
enforcement mechanism against the legislature, and against its members 
personally. In addition, the court may, as a last resort, issue a legislative order 
prescribing “the rules meant to have been enacted by the legislature required under 
the Constitution”.350 The significance of a declaratory order, as was made by the 
Court in the Grootboom decision,351 forms an integral part of this mechanism, and 
can be set out as follows: 
…it could rule that the legislature’s failure to act positively in the particular 
circumstances of the case was unreasonable and provide broad guidelines on 
what is required to fulfil the constitutional obligations. The effect of a declaratory 
that Parliament has not complied with its constitutional duties should not be 
underestimated. An order of this nature is in the public interest by promoting 
accountability, responsiveness and openness in decision-making affecting 
fundamental social and economic rights.352 
It is against this background that the establishment of a Social Security Tribunal is 
recommended with the jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce these rights, and it is 
thought to be an effective mechanism in the execution and realisation of these 
rights. 353 
Amongst the challenges facing judicial policy-making is that the implementation of 
judicial decisions that have an impact on policy changes can be delayed by the 
executive branch of government. This has occurred in the Grootboom and the 
Treatment Action Campaign judgments.354 There have been reports that the 
                                                          
349  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 95. See also Trengove 
1999 ESR R 10-11. 
350  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Law, Democracy & Development 95. 
351  Grootboom paras 96,99. 
352  Davis et al Fundamental rights in the Constitution 352. 
353  Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg 2009 Democracy, Law & Development 96. See also at 95: “It 
is further clear that, standing as it is, the right to (access to) social security in South Africa is not 
yet cast in concrete terms. For such a right to fully mature, the state should initiate legislation 
which must provide for the substantive rights capable of being claimed (what actually should be 
claimed); the procedure and mechanism for claiming such rights (how the tights should be 
claimed); and where the rights should be claimed (venue). On the question of how and where 
the rights should be claimed, we are concerned with the institutions that will hear and determine 
disputes arising from claims for social security benefits provided for under the relevant 
legislation”. 
354  Thipanyane www.ffc.co.za/.../48-13-thipanyane-t-the-courts-vs-policy-makers-who-sets-the-
pace (Date of use: 10 July 2019) 
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Wallacedene community has seen no significant difference resulting from the 
Grootboom judgment. Furthermore, the Treatment Action Campaign judgment’s 
implementation was delayed in many provinces despite the Constitutional Court’s 
order that it should be effected “without delay”. 355 
While Olivier and Jansen van Rensburg seem not to have any issues with the courts 
dictating on budgetary allocation or formulating government’s policy through the 
adjudication of these rights, they do, however, question how these rights can be 
adjudicated and realised successfully. They find the courts’ adjudication process to 
be inadequate to successful enforcement and realisation of these rights. Hence, 
they propose the establishment of the Social Security Tribunal that will be an 
interactive and collaborative process which will not only adjudicate, but 
comprehensively enforce these rights. The courts do have a role to play, but not that 
of policy-making. 
3.3  Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter probed the role of the courts in the United States, 
Canada and South Africa in developing criminal offences and public policy under 
the provisions of a constitution. Under common law, the courts had the inherent 
power to develop laws. However, it is disputed that the common law empowers the 
courts to develop the scope and definitions of common-law crimes. In the United 
States, this principle has enabled the courts to develop the extent and application 
of common-law concepts and other policy issues, for example, defamation, PAS, 
same-sex marriages, abortion, amongst others. There have been contradictory 
views on whether the United States Constitution has mandated the courts to change 
public policy preferences on these issues, as these issues are said to be falling 
within the sphere of elected government officials (legislature and executive), and not 
                                                          
355 Thipanyane www.ffc.co.za/.../48-13-thipanyane-t-the-courts-vs-policy-makers-who-sets-the-
pace... (Date of use: 10 July 2019). A report on the Sunday Times, 21 March 2004 entitled 
“Treated with Contempt” stated: “Grootboom is a part of Wallacedene, a large shantytown on 
the eastern side of Kraaifontein, a working-class area of 30 km inland from Cape Town along 
the N1. Grootboom is named after Irene Grootboom, a woman who made legal history and then 
apparently disappeared. Grootboom and 900 other applicants successfully contested in their 
1998 eviction from a site in Wallacedene when the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour in 
October 2000. Today, all that the site of Grootboom has to show is the smelly ablution block, 
built in a donga that had served as a latrine for the squatters who went to court”.  
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unelected judges. Judges deciding on these issues have been termed ‘judicial 
legislators’, and their legitimacy has been questioned. There were also views which 
found no fault with judges deciding and formulating these policy issues.  
In Canada, the Canadian Constitution also empowers the courts to declare 
unconstitutional any legislation which it finds not to be in line with the Charter rights, 
and this power has been used by the courts to develop laws. Judicial law-making 
has been criticised as courts overstepping its constitutional boundary, and there 
have been divergent views on the scope and limits of these constitutional powers. 
As part of judicial law-making, the Canadian Supreme Court has exercised the 
reading-in of words into legislation which it finds to be unconstitutional. This Court’s 
jurisprudence has been criticised by members of society and judges alike on the 
ground that it is considered to be amounting to an unwarranted intrusion into the 
terrain of the elected branches of government. While judicial law-making impacting 
on public policy has been criticised by some as going too far, there has been fervent 
supporters of judicial law-making, for example, McLachlin CJ, who finds no fault with 
the courts’ application of judicial law-making because the judiciary, in her view, is 
the government branch which has supervisory powers over the other branches, and 
it is not only elected representatives who can legitimately develop public policy 
issues. 
The South African Constitution entrusts the courts with the power to develop the 
common law while making use of the interests-of-justice test. However, the 
parameters and scope of this test are not comprehensively defined in the 
Constitution. The Constitution also provides that the courts, when interpreting any 
legislation or developing the common law, are required to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. However, the meaning and scope of these concepts 
are also not comprehensively defined and mandated by the Constitution. While the 
Constitution is clear in that the judiciary is entrusted with these powers, the 
challenge is that, as the meaning and the scope of these concepts remains unclear, 
the three branches of government come up with conflicting understandings of these 
concepts, and also of the constitutional boundary lines. The use of the interests of 
justice framework in the development of the common law has been criticised in other 
jurisdictions, and under the South African Constitution it remains worrisome. 
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In South Africa, judicial law-making not only applies to the development of the 
common law but section 27 of the Constitution also makes it applicable to socio-
economic rights’ development, enforcement and realisation. There have also been 
mixed reactions to the concept of judicial law-making in South Africa which removes 
policy issues from the public sphere, and makes unelected courts the sole arbiter 
instead of elected public representatives. There have been divergent views on 
whether the courts’ role regarding socio-economic rights is one of an enforcer or a 
policy-maker. The effectiveness of the enforcement of these rights through the 
current courts’ judgments and processes is also questionable. Furthermore, there 
have been conflicting opinions on whether these rights should be included in the 
Constitution, and also whether these rights are justiciable as they involve budgetary 
implications, which is an area which falls within the executive and legislative branch 
of government, and not the judiciary.  
There are also challenges facing the implementation of courts’ judgments which 
impact on policy issues where budgetary implications are at issue, as the courts lack 
control over government’s budget to implement its judgments. The limits and 
effectiveness of judicial policy-making seem not to be consistent and 
comprehensive as verified from the courts’ judgments. In the Soobramoney 
judgment, the court refused lifesaving dialysis treatment to the applicant because of 
budgetary constraints, after it was argued that the court’s obligation to safeguard 
this right was provided by section 27 of the Constitution. Chaskalson CJ, in 
dismissing this application, reasoned that determining this decision involves difficult 
decisions, which should rather be done at a political level. The political organs 
should fix the health budget, and decide how and when the priorities should be met. 
As such, courts will be slow to interfere with reasonable bona fide resolutions taken 
by the executive and the legislature. This reasoning seems to be inconsistent with 
this court’s judgment in the Treatment Action Campaign case, and exhibits a 
measure of judicial restraint by the court in the interpretation of its powers. 
Consequently, the next chapter will examine the concept of judicial restraint, and its 




JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERENCE: 
DETERMINING THE LIMITS OF POWER 
4.1  Introduction 
The discussion in this chapter will probe whether - and to what extent - judicial 
restraint is part of South African constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the 
constitutional powers which the courts have been provided with to develop laws, as 
well as the concept of the supremacy of the Constitution. As such, this section will 
examine the nature and scope of judicial restraint in South African courts, and 
whether this concept has been comprehensively entrenched by the Constitution, as 
well as its application by our courts in constitutional review matters. In the pursuit of 
these latter objectives, this chapter will also probe the weaknesses in the current 
state of law in this area. 
The discussion in this chapter will first examine the concepts of judicial restraint and 
constitutional deference, which will include their scope and limitations. The grounds 
for justifying restraint will be probed with a view of establishing whether the South 
African constitutional jurisprudence provides clear judicial restraint and deference 
principles. In order to fully appreciate the degree of restraint exercised by our courts; 
the application, justification and limitations of these principles as applied in other 
common-law constitutional democracies will also be observed. The United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has studiously articulated the notion of deference, and 
their concept is thought to have “migrated north to Canada”,1 and it has also found 
its way to South Africa. As it will be shown below, South Africa and Canada share 
similar general limitation clauses which comprise of a two-stage approach.2 The 
commonwealth background and the South African constitutional framework leaned 
relatively towards the Canadian constitutional design.3   
                                                          
1  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education Journal 100. 
2  Botha 2010 Penn State Int LR 536. 
3  Simeon http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/WorkingPapers/Archive/1998/1998-2RichardSimeon.pdf 
(Date of use 15 April 2014). 
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Amongst the enormous challenges confronting courts in the adjudication of public 
law is to establish the proper limitations of their constitutional function.4 In the event 
that a litigant avers that his fundamental rights have been violated, the question 
should be asked whether there are any circumstances in which the courts must 
abstain from safeguarding rights, or refrain from safeguarding them to an optimal 
level? Should courts’ lack of democratic legitimacy prompt judges to exercise 
restraint when reconsidering the decisions of the elected branches for compatibility 
with fundamental rights?5 The extent of restraint applied by the courts has a direct 
impact on the degree to which the legislature and the executive are constrained by 
rights, and the degree to which fundamental rights’ claims are upheld by the courts.6 
It is against this background that judicial restraint presents a dilemma to the courts 
as “the institutional limitations of the courts sometimes warrant judicial restraint”.7 
Courts have a level of discretion regarding how strictly norms are to be applied - 
they can include a high-degree of judicial scrutiny for a strict approach; and, on the 
other hand, they can apply the norms leniently, and be inclined to adopt the wisdom 
of the legislature or executive that it has complied with the level required by the norm 
in question.8 This level of discretion includes the concept of deference.9 In the 
following paragraphs, these notions will be further investigated against the judicial 
background in the United States, Canada, and South Africa.  
4.2  Distinguishing between the concepts of judicial restraint and 
constitutional deference 
From ancient periods onward, self-restraint has been among the human virtues.10 
Judicial restraint refers “to a judge’s duty not to allow his personal views to influence 
his decision in a case”.11 Consequently, judicial self-restraint, as a policy, informs 
that judges should uphold legislation even when the judge entertains doubts 
                                                          
4  Kavanagh 2010 Univ of Toronto LJ 1 
5  Kavanagh 2010 Univ of Toronto LJ 1. 
6  Kavanagh 2010 Univ of Toronto LJ 1. 
7  Kavanagh 2010 Univ of Toronto LJ 2. 
8  McLean Constitutional deference 61. 
9  Naidoo Does the lack of sufficient formulation and articulation 28. 
10  Luban 1994 Duke LR 450. 
11  Prinsloo, Alberts and Mollema Legal terminology 159. 
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regarding its constitutionality, and thus “deferring to the legislature’s implicit 
judgment that the legislation is constitutional”.12 Deference, again, is thought to 
amount to the court’s understanding of its role, and the role of the other branches of 
government in the process of adjudication.13 This notion of deference: 
…arises out of the observation of the separation of powers as the separation of 
powers doctrine requires that the judiciary refrain from intruding unnecessarily 
into the realm of the other branches of government.14   
Dyzenhaus differentiates between two definitions of deference.15 The primary 
definition of deference, which is premised on Dicey’s rule-of-law doctrine, means 
“submission to authority”.16 The second definition of deference denotes deference 
as ‘respect’. This definition: 
…provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to rearticulate the relationship 
between the legislature, the courts and the administration in such a way that the 
courts retain a legitimate role as ultimate authority on the interpretation of the 
law.17  
The ordinary meaning of deference, according to New Oxford Dictionary, is - 
1. Polite submission and respect; 
2. Compliance with the advice or wishes of another.18 
The undertone of subordination and submission is illustrated more effectively in the 
United States’ dictionaries, for example, the Merriam Webster Dictionary gives the 
meaning: “Respect and esteem due to a superior or elder”.19 The Collins English 
Dictionary gives the meanings in American English as:  
1. a yielding in opinion, judgment, or wishes 
2. courteous regard or respect.20  
                                                          
12  Luban 1994 Duke LR 450: “This proposition, in turn, has generally been taken to imply that the 
United States Supreme Court should uphold legislation unless it clearly bears no reasonable 
relation to a legitimate state end”. 
13  McLean Constitutional deference 62. 
14  Lenta 2004 SAJHR 457. 
15  Dyzenhaus The politics of deference 279. 
16  Dyzenhaus The politics of deference 279. 
17  Dyzenhaus The politics of deference 303. 
18  Pearsall and Hanks New Oxford Dictionary of English 303. Also see Wallis 2018 SA Judicial 
Education J 99.  
19  Merriam-Webster Dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deference (Date of 
use: 26 November 2019). 
20  Collins English Dictionary https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/deference (Date 
of use: 26 November 2019).  
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The Webster’s New World College Dictionary has a similar inscription.21 The South 
African Constitutional Court prefers to use the word ‘respect’, and has adopted 
Dyzenhaus’ second definition of deference.22 However, whichever definition is 
chosen for use in South Africa, it communicates: 
…an image of the court standing back in favour of the decision-maker or 
administrator that seems inconsistent with the role of the court in review 
proceedings.23  
The use of the word ‘deference’ in court proceedings seems to present problems, 
as it has prompted many explanations as in the Bato Star case, where it was stated 
that the word does not consist of its ordinary meaning, and that it could be 
understood as respect.24 Deference is, however, a “complex notion relating to the 
doctrine of separation of powers, justiciability and comity”.25 How and when a court 
decides to defer is established by the court’s approach to three considerations; 
namely, the understanding of the court of its institutional role; “of its institutional 
competence; and the nature of the matter before the court”.26 The notion of 
deference cannot constitute a bright-line test.27 
Moreover, deference must be differentiated from the notion of judicial restraint. 
While these two concepts may at times overlap, judicial restraint is often contrasted 
with the concept of judicial activism.28 Judicial activism is understood to be referring 
to a court that plays an active role in governance; it is seen as having its own political 
programme, and also making use of its decisions to advance that specific 
programme.29 Posner differentiates between deference, separation of powers, 
judicial self-restraint and prudential self-restraint. Judicial deference is understood 
                                                          
21  Webster’s New World College Dictionary https://www.yourdictionary.com/deference (Date of 
use: 26 November 2019). 
22  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 46 (hereafter Bato Star). 
23  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 90. 
24  Bato Star para 46. 
25  McLean Constitutional deference 64. 
26  McLean Constitutional deference 63. 
27  McLean Constitutional deference 64. A bright-line test or rule is in the United States a clearly 
delineated rule or standard, which leaves almost no room for varying or inconsistent 
interpretation. 
28  McLean Constitutional deference 64.  
29  McLean Constitutional deference 64. See Cilliers Finding a balance 11, who argues that: “Unlike 
the activist approach, judicial deference emphasises the limits of the courts’ power by narrowly 
restricting interpretation of the legislation at issue (e.g. the Constitution) in conformity with the 
concept of stare decisis (obligatory deference to previous decisions)”.  
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by him as referring to judges that are being cautious about putting forward their own 
views, and restricting their discretion as far as possible.30 The notion of ‘separation 
of powers judicial self-restraint’ defines judges as restricting the courts’ authority 
when dealing with the other branches of government, and deferring to the decisions 
of the other branches of government.31 The notion of prudential self-restraint, he 
contends, requires that judges avoid making decisions that will impact upon their 
ability to make future decisions.32 Deferent courts have a strong predisposition for 
judicial restraint when adjudicating cases, unless where the law is evidently 
unconstitutional.33 In the following paragraphs, these intricate concepts will be 
further explained, especially as they are applied by the courts in the United States, 
Canada and South Africa. 
4.2.1  Judicial restraint and deference: The United States’ perspective 
As mentioned in paragraph 4.1, the notion of separation of powers forms part of the 
United States Constitution even though this document does not provide for it 
explicitly. In this jurisdiction, the recognition by each branch of government of its 
proper sphere of activity remains a crucial component of the separation of powers 
principle.34 American courts have acknowledged the proper realm of judicial activity 
by adopting numerous practices which defer their full judicial power. Courts and 
academics have termed these deferring practices as judicial restraint.35  
In recent years, the proper functions of the three constitutional branches have turned 
out to be increasingly burdensome to define. Many United States’ judges see 
themselves as “quasi-legislators” entrusted with “the right to speak out on all 
issues.”36 It seems that courts are attempting to relinquish judicial restraint, and 
adjudicate any and all cases litigants may wish to present. This judicial activism 
leads to “untoward and inappropriate involvement by the courts in political questions 
and partisan conflicts”.37 This state of affairs has led to the emerging of “a cowboy 
                                                          
30  Posner The federal courts 314.  
31  Posner The federal courts 314. 
32  Lenta 2004 SAJHR 548. 
33  Cilliers Finding a balance 11.  
34  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 695. 
35  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 695. 
36  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 695. 
37  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 695-696. 
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judiciary riding roughshod over separation of powers in its zeal to save every damsel 
in distress and to right every wrong”.38 As a result of these courts’ unwillingness or 
inability to define the boundaries of their judicial role, or to respect the concepts of 
judicial restraint, citizens in the United States now see the courts as simply another 
partisan arm of government. As a result of courts acting as a government branch, 
the aura of judicial impartiality has receded, and people’s respect for the courts and 
the courts’ power has eroded.39 Frankfurter J in Dennis v United States40 expresses 
this dilemma as follows: 
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex 
of a democratic society. Their judgement is best informed, and therefore most 
dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded 
on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is 
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and 
assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, 
economic and social pressures.41 
Dispute resolution is the most significant court function, not only in America, but 
everywhere else. Courts were designed to resolve disputes presented by litigants 
so that litigants do not resort to private remedies.42 As such, courts should exercise 
restraint in adjudicating political or social problems because courts are: 
…not readily capable of managing the resolution of large-scale political 
problems … [and] judges are ill-suited to the role of managers because the 
courts require deliberation and elaborate process before decisions can be 
made”.43  
Talmadge further observes that: 
The dictates of due process tend to be inconsistent with the typically more 
immediate operational needs of a business enterprise, a social services 
organisation, or a school system. By its nature, the common law process is not 
the best means for establishing complex societal policies.44  
                                                          
38  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 696. 
39  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 699.  
40  Dennis v United States 341 US 494 525 (1951). 
41  See also Bright 1997 New York LR 308, 310 who argues that: “Politicians have long blamed 
judges for forcing them to take unpopular actions … but many of those politicians had enough 
respect for the courts that they were careful not to take their criticism too far. Today, however, 
politicians criticise judges for the purpose of intimidating them and getting specific results”. 
42  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 697. 
43  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 698. 
44  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 698. 
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Judges adjudicating cases may have an understanding of the issues which are 
confined to the court record developed through witnesses’ testimony, and, at times, 
experts retained by the litigants. However, cases are unable to present the whole 
array of interests which might be underlying many issues.45 Courts may be efficient 
in establishing that a wrong has been committed, yet they are the least effective 
branch of government at formulating remedies for major political or social issues.46  
The protection of human rights remain a fundamental function of the courts against 
the majoritarian inclination to tyranny.47 This anti-majoritarian policy remains 
significant despite a policy of judicial restraint. The individualised decision-making 
process and ‘policy’ of the common law is where its power rests.48 Courts possess 
far-reaching powers, and society brings more and more difficult socio-political 
disputes to the courts for resolution. Yet many court members are unknown to the 
public, and they make use of a procedure that is not comprehensively understood 
by the average layperson. Courts may declare legislation adopted by a majority of 
the legislature, or the people themselves, to be unconstitutional, and this could result 
in “some people in the body politic undoubtedly be upset”.49 
While activist courts have been criticised, the desire of the United States’ courts to 
resolve all societal ills has been intensified both by unwillingness or inability of the 
courts (as a partisan branch of government) to deal with difficult societal problems, 
and the willingness of courts to adjudicate on nearly every imaginable subject 
matter.50 Some litigants approach the courts for an “individualised, case-by-case 
determination of policy”51 since they distrust the collective legislature or executive 
administrative regulations. Yet, in determining policy, a judge faces a difficult choice: 
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a judge realizes 
that in the case before him his strongly held view of justice, his political and moral 
imperative, is not embodied in a statute or in any provision of the Constitution. 
                                                          
45  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 698. See also Burkhart v Harrod 110 Wash 2d 381 755 P 2d 
759 761 (1988): “We fully concur in the statement that ‘of the three branches of government, 
the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy 
questions based on a societal consensus”. 
46  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 698-699.  
47  See footnotes 192 and 243 in Chapter 2. 
48  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 699. 
49  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 700: “While some of the criticism directed at the unelected 
federal judiciary may be unfairly aimed at an elected judiciary, the institutional remoteness and 
relative anonymity of elected judges mean the criticism may still be accurate”. 
50  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 701. 
51  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 701.  
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He must then choose between his version of justice and abiding by the American 
form of government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to him 
obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is abstract, 
rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels is unsatisfying. To give in to 
temptation, this one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack 
appears in the American foundation. A judge has begun rule where a legislator 
should.52 
Deference, to the other branches of government, is another mechanism that is an 
embodiment of the principle of constitutional deference.53 However, this concept, 
which is also termed “prudential constraint”,54 is not without controversy, as in the 
Washington Supreme Court case, Island County v State, where a justice of this court 
argued for the ending of any deference to legislative enactments: 
Today’s majority, which regales itself in legislative deference, thereby 
surrenders at least a portion of that righteous power necessary to check that 
power exercised by the legislature. Such capitulation in the face of 
unconstitutional legislative usurpation is no virtue. It eliminates the most 
important constitutional check upon legislative abuse. It is license for the strong 
to vanquish the weak. Such surrender, often euphemistically denominated 
“restraint,” is sometimes falsely glorified as an aspect of the judiciary’s role as a 
co-equal branch of government; however, in matters of constitutional law, the 
judiciary is not co-equal, but supreme.55 
Another member of the court disagreed, and reaffirmed the conventional notion of 
deference: 
The concurrence’s approach is judicial activism in full flower: “By judicial activism 
I mean, quite simply and specifically, the practice by judges of disallowing policy 
choices by other governmental officials or institutions that the Constitution does 
not clearly prohibit”. …Unlike the concurrence, I do not believe the judiciary has 
a charter, in the guise of constitutional interpretation, to substitute itself for the 
executive and legislative branches of government. We do not have a 
constitutional mandate to roam across the governmental landscape, changing 
in our discretion decisions by other constitutional branches of government with 
which we disagree. There is no check, no balance to such unfettered power. The 
concurrence offers a paean not only to judicial activism, but to judicial 
supremacy in our government. I do not agree with such a fundamentally flawed 
notion of judicial power. Our role is to analyse the legislature’s enactments 
against the overarching principles of the Constitution, and resolve the dispute 
brought to us, as we did in this case. It decidedly is not our function to express 
disrespect for coordinate constitutional branches of government by lightly 
                                                          
52  Bork The tempting of America 1. 
53  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 721. 
54  Island County v State 135 Wash. 2d 141 146-147 955 P 2d 377 380 (1998) (hereinafter Island 
County). 
55  Island County 389 (Sanders J, concurring). 
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tossing away their decisions with arrogant judicial fiat, as the concurrence would 
have us do.56 
The view is that it is not the courts’ constitutional role to disrespect the other 
constitutional branches and to alter their decisions, or to take the place of the 
executive or legislative branches of government. Courts must be willing to define 
their fundamental functions to prevent other branches from trampling upon the 
constitutional imperative of the judiciary. Still, the judiciary must restrain itself from 
becoming an unnecessary and inappropriate participant in socio-political 
controversies, which could weaken its respect, as stated above.57 Courts should 
resist the temptation to right all wrongs, undertaking what Kennedy J has termed 
“power grab in a black robe”.58 
Three arguments are made against courts playing an active role in shaping current 
society.59 Firstly, the illegitimacy of the court to act in this manner is stressed. Courts 
cannot act until a case is brought before it. Furthermore, a judgment in a specific 
case binds only the particular litigants, and as a result, the court cannot address a 
wide range of social issues, or solve it comprehensively.60 However, it is conceded 
that courts have its institutional incapacities, and there may be cases where 
deference to the legislature might be required. Courts do not have the requisite fact-
finding tools, and do not have the pertinent knowledge upon which intelligent social 
action must be based.61 It is still averred that where the legislature does not act - or 
cannot act - to rectify “an unconstitutional status quo, the Court, despite all its 
incapacities, must finally act to do so”.62 In the event that the legislature fails to live 
up to their constitutional duties, and since “nature abhors a political vacuum as much 
as any other kind”,63 the court must act to fill the gap.64 
The second argument stresses the adverse effect on democratic processes when 
courts act in this manner. Here, the emphasis is on the incapacitating effects the 
                                                          
56  Island County 394 (Talmadge J concurring). 
57  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 738. 
58  Talmadge 1999 Seattle Univ LR 739. 
59  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 3. 
60  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 3. See also footnote 44 above. 
61  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 3. 
62  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 5-6. 
63  Brogan The crises of American federalism 43. 
64  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 6. 
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courts’ action has on the other branches of government.65 The foundation for this 
argument was laid down over a hundred years ago: 
Legislatures are growing accustomed to this judicial distrust and more and more 
readily inclined to justify it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional 
restraints … turning that subject over to the courts. … The people, all this while, 
become careless as to whom they send to the legislature … and come to depend 
on these few wiser gentlemen on the bench … to protect them against their more 
immediate representatives. … The consequent exercise of the power of judicial 
review, even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, 
that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the 
people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus 
that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting 
their own errors. The tendency … is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, 
and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.66 
This latter argument is, however, criticised because even if it would be very 
unfortunate for the legislature to enact legislation which the court would consider 
unconstitutional, it would be worse if the public and the legislature had come to the 
point where they expected the courts to do their work for them.67 While the courts 
may be institutionally ill-equipped to drive social reform, if the legislature cannot 
uphold any substantial rights at stake, it inevitably remains the task of the courts to 
do so.68 
The final third argument for judicial restraint goes to the court’s legitimacy as a policy 
maker in a democratic society. Here, the court’s self-restraint is said to be the result 
of the court’s undemocratic structure, and that only in exceptional compelling 
circumstances, “it should allow the representative bodies to act, or not to act, as 
they choose”.69 This argument is criticised on two grounds, namely, it remains 
unclear what is meant by democratic society. Furthermore, the internal practices of 
“the legislature makes majority control even less likely”.70 In support of this 
understanding is noted that, for example, the United States Senate composition 
whereby the votes of 18 000,000 Californians count no more than those of 180,000 
Alaskans, can be hardly suggested to be conducive to majority rule.71 Despite this 
                                                          
65  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 6. 
66  Thayer John Marshall 103-104, 106-107.   
67  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 8-9. 
68  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 8-9. 
69  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 9. 
70  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 9-10. 
71  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 9-10. 
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institutional deficiency, namely, the undemocratic and non-representative structure 
of the courts, this factor cannot determine how courts should play its appropriate 
function within its boundaries, however, “it does tell us about the limits of the 
province itself”.72 
In Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, Brandeis J compiled the “classic rules 
for … avoidance”.73 These rules are premised on the understanding that courts 
should not decide a constitutional issue if there is some plausible way to avoid it.74 
The canon of statutory interpretation, which is of consequence to this rule, is that “a 
serious constitutional challenge to a statute should be avoided if the statute can 
plausibly be construed in a manner that makes the constitutional question 
disappear”.75 The United States Supreme Court continues to use this rule, and has 
recently held that it is “beyond debate”.76  
Yet judges77 and commentators78 give different ideological perspectives, and have 
often criticised this rule or canon. The primary attack against this rule is that it allows 
a court, based on vague grounds that a serious constitutional question exists, to 
rewrite legislation without comprehensive limits on this role.79 Scalia J’s idea of 
judicial restraint is thought to be linked with his argument that the government 
system makes the democratically accountable branches responsible for making law, 
and that it was not within the judiciary’s role to make an end run around the 
democratic process by exercising common-law discretion “to make the law”.80 It is 
understood that judges exercise some discretion when deciding cases, yet Scalia J 
                                                          
72  Wright 1968 Cornell LR 10-11. 
73  Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority 297 US 288, 341 (1936). See also County of 
Sacramento v Lewis 523 US 833, 861 (1998) and Rice v Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery 
349 US 70,74 (1955). 
74  Frickey 2005 California LR 399. 
75  Frickey 2005 California LR 399. 
76  Jones v United States 526 US 227, 240 (1999).  
77  See Reno v Flores 507 US 292, 314 (1993) where Scalia J called the avoidance canon “the last 
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79  Frickey 2005 California LR 400. 




resists the discretion Dworkin has termed “a strong sense”,81 which is premised on 
the understanding that a judge’s decision is not meaningfully bound by standards 
external to his or her own authority. In other words, it is believed that it is wrong for 
courts in a constitutional democracy to determine the rights and duties of the people 
based on “little more than morals, conscience or policy predilections of five 
unelected, life-tenured justices”.82 As a result, Scalia J stresses that the courts 
should base their decisions in some power external to the judge’s will, namely, in 
the text, the original meaning, in long-standing legal practices, or widespread social 
traditions. It is this theory of judicial restraint that is known as the “anti-discretion 
principle”.83  
The concern with judges’ discretion is premised more on limiting “free-form judicial 
policy-making than upon rooting judicial decisions in legitimate external authority”.84 
However, this understanding of judicial restraint seems to expose Scalia J as “a 
judge suspicious of judges” because his: 
…theory of interpretation was not motived solely, or perhaps even primarily, by 
his felt obligation to the words chosen by democratic lawmakers. His text-based 
approach also rested on, and sought to implement, his anti-discretion principle. 
Unless the Constitution or a statute clearly authorised judges to act on their own 
sense of good, Justice Scalia insisted that they ground decisions in some form 
of constraint external to the judges’ own preferences.85  
Unlike the most traditional forms of judicial restraint, Scalia J’s theory was not 
premised on a call on judges to bend over backwards in avoiding the striking down 
of legislation. Instead, he placed emphasis on the system of judicial decision-
making. He thought it would be prudent that judges base their decisions, statutory 
or constitutional, on grounds outside their own wills, “to rest their judgements on 
something other than their personal morality, conscience, or policy preferences”.86 
The view is furthermore held that judicial restraint is a contestable principle which is 
                                                          
81  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 748-749. See also Dworkin Taking rights seriously 31. 
82  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 749. 
83  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 749. 
84  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 749. 
85  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 750. He elaborates at 18: “When you are told to decide, not on the 
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86  Manning 2017 Michigan LR 781. 
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open to numerous definitions.87 This is because: 
A restrained judge is simply a highly predictable judge, and this may include 
being predictably non-deferential to other institutions. … A restrained judge 
would reach the same result, even though this involves invalidating a 
democratically-enacted statute, and hence in this sense entails imposing the 
judicial will against the wishes of other political institutions.88 
Nonetheless, judicial restraint is good because legal settlements sought by interest 
groups in seeking legal change is restricted, and “it protects expectations and 
reduces retroactivity in legal decision making”.89 Judicial restraint is also sound 
because it advances equal treatment in terms of treating similarly-situated litigants 
the same. There is thus no surprise in the jurisprudence, because all litigants are 
treated in the same way.  
Finally, related to the last point, judicial restraint assist judges to “resist pressure to 
bend the rules in ways that operate to the disadvantage of unpopular claimants or 
minorities”.90 This last point is described as follows in the context of problems in 
emerging democracies: 
A restrained judiciary is in a much stronger position to perform these functions 
[resolving disputes in an impartial manner, and assuring that executive officials 
adhere to the law], because such a judiciary can claim to be doing no more or 
less than what it always does – enforcing established legal principles. Moreover, 
a restrained judiciary will not have dissipated any of its institutional capital 
through the pursuit of controversial social reforms.91 
Hence, there are three grounds in the United States for rejecting judicial activism, 
and exercising judicial restraint. First, judicial activism replaces a representative 
legislature with a group who are not representative or responsible to anyone but 
itself. Secondly, it undermines the public faith in the objectivity and detachment of 
the court; and thirdly, the exercise of such power invites a reply in kind from those 
on whose domain the court is poaching.92  
                                                          
87  Merrill 2005 Constitutional Commentary 274: “Sometimes judicial restraint is defined to mean 
fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution. If this what judicial restraint means, then 
obviously originalism – and only originalism – promotes judicial restraint. Other times judicial 
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88  Merrill 2005 Constitutional Commentary 274-275. 
89  Merrill 2005 Constitutional Commentary 275-276. 
90  Merrill 2005 Constitutional Commentary 276-277. 
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Judicial restraint and judicial deference are very visible in the case of Chevron USA 
Inc v National Resources Defence Council Inc,93 where the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute, and held that a two-
step process must be followed in this regard. First, the court must ask whether the 
legislature (Congress) has, by means of the statute, comprehensively and directly 
addressed the precise question at issue. In the event that this question is answered 
in the affirmative, both the court and the agency are bound by the legislature’s 
comprehensive statutory instruction.94 If, however, the statute is “silent or 
ambiguous”95 regarding the particular question at issue, the court, by making use of 
the second step, questions only whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is 
permissible.  
Under the second step, the court must uphold the agency’s interpretation provided 
it is a reasonable construction of the statute, even if it is not what the court considers 
to be the best construction.96 The ambiguity in the legislation is considered to be an 
implicit delegation to the agency of the authority to “elucidate”97 the legislation. 
Hence, the concept of the “Chevron deference”98 came about. The court explicitly 
gave deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutes in order to 
respect the use of powers expressly delegated to the agency: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.99  
                                                          
93  Chevron USA Inc v National Resources Defence Council Inc 467 US 837 (1984) (hereinafter 
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98  Siegel 2018 Vanderbilt LR 945. 
99  Chevron 843-844. 
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This court endorsed the idea that ambiguity in an agency statute is deemed to be 
an “implicit delegation of power to the agency”.100 Thus, the Chevron deference is 
simply a way of conceiving what Congress is doing when it entrusts an agency with 
an ambiguous delegation, and it is constitutionally permissible. 
The United States courts’ reviews of government federal administrative agencies’ 
actions have long been questioned on what considerations to be given to the 
agencies’ own construction of the statutes they administer. It is by necessity that 
agencies must construct these pieces of legislation.101 The legislation informs the 
agencies what to do, so the agencies must interpret them in order to know what to 
do. Administrative law and justiciability principles present a court with an opportunity 
to encounter such legislation only after the agency has taken certain action under 
it.102 Consequently, by the time a statute administered by an agency comes to court, 
the agency itself would typically have had the opportunity to render an interpretation 
of the statute.103 
The Chevron deference-doctrine has been criticised by some judges of the United 
States Supreme Court, and its constitutionality questioned. In the case of Perez v 
Mortgage Bankers Association,104 Thomas J criticised judicial deference to an 
agency’s construction of the regulation administered by the agency, and stated that 
it “amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political 
branches”.105 The United States Constitution, Thomas J stated, has entrusted 
judicial power to the courts, and the Constitution “requires a court to exercise its 
independent judgement in interpreting and expounding upon the laws”.106 The 
Framers of the Constitution were aware that legislation would at times be considered 
to be unclear or ambiguous, and “the judicial power was understood to include the 
power to resolve these ambiguities over time”.107 Judges were insulated by the 
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Constitution from the pressures that might result in courts’ bias so as to safeguard 
judges’ ability to exercise independent judgment.108 The judiciary, Thomas J added, 
“is duty bound to exercise independent judgement in applying the law”.109 
Moreover, Thomas J decried deference itself, and stated that it “amounts to a 
transfer of the judge’s exercise of interpretative judgement to the agency”.110 He 
further asserted that deference “undermines the judicial ‘check’ on the political 
branches”.111 In his view, Congress could not give power to agencies to construct 
the regulations they administer, and require the courts to defer their interpretations. 
This was because the Constitution entrusted the power to issue judicially binding 
construction of laws to the courts, not to the legislature or Congress: “Lacking the 
power itself, Congress cannot delegate that power to an agency”.112 
Three months after Perez, the United States Supreme Court once more commented 
on the Chevron deference-doctrine in Michigan v EPA,113 in which the court struck 
down an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule. Thomas J again applied the 
principle he set out in Perez, and questioned the constitutionality of the Chevron 
deference.114 He repeated that the Constitution’s assignment of judicial authority to 
the courts depended upon the courts exercising “independent judgement”115 when 
constructing laws. The problem with the Chevron deference-doctrine, he observed, 
is that it makes it impossible for courts to do so. Thus, the Chevron deference-
doctrine removes the judicial authority to say what the law is from the courts, and 
gives it to the executive; a removal of constitutional authority that Thomas J found 
to be unconstitutional because it was “in tension with the Vesting Clause of Article 
III”.116  
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Thomas J accepted that the Article III problem might be resolved by regarding an 
agency’s act of interpreting a statute it administers as a “formulation of policy”,117 
rather than as an interpretation. Nonetheless, Thomas J asserted, although it might 
solve the Article III problem, it creates an Article I problem, for Article I entrusts 
Congress, not the executive, with legislative power.118 Thomas J concluded that, 
either way, the court has strayed “further and further from the Constitution”.119 
The constitutionality of the Chevron deference-doctrine was also questioned in the 
case of Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch120 by Gorsuch J,121 while a judge on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This case concerned an immigration 
law question, and the administrative law principle enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court in its decision in the case of National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services.122 The principle in 
Chevron was also followed which allowed an agency to overrule a judicial opinion 
by issuing a new, reasonable construction of a legislation it administers, even if that 
construction is different from a previous judicial construction.123 Gorsuch J also 
suggested that Chevron makes it more difficult for ordinary citizens to obey the law. 
He complained that: 
Under Chevron the people aren’t just charged with awareness of and the duty 
to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a detached 
magistrate can muster. Instead, they are charged with an awareness of 
Chevron; required to guess whether the statute will be declared “ambiguous” 
(courts often disagree on what qualifies); and required to guess (again) whether 
an agency’s interpretation will be deemed “reasonable”. Who can even attempt 
all that, at least without an army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists?124 
It is difficult for ordinary citizens to discern the meaning of complex statutes that they 
are assumed to understand. Yet Gorsuch J offers no evidence that Chevron makes 
things worse on this point.125 The deference doctrine as applied in the Chevron and 
Brand X cases, Gorsuch J observed: 
                                                          
117  EPA 2712-2713. 
118  EPA 2713. 
119  EPA 2714. 
120  Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch 834 F3d 1142 1152 (10th Cir 2016) (hereinafter Gutierrez-Brizuela). 
121  Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
122  National Cable and Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services 544 US 967 
(2005) (hereinafter Brand X). 
123  Brand X 982-984. 
124  Gutierrez-Brizuela 1152. 
125  Siegel 2018 Vanderbilt LR 986. 
174 
 
…permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and 
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than 
a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.126  
Considering the foundational case of Marbury v Madison,127 Gorsuch J stated that 
under that case, the resolution of issues of private legal rights is a judicial function.128 
He argued that “Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the 
abdication of the judicial duty”.129 Gorsuch J also alluded to the implication of the 
Marbury v Madison judicial role, and asked, “Where in all this does a court interpret 
the law and say what it is?”130 Like Thomas J, Gorsuch J stated that although the 
Article III problem might be solved by suggesting that when an agency interprets 
and gives content to an ambiguous legislation, it is not interpreting the legislation, 
but instead exercising delegated authority to make policy; such a solution creates a 
delegation problem. So even though Chevron might not violate Article III, it would 
likely violate Article I.131  
The criticism of the Chevron deference did not only come from the judiciary, but 
some members of Congress also expressed the view that the doctrine is 
illegitimate.132 Congress adopted the Separation of Powers Restoration Act 
(SOPRA)133 which amended the current legislation empowering a reviewing court 
to “decide relevant questions of law, and interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions”.134 The proposed amendment will result in a provision which makes it 
clear that a reviewing court must interpret legislation de novo, and must not give 
deference to agency constructions.135 The House of Representatives’ Report on the 
SOPRA found that the Chevron deference was inconsistent with the judicial role as 
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declared in Marbury v Madison, in that “it is emphatically the province of the Judicial 
Department to say what the law is”.136 The House Report also stated that the 
Chevron principle “is difficult, if not impossible, to square with the Framers’ intent in 
the Constitution to create a government of definite, limited, and separated 
powers”.137 However, the SOPRA has not become law because it lacked the 
required votes in Senate.138 
It should be noted that both Thomas J and Gorsuch J have relied heavily on 
Hamburger’s administrative work in their judgments where they questioned the 
constitutionality of the Chevron deference.139 Hamburger observes that the Chevron 
deference is unconstitutional because it is incompatible with the judicial duty 
imposed by Article III of the Constitution which entrusts courts with the power to 
exercise independent judgment when addressing questions of law.140 Hamburger 
premised his view on the assumption that judges hold an office, in particular, “an 
office of judgement, in which they must exercise their own independent 
judgement”.141 This office, he adds, has the implication that a duty “of a judge to 
exercise his independent judgement was the very identity of a judge”, and that a 
judge consequently cannot defer to an administrative agency’s judgment “without 
abandoning his office as a judge”.142 Congress’ delegation of such power to an 
agency is irrelevant because Congress cannot remove a judge’s constitutional duty 
to exercise independent judgment.143 
The other ground of criticism is that Chevron’s requirement that courts defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of legislation they administer creates “systematically biased 
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judgement”.144 These agencies are often litigants in cases where their 
interpretations are judicially reviewed, and, in such cases, Chevron requires courts 
to defer to the views of one of the parties of the case before them.145 The bias 
created by Chevron in deferring to one of the litigants constitutes a “brazen 
violation”146 of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Farina is another academic who has questioned the constitutionality of the Chevron 
deference.147 However, Farina does not see the Chevron deference as a violation 
of Article III, but argues that it threatens to violate the non-delegation doctrine. At 
the core of her argument is the view that in Chevron the Supreme Court failed to 
consider whether every ambiguity in an agency’s legislation amounts to an implicit 
delegation of authority to the agency, which would further increase the accumulation 
of power to the legislature (president) in a way that impedes the balance of powers 
among the three branches of government.148  
However, these criticisms of the Chevron deference are disputed, and its premise 
is considered to be constitutionally permissible because “it is merely a way of 
conceiving of what Congress is doing when it gives an agency ambiguous 
instructions”.149 Allowing an agency to resolve the ambiguity is “simply one way of 
recognising a delegation of law-making authority”.150 There can be no question that 
the agencies under the control of the executive are authorised to interpret legislation 
they administer in the “simple sense of the word interpret”151 in order to establish 
what the legislation mean. Agencies are obliged to do so. At the end, legislation 
informs agencies what to do. An agency must interpret the legislation it administers 
in order to know how to act under them.152 Even when the meaning of a legislation 
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is clear, an agency is still interpreting the legislation when it looks at the ink marks 
that makes up the statutory text, comprehend those ink marks as letters, the letters 
as words, and the words as having meaning.153   
It would be impractical for an agency to run to court each time it requires to resolve 
an ambiguity in a statute it administers; and even if the agency intended to do so, 
the principles of justiciability would prevent the court from providing advice to the 
agency regarding the legislation’s meaning outside of the context of a specific case. 
This point is also acknowledged by Chevron’s critics that “other branches of 
government have the authority and obligation to interpret the law”.154 When it is 
debated who may interpret the law, the word “interpret” is used in the strong sense 
by the critics of Chevron. The real question is: 
When an agency and a court have both undertaken to interpret a statute, in the 
simple sense, but the interpretations are different, whose interpretation 
controls?155 
Under the Chevron deference, if the legislation is ambiguous, and the agency’s 
construction is reasonable, a reviewing court must uphold it even if the court 
believes it is not the “best interpretation”.156 The problem is that Chevron’s critics 
maintain that when a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of a statute, it ought 
to apply an independent judgment, and must enforce what it believes to be best 
interpretation.157 
It is incorrect to suggest that the Chevron deference permits a court to abdicate its 
judicial duty to interpret legislation because when a court decides that an ambiguous 
legislation constitutes a delegation of authority to the agency, it is interpreting the 
legislation.158 Gorsuch J queries: “where in the Chevron two-step process does a 
court interpret the law and say what it is?”159 The court performs its duty of 
interpreting the laws when it determines that the law delegates power to an 
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administrative agency. Moreover, the “court says what the law is when it says that 
the law is that an agency is vested with the power to make a certain decision”.160 
Thus, the Chevron deference is constitutionally permissible because it does not 
seize the power to interpret from the courts, and hands it over to the executive. 
Neither does the deference prevent any court from achieving their function to 
interpret statutes. As such, it is submitted that the attacks against the doctrine are 
misdirected.161 
Despite the criticism directed against the Chevron doctrine, many countries’ courts 
have been influenced by the United States’ views on judicial restraint and deference. 
One of these jurisdictions is Canada, which will be subsequently discussed. 
4.2.2  Judicial restraint and deference: The Canadian perspective 
In Canada, the Supreme Court is considered the protector of rights that are 
enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms through the process of 
judicial review.162 In order to determine whether any rights have been violated, the 
Canadian courts undertake a two-stage process.163 Firstly, the court interprets the 
right in order to establish its scope, and then decides whether the Charter 
safeguards the affected right. In the second stage, the court undertakes a limitation 
analysis.164 The Canadian Charter provides that rights enshrined in the Charter may 
be limited where the limitation is a “reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.165 The state bears the 
burden of proof on a balance of probabilities to justify the right’s limitation. The 
application of the limitation analysis advances a “culture of justification”166 as the 
legislature and the executive have to justify through showing some grounds in order 
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to limit rights safeguarded by the Charter. The court, as the protector of the 
Canadian Charter, enters into a dialogue with the legislature and executive.167 There 
is an understanding that because judges under the Charter: 
…who are neither elected into office nor accountable for their actions, are vested 
with the power to strike down laws that have been made by the duly elected 
representatives of the people.168 
This makes it easy for critics to suggest that judicial review in a democratic society 
is illegitimate. It has been stated that because the Canadian Constitution is drafted 
in “broad, vague language”,169 judges are entrusted with a measure of discretion in 
interpreting the Constitution. Despite this deficiency in constitutional interpretation, 
judges cannot simply strike down laws or impose their own personal construction of 
the Constitution - they first have to take part in a “dialogue”170 with the legislative 
branch, as stated below: 
Where a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification, or 
avoidance, then it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court 
and the component legislative body as a dialogue.171 
In the case of Vriend v Alberta,172 the courts advanced the concept of a ‘democratic 
dialogue’, and stressed its support of respecting the roles of the political branches 
of government: 
In reviewing legislative enactments, the executive decisions to ensure 
constitutional validity, the courts speak to the legislative and executive branches. 
…most of the legislation held not pass the constitutional muster has been 
followed by new legislation designed to accomplish similar objectives…. By 
doing this, the legislature responds to the courts; hence the dialogue among the 
branches.173 
The fostering of accountability between the different branches of government, and 
the promoting of the democratic process were also described by the court as part of 
this dialogue process: 
A great value of judicial review and this dialogue among the branches is that 
each branch is somewhat accountable to the other. The work of the legislature 
is reviewed by the courts and the works of courts in its decision can be reacted 
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to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation. … This dialogue between 
and accountability of each of the branches has the effect of enhancing the 
democratic process, not denying it.174 
The legislature will react to courts’ decisions by enacting new laws which are aligned 
to the courts’ decisions. Through this dialogue process, the courts ensure they show 
respect to the legislature and executive, and not to second-guess the decisions of 
the legislative or executive branches, or to make judgments in areas where the 
courts are deemed to be ill-equipped to decide upon: 
In carrying our duties, courts are not to second guess legislature sad the 
executives; they are not to make value judgements on what they regard as the 
proper policy choices; this is for the other branches. Rather, the courts are to 
uphold the Constitution … respect by the courts for the legislature and the 
executive role is as important as ensuring that the other branches respect each 
other’s’ role and the role of the courts.175 
Four factors exist which make this dialogue possible.176 Firstly, section 33177 of the 
Charter provides the power of legislative override.178 The authority to strike down 
legislation permits the legislature to re-enact laws that have been struck down by 
the courts. The legislature can also insert an “express notwithstanding clause”179 
into a statute which results in protecting the legislation from judicial scrutiny or 
review. Secondly, under section 1 of the Charter, a right can be limited within 
reasonable limits. The limitation analysis permits courts to “speculate on how the 
offending legislation could be remedied”.180 This is done by suggesting that less-
curbed means be offered in order to reach the same result.181   
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Thirdly, some rights in the Charter are “internally qualified”,182 and the courts could 
second-guess alternative measures that could satisfy constitutional muster. For 
example, in the case of RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada,183 the court had to determine 
the constitutionality of a total restriction on commercial tobacco advertising, and also 
whether an unattributed health warning on tobacco products was a violation of the 
right to freedom of speech. The majority of the court held that deference is context-
specific, however, the court was careful as not to be overly deferential: 
As with context, however, care must be taken not to extend the notion of 
deference too far. Deference must not be carried to the point of relieving the 
government of the burden which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating 
that the limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable. 
Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problem 
within the limiting framework of the Constitution. But the courts also have a role: 
to determine, objectively and impartially, whether parliament’s choice falls within 
the limiting framework of the Constitution. The courts are no more permitted to 
abdicate their responsibility than is parliament. To carry judicial deference to the 
point of accepting parliament’s view simply on the basis that the problem is 
serious and the solution is difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in 
the constitutional process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which our 
constitutional and our nation is founded.184 
The minority of the court came to the conclusion that different degrees of deference 
should be applied, which would depend upon the nature of the right and the nature 
of the legislation before the court.185 The minority defined the nature of the 
legislation in this regard as “social engineering”186 which should be given a high level 
of deference. The nature of the right was defined as one not worthy of being 
presented with a level of safeguard, since: 
…harm engendered by tobacco, and the profit motive underlying its promotion, 
place this form of expression as far from the ‘core’ of freedom of expression 
values as prostitution, hate mongering or pornography.187 
The difference between the majority and the minority judgment is the role that 
deference should play in determining the nature of the burden of proof which the 
state bears in the section 1 analysis.188 The minority adopted a deferential approach 
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which meant that the state did not have to meet its burden under the conventional 
civil standard of proof, but simply had to “demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis 
for believing that such a rational connection exists”.189 The majority, while it 
concluded that a contextual approach should be adopted of the section 1 analysis, 
reaffirmed that, on a balance of probabilities, such civil standard of proof was “the 
appropriate standard of proof in all stages of the proportionality analysis”.190 
Moreover, the majority warned against taking the contextual approach of the section 
1 analysis too far in a way that would undermine parliament’s obligation to justify 
any limitations it places on the Charter’s rights, and in doing so “substitute ad hoc 
judicial discretion for the reasoned demonstration contemplated by the Charter”.191 
In Thomson Newspapers v Canada,192 the court considered numerous contextual 
factors in determining the proper degree of deference. This case dealt with the 
restriction of free speech regarding opinion survey results during the final three days 
of the federal election campaign. The majority of the court decided that the means 
followed by the legislature did not meet the minimum impairment criteria.193 Looking 
at the nature of the expression in issue was necessary in determining the degree of 
deference.194 The nature of the expression, the court found, was “at the core of the 
political process”,195 and hence a deferential approach by the court would not be 
proper. The court also stated the factors which it found could militate in favour of a 
deferential approach, namely, the vulnerability of the group sought to be 
safeguarded; secondly, the voters’ interests and those opposed to the pollster, and 
thirdly, the:  
…reasonable apprehension of harm test that has been applied where it has 
been suggested, though not proven, that the very nature of the expression in 
question undermines the position of groups or individuals as equal participants 
in society.196   
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However, the court concluded that Canadian voters were not a vulnerable group; 
thus, the government’s claim of widespread significant harm to the group could not 
be sustainable, as the autonomy and dignity of the group was not under attack.197 
Hence the court found that a “significant level of deference”198 was not required, and 
that, as a result of these facts, the legislative means taken did not amount to a 
minimum impairment.  
In another case where deference was exercised - R v Edwards Books199 - the 
constitutionality of the Retail Business Holidays Act was questioned. This Act was 
drafted in such a manner that it exempted business with less than seven employees 
from closing on Sunday, whilst restricting retail stores with more than seven 
employees from opening on a Sunday. The court had to decide whether the manner 
in which the legislature had formulated this exemption was reasonable. Dickson J 
maintained that “the legislature is entitled to a measure of leeway on how to achieve 
its goals”.200 Applying deference, he stated that although there could be a better 
legislative solution to the religious exemption, it was not up to the court to impose 
such solution. He concluded that the Act was unconstitutional, as it would impose 
“an excessively high standard on the legislature”.201 Hence, the court found that the 
state made a serious effort to balance the rights of those affected, and showed that 
its legislation was a justifiable violation on the right to freedom of religion.202 La 
Forest J, in a concurring judgment, also stressed that the needs left to the legislature 
a reasonable degree of room in formulating its legislation.203 Yet La Forest J also 
stressed that there is an obligation on the legislature to formulate legislation that is 
reasonable, and once this duty is satisfied, the court may go no further.204 
The case of Chaoulli v Quebec205 concerned the validity of section 15 of the Health 
Insurance Act, and section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act of Quebec. These two 
provisions prohibited Quebec citizens from taking out medical insurance for services 
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in the private sector that are available under the provincial health system. It was the 
appellants’ argument that this prohibition constituted an infringement under section 
7 of the Charter.206 The majority of the court concluded that there was an 
infringement of section 7 of the Charter.207 The court engaged in a debate on how 
much deference was owed to the legislature. Deschamps J stated that: 
It must be possible to base the criteria for judicial intervention on legal principles 
and not socio-political discourse that is disconnected from reality.208 
The majority also noted that, although the democratically elected legislature has the 
duty of defining and implementing social policy, the courts have the role of holding 
such policy accountable to the foundational commitments of the people, as 
enshrined in the Constitution.209 There is a possibility for the court to defer when the 
legislature provides grounds that can be justified under the terms of democratic 
principles of the Constitution.210 The courts must also be informed of its institutional 
competence to evaluate the issues at hand. Deschamps J noted that: 
Certain factors favour greater deference, such as the prospective nature of the 
decision, impact on public finances, the multiplicity of competing interests, the 
difficulty of presenting scientific evidence and the limited  time available to the 
state.211 
Deference is to be exercised depending on the circumstances and evidence before 
the court.212 Subsequently, the ability of the court to decide upon a matter depends 
on the evidence before the court, “rather than a deeper appreciation of the inherent 
limitations of the court for adjudication of complex, polycentric matters”.213 Lastly, 
the right to equality, as guaranteed in section 15(1) of the Charter, can also be met 
through numerous remedies.214 This provision of the Charter prohibits laws that 
discriminate on listed grounds.215 A decision by the court under section 15(1) 
requires that the legislature aligns its laws to accommodate the individual or group 
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that has been affected.216 In spite of this, the legislature still has other options to 
remedy the exclusion of the affected group or individual.  
However, despite these four factors that are understood to be making dialogue 
possible, questions are raised regarding the “inconsistent application of the 
reasonableness standard”217 by the Canadian Supreme Court. For example, in the 
case of Dunsmuir v New Brunswick218 - which involved the constitutionality of the 
dismissal of public office holders - an employee was not informed of the reasons for 
his termination of employment, or provided with the opportunity to respond. In this 
case, the majority of the court found that the respondent was rightfully correct in 
dismissing the appellant, and that “it was unnecessary to consider any public law 
duty of procedural fairness”.219 Yet, the court had to review the reasonableness of 
the decision-maker concerned. 
The majority decision in this case was criticised as being full of mixed messages in 
that it “preserves the status quo relabelling, rather than rewriting, the pragmatic and 
functional approach”.220 The only difference is that after Dunsmuir, the process of 
determining reasonableness requires one to undertake a procedure of review 
analysis in situations where current case law has already established that judicial 
deference is owed regarding a specific issue.221 Nonetheless, Bastarche and 
LeBelle JJ in Dunsmuir noted the dilemma, in that: 
Neither wish nor intend to return to the jurisdiction/preliminary question doctrine 
that plagued the jurisprudence in this area for many years and that judges must 
not brand as jurisdictional issues that are doubtfully so.222 
Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach to reasonableness review in 
Dunsmuir also amounted to mixed messages while it adopted Dyzenhaus’ notion 
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that judicial deference requires “respectful attention to the reasons offered”223 by an 
administrative decision-maker. It also builds on that notion by stating that 
“reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process”.224 Thus, the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s application of judicial restraint and deference seems not 
to have been consistent or sufficiently formulated.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and their courts’ jurisprudence have 
influenced South African courts to a great extent. In the following section, the South 
African courts’ perspective on judicial restraint and deference will be investigated. 
4.2.3  Judicial restraint and deference: The South African perspective 
Like the Canadian Supreme Court, the South African Constitutional Court has 
exercised judicial restraint premised on the separation of powers, and not interfering 
with the decisions by other government branches when it found such decisions to 
be in line with the Constitution. The respect of the other government branches’ 
domains forms a central aspect of the separation of powers doctrine and the idea of 
judicial restraint.225 This respect to other government branches’ spheres presents 
the court with the challenge that:  
This Court may frequently find itself faced with complex problems as to what 
properly belongs to the discretionary sphere which the Constitution allocates to 
the legislature and the executive, and what falls squarely to be determined by 
the judiciary. …The search for an appropriate accommodation in this frontier 
legal territory accordingly imposes a particularly heavy responsibility on the 
courts to be sensitive to considerations of institutional competence and the 
separation of powers. Undue judicial adventurism be as damaging as excessive 
judicial timidity. …Both extremes need to be avoided.226 
The supremacy of the South African Constitution must be considered to avoid 
extremes.227 The boundaries of the judicial terrain have been determined by the 
constitutional supremacy clause as provided by section 2 of the Constitution:  
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Courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the 
Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government. 
They too must observe the constitutional limits of their authority. This means that 
the judiciary should not interfere in the processes of other branches of 
government unless to do so is mandated by the Constitution. …But under our 
constitutional democracy, the Constitution is the supreme law. It is binding on all 
branches of government and no less on Parliament. … Courts are required by 
the Constitution to ensure that all branches of government act within the law and 
fulfil their constitutional obligations.228  
The word ‘respect’ is not only used within the context of judicial restraint but is also 
used when referring to deference. As regards the use of the ordinary meaning of the 
word ‘deference’, the Court was prompted to explain that: 
Judicial deference does not imply judicial timidity or an unreadiness to perform 
the judicial Function. … The use of the word ‘deference’ may give rise to 
misunderstanding as to the true function of a review Court. This can be avoided 
if it is realised that the need for Courts to treat decision-makers with appropriate 
deference or respect flows not from judicial courtesy or etiquette but from the 
fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers itself.229 
This practice of constraint is also termed ‘due deference’, and believed to primarily 
constitute self-imposed constraint by the courts which is less formal and more 
intangible than what others may term the “formal rules of restraint”.230 The self-
imposed limitations are the result of the “D word”:231 deference. As mentioned in 
paragraph 4.2 above, the concept of deference is to some degree vague and 
restricting, and has been described as “a highly impressionistic concept which is not 
open to scientific analysis”.232 It consequently constitutes a flexible counter-weight 
to a strong-form judicial review, because there is no understandable formula for 
accurately describing what it entails in all cases, in spite of academic pleas for a 
“theory of deference”233 in order to “guide judicial intervention and non-
intervention”.234 As Sachs states:  
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There is a time to be cautious and a time to be bold, a time for discretion to be 
the better part of valour and a time for valour to be the better part of discretion. 
And it would appear that there is no logic intrinsic to the judicial function itself 
that can tell us when the clock strikes for valour and when for caution. The 
question becomes not one of whether but when; I would love to see a theory of 
when.235 
The fluctuation in the notion of deference as either strict restraint or simple respect 
is a result of the “democracy versus juristocracy debate”,236 and is an inevitable 
outcome of both South Africa’s legal and socio-political history. O’Regan has 
observed that during the days of the apartheid state, the courts demonstrated a 
“supine attitude … in the face of domineering state power”.237 This was clearly 
shown in Rabie CJ’s judgment in the case of Omar v Minister of Law and Order238 
on the issue of whether, to the degree in which the regulations restricted 
consultations between detainees and their legal representatives, the courts were 
ultra vires. He stated that: 
This indicates that Parliament contemplated the need to ensure the safety of the 
public … might necessitates the taking of extraordinary measures which might 
make drastic inroads into the rights and privileges normally enjoyed by 
individuals.239 
As O’Regan observed, this put into motion a “tone for judicial complicity”240 which 
entailed huge limitations of human rights during the state of emergency era, and 
eventually resulted in the UDF case241 which served as the “lowest point of our pre-
democratic jurisprudence”.242 Keeping this history in mind, it is not difficult to see 
why judicial deference has a disastrous reputation for having the same meaning as 
judicial “passivity”243 or “complaisance indicative of collusion with the political arms 
of state”.244 In this context, deference became a concept associated with the political 
authoritarianism by political government branches, and a concomitant judicial 
“surrendering to political pressure”.245 The concept of deference as submission or 
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“gracious concession”, thus, is deemed not to be adequate.246 
Deference, when not properly exercised, may permit the courts to overreach in ‘no-
go areas’ in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and it needs to avoid 
being “castigated for overreaching”.247 It is against this background that Bickel 
mentions the significance of ‘passive virtues’ in constitutional adjudication, for, 
amongst other things, the task of ‘not deciding’ is just as crucial as that of deciding, 
and it “demands a subtle acuteness, an ability to know whether, when and how 
much to decide”.248 This presents the courts with an unenviable position of having 
to strike the proper balance, of having to ensure that they show neither a “failure of 
nerve”,249 nor too zealous a practice of judicial activism.250 As a solution to this 
dilemma, a “theory of deference” or “deference lite”251 has been suggested. The 
specific concept of deference adopted is thus a direct connection of how wide a role 
the court will play in a given case.252 Moreover, the theory of deference adopted will 
“animate the drawing of the line between executive action and administrative 
action”.253 Deference as ‘respect’ is the notion originally articulated by Dyzenhaus 
as demanding respectful or deferential attention to the reasons offered in support of 
a decision, “whether that decision be the statutory decision of the legislature, a 
judgement of another court, or the decision of an administrative agency”.254  
For the development of a South African deference concept, Hoexter endorses 
Dyzenhaus’ notion of deference as respect, and proposes that this is the “sort of 
deference we should be aspiring to”255 as requiring: 
A judicial willingness to appreciate the constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies; to acknowledge the expertise of those agencies in 
policy-laden or polycentric issues; to give their interpretations of fact and law due 
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respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interest legitimately pursued by 
administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which 
they operate. This type of deference is perfectly consistent with a concern for 
individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It 
ought to be shaped not by an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, 
but by a careful weighing up of the need for-and the consequences of-judicial 
intervention. Above all, it ought to be shaped by a conscious determination not 
to usurp the functions of administrative agencies; not to cross over review to 
appeal.256 
The concept of variability is linked to this perspective of deference.257 This requires 
the courts to legitimise the intervention in a “candidly and conscious manner”.258 
Justifying the courts’ determination on this aspect should not be done in a formalistic 
manner, or in what could be an all-or-nothing framework.259 In determining whether 
or not the court should intervene will be premised upon the circumstances of each 
case.260 
Such deference was exemplified in Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v 
Premier Western Cape and Another.261 This case concerned the validity of the policy 
pursued by the government of the Western Cape in attempting to give effect to the 
constitutional imperative to introduce equity into its educational system. The schools 
did not dispute the validity of the goal to which the policy was directed, nor did they 
dispute the core aspects of that policy which made provision for a programme of 
rationalisation within the education system, in order to ensure that education in the 
province was conducted on a fair and proper basis. They did, however, complain 
that the manner in which the rationalisation programme was to be implemented 
imposed an unfair burden on them. They also complained that they were neither 
informed adequately of the details of the rationalisation programme or its impact on 
them, nor were they consulted in regard to such matters.262 Chaskalson CJ, in the 
majority judgment, observed that: 
…the role of the courts has always been to ensure that the administrative 
process is conducted fairly and that decisions are taken in accordance with the 
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law and consistently with the requirements of the controlling legislation.263  
If these requirements are met, and if the government’s decision is considered to be 
reasonable, the court will not interfere with such decision.264 In the minority 
judgment, it was Mokgoro and Sachs JJ’s view that while courts should exhibit 
significant deference towards the administration, and recognise the practical 
difficulties which the administration faces, it could create a misleading impression 
that in instances where there is an infringement of a constitutional right, and there 
are significant practical difficulties in remedying the injustice caused, a decision-
maker will not be held accountable.265 This would occur in instances where there is 
an infringement of a constitutional right, and “there are significant practical 
difficulties in remedying the injustice caused”.266 Thus, “it is the remedy that must 
adapt itself to the right, not the right to the remedy”.267 Mokgoro and Sachs JJ also 
observed that these latter sentiments were in accord with the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in Premier Province Mpumalanga,268 where: 
…it was clear that despite the polycentric nature of the issues involved and the 
budgetary implications of the court order, this Court felt it appropriate and 
necessary to intervene.269  
The Court intervened in Premier Province Mpumalanga not simply by setting aside 
as unlawful a decision relating to a detail of the overall financial administration, but 
also by finalising the matter in accordance with principles of fundamental fairness.270 
This was also evidenced in the case of Logbro Properties v Bedderson NO and 
Others,271 where the issue was whether a provincial tender committee, when 
considering a tender in 1997, was entitled to take into account the fact that property 
values had increased since 1995, or whether it should have adjudged the tender 
excluding this and other supervening considerations. The High Court held that the 
increase could properly be taken into account. This decision was appealed by the 
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appellant.272 Cameron JA held that the increase of property values was to be 
considered by the tender committee as polycentric decision-making which entailed 
the complex nature of balancing all public interests that its mandate required of it.273 
This “was not a unilinear question involving the assertion of one’s subject’s rights 
against the administration”.274 The tender committee’s task entailed more than just 
looking at the appellant’s tender. The task was complex, and required “balancing all 
the public interests its mandate required it to fulfil”.275 This included fair 
reconsideration of the appellant’s tender, and not the exclusion of its broader 
responsibilities, which includes the “public benefit to be derived from obtaining a 
higher price by re-advertising the property”.276 It was against this background that 
Cameron JA held that in such situations “a measure of judicial deference is 
appropriate to the complexity of the task that confronted the committee”.277 He 
consequently approved of Hoexter’s views on deference.  
Judicial deference is particularly appropriate where the subject matter of an 
administrative action is very technical, or of a kind in which a court lacks a particular 
proficiency.278 For example, in the case of Phambili Fisheries,279 the court observed 
that the Marine Living Resources Act has entrusted the Chief Director with a wide 
discretion to a strike a balance, in order to achieve the objectives of the Act.280 The 
decision of the Chief Director “gives effect to government economic policies”,281 and 
was a polycentric one. Phambili, the first respondent, argued that the decision made 
by the Chief Director was incorrect. Schutz JA noted that “what is really under attack 
is the substance of the decision, not the procedure by means of which it was arrived 
at”.282 He added that it was not the function of the court to impose its views on what 
it believed would be a proper decision, when a decision was made under the 
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provisions of legislation, and was rational.283 Schutz JA also observed that 
deference as imparted by the courts does not imply judicial timorousness or not 
being ready to perform its function, but that it simply recognises that certain 
administrative conduct must be handled by the executive, and not the judiciary.284 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in the Phambili case was taken on appeal 
to the Constitutional Court in Bato Star,285 where O’Regan J confirmed Schutz JA’s 
decision in Phambili that the notion of judicial deference does not mean that the 
courts are hesitant or not ready to perform its function.286 However, as explained 
above, O’Regan disapproved of the word ‘deference’ because misunderstandings 
may arise as to a review court’s real function.287 She went on to state that if it could 
be realised that the need for courts to treat decision-makers with the appropriate 
deference or respect flows not from judicial courtesy or etiquette, but from the 
fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers, this 
“misunderstanding”288 would be prevented. A court should be careful not to attribute 
to itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of 
government.289 Also, a court gives “due weight to finding of fact and policy decisions 
made by those with special expertise in the field”.290  
The level of respect that the courts give an administrative agency may depend upon 
the nature of the decision and the identity of decision-maker.291 A decision which 
requires an equilibrium to be balanced between a range of competing interests, and 
which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise in that field, 
must be shown respect by the courts.292 At times, an agency may identify a goal to 
be achieved, but it will not dictate which route should be followed in order to achieve 
such goal. It is in such circumstances that a court should show respect to the route 
selected by the decision-maker.293 It should be noted that courts must however not 
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“rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity of the 
decision or the identity of the decision-maker”294.  
In his minority judgment in Bato Star, Ngcobo J commented as to whether the 
Minister has complied with his obligation to ensure that the provision giving effect to 
transformation in the fishing industry was complied with, that the “duty of the courts 
does not extend to telling the functionaries how to implement transformation”,295 and 
that this must be left to the functionaries concerned. According to him, 
transformation can take place in various ways, and how this is to be done is a 
complex and difficult policy matter.296 Hoexter and O’Regan both established 
deference as an important topic and concept. In this process, both Hoexter and 
O’Regan made reliance on Dyzenhaus’ idea of deference as respect.297 This idea 
of deference as respect is premised on an attempt to address the following 
questions: 
How should judges in common law jurisdictions respond to administrative 
determinations of the law? Should they defer to such determinations or evaluate 
them in accordance with their sense of what the right determination should have 
been?298 
O’Regan’s concept of deference as respect is not only associated with, but is 
understood as to be stemming from the separation of powers doctrine.299 However, 
this association remains unclear because she does not clarify how deference stems 
from the doctrine, or “whether the ideas of the separation of powers simply support 
deference”.300 The link between deference and the separation of powers doctrine is 
problematic, if not questionable.301 If deference simply “consists of a judicial 
willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies”,302 then the concept connotes “recognising the proper role 
of the Executive within the constitution within the Constitution”,303 or “manifests the 
recognition that the law itself places certain administrative actions in the hands of 
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the executive”.304 It is then contended that deference provides nothing beyond the 
pure separation of powers.305  
Unlike the separation of powers doctrine, which covers a broad range of political 
and legal relationships, deference, on the other hand, focuses on - while not being 
limited to - the relationship between the public administration and the judiciary.306 
Nonetheless, O’Regan’s view which links deference to the separation of powers 
doctrine in the Bato Star case, made reliance on Lord Hoffmann’s views in the 
ProLife Alliance case, where he observed that: 
In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is 
necessary to decide which branch of government has in any particular instance 
the decision-making power and what the limits of that power are. That is a 
question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts. This means that 
the courts themselves often have to decide the limits of their own decision-
making power. That is inevitable. But it does not mean that their allocation of 
decision-making power to the other branches of government is a matter of 
courtesy or deference. The principles upon which decision-making powers are 
allocated are principles of law. The courts are independent branch of 
government and the legislature and the executive are, directly and indirectly 
respectively, the elected branches of government. Independence makes courts 
more suited to deciding some kinds of questions and being elected makes the 
legislature or executive more suited to deciding others. The allocation of these 
decision-making responsibilities is based upon recognised principles. …When a 
court decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the legislature 
or executive, it is not showing deference. It is deciding the law.307 
Lord Hoffmann’s view is not that deference is supported by the separation of 
powers, as stated by O’Regan J, but that “deference is empty in the sense that the 
allocation of functions by the courts is nothing more than a legal question in terms 
of the separation of powers and the rule of law”.308 This notion of deference which 
is imported from Canada is not yet contextualised in South Africa, especially within 
the human-rights sphere.309 Constitutional supremacy within the context of human 
rights should be understood to imply the separation of powers, and by implication, 
deference. It must be informed by the administrative justice content premised on the 
                                                          
304  Phambili Fisheries para 50. 
305  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 453. 
306  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 453. 
307  R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] 2 All ER 977 
(HL) paras 75-76 (hereinafter ProLife Alliance). 
308  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 464. 
309  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 461. 
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understanding that “it is not for an undeveloped ‘theory’ of deference to determine 
the scope of administrative justice”.310 
Although deference is an undeveloped concept in the South African constitutional 
review jurisprudence, in Canada (as discussed in paragraph 4.2.2 above), the 
concept has a long history. Yet the concept remains contested and criticised,311 
similar as in the United States. The United States’ Chevron deference has also 
made its way both to Canada and South Africa.312 The question now is whether 
South African courts should adopt the United States’ deference concept.313 Even 
though it is stated that “borrowing from another system is the most common source 
of legal change,”314 the difficulty with this aphorism is that “such borrowing may 
create problems when a rule is torn from its domestic roots and transplanted to 
foreign soil”.315 Kriegler J gave the following warning when considering the role that 
foreign law can play in South African constitutional jurisprudence: 
Nor does the advent of the Constitution, which codifies them, warrant the 
wholesale importation foreign doctrines or precedents. To be sure we are to 
promote values not yet rooted in our traditions and we have agreed to applicable 
public international law. We are also permitted to have regard to foreign public 
case law. But that does not amount to a wholesale importation of doctrines from 
foreign jurisdictions316 
In the case of Bernstein v Bester,317 Krieger J again commented on this theme by 
emphasising that the subtleties of foreign jurisdictions, their practices and 
terminology require more intensive study. There seem to be differences of much 
substances between South African practices and those countries. Some countries’ 
jurisprudence renders ostensible dangerous analogies without thorough 
understanding of the foreign systems. The frequent resort to foreign authorities 
should also be discouraged, because: 
Far too often one sees citation by counsel of, for instance, an American 
judgment in support of a proposition relating to our Constitution, without any 
attempt to explain why it is said to be in point. Comparative study is always 
useful, particularly where courts in exemplary jurisdictions have grappled with 
                                                          
310  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 462. 
311  Maree and Quinot 2016 TSAR 465 
312  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 99-101. 
313  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 97. 
314  Watson Legal origins and legal change 73. 
315  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 97. 
316  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 144. 
317  Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) paras 132-133. 
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universal issues confronting us. Likewise, where a provision in our Constitution 
is manifestly modelled on a particular provision in another country’s constitution, 
it would be folly not to ascertain how the jurists of that country have interpreted 
their precedential provision. The prescripts of section 35(1) of the Constitution 
are also clear: where applicable, public international law in the field of human 
rights must be considered, and regard may be had to comparable foreign case 
law. But that is a far cry from blithe adoption of alien concepts or inapposite 
precedents.318 
The task of delineating the boundaries between the judiciary and the other branches 
has resulted in the adoption of the idea of deference from other jurisdictions.319 The 
concept is an immigrant from other jurisdictions,320 and there have been calls for the 
construction of an appropriate theory of deference in South Africa.321 
In the Bato Star case, the use of the word ‘deference’ has prompted the court to 
immediately explain that it could be better understood as respect because of 
possible misunderstandings it may give as to a review court’s true function.322 As 
was shown above, the ordinary meanings of the word ‘deference’ varies from one 
jurisdiction to another, and whichever of these definitions one chooses: 
…it conveys an image of the court standing back in favour of the decision-
maker or administrator that seems inconsistent with the role of the court in 
review proceedings.323  
The answer on whether South Africa should board the deference train lies in the 
general principle of accountability, responsibility and openness that is a fundamental 
value enshrined in the Constitution. South African courts do not approach review 
from the perspective of determining the ‘correct’ legal position, and assessing the 
legality of the administrator’s actions against that yardstick.324 It is not an approach 
that can prevail in the light of the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act325 which provides that a decision is reviewable if it is materially 
influenced by an error of law.326 This demands that a review court should decide 
what the true legal position is; not whether the legal conclusion of the decision-
                                                          
318  Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) paras 132-133. 
319  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 98. 
320  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 98. 
321  Hoexter 2000 SALJ 501-502. 
322  Bato Star para 46. See also footnotes 229, 287-288 above. 
323  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 99. 
324  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 103-106. 
325  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
326  Section 6(2)(a). 
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maker was one that could reasonably be held and defended.327 
Deference, as it is exercised in the United States and Canada, is mainly an approach 
that the courts of those countries take in response to the legal decisions of 
administrative agencies and decision-makers. As a result, “one sees immediately 
that the imported plant cannot grow in the same way in South African soil”.328 As 
with any other decision, the court explains its decision on the basis of the arguments 
presented to it in the evidential material. A judge who is convinced that a decision 
is unreasonable will not be deterred from making such pronouncement because of 
a need for deference. The fundamental role of judges is reasoned decision-
making.329 
The use of deference adds nothing to judicial reasons in the absence of expansion 
and explanation. As is the case with “many alien plants, its extirpation from our 
society would not seem to be a loss”.330 As discussed earlier, this understanding 
regarding the origin of deference is contrary to O’Regan’s view regarding the origin 
of the South African deference concept which she suggests existed prior to 1994, 
where the judiciary’s attitude was lethargic in the face of the authoritarian powers of 
the state.331 Despite these criticisms for the inclusion of deference in South African 
constitutional jurisprudence, according to O’Regan J in Bato Star, deference forms 
a vital role in South African law.332  
The other problem presented by deference in South African jurisprudence seems to 
stem from the fact that its scope and limitations are incomprehensible, and not 
properly defined. These sentiments are evident in Ackerman J’s reasoning in the 
case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality333 in that: “it is not possible 
to formulate in general terms what deference must embrace, for this depends on the 
facts and circumstances of each case”.334   
                                                          
327  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 103. 
328  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 105-106. 
329  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 107. 
330  Wallis 2018 SA Judicial Education J 106-107. 
331  O’Regan 2004 SALJ 424. See also footnote 237 above. 
332  Bato Star paras 46-48. 
333  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
(hereinafter National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian).  
334  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality para 66. See also Taggart 2008 NZ LJ 454. 
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The following two judgments of the Constitutional Court both involved governments’ 
policy and budgetary implications, yet the application of deference by the Courts 
raises questions. In the Soobramoney,335 Chaskalson JP, in dismissing Mr 
Soobramoney’s claim for his right not to be refused emergency treatment under 
section 27(3) of the Constitution, stated that the provincial government was the 
responsible authority to make health-care policy decisions about the funding that 
should be made available, and how such funds should be spent. It was stated that 
courts will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the 
political organs.336 This Court exercised deference, and refused to order the state 
to provide expensive dialysis treatment because “the cost of doing so would make 
substantial inroads into the health budget”.337  
While the Court exercised deference, its limits and scope were not comprehensively 
formulated. For example, it seems it did not comprehensively determine the 
circumstances in which a court would be slow to interfere with decisions by other 
state organs. In the case of Treatment Action Campaign,338 it was contended by the 
government that under the separation of powers doctrine the making of policy is the 
prerogative of the executive and not the courts, and that courts cannot make orders 
that have the effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy.339 The 
Constitutional Court dismissed this argument by noting that while: 
…there are no bright lines that separate the roles of the legislature, the executive 
and the courts from one another, there are certain matters that are pre-eminently 
within the domain of one or other arms of the government and not the others.340  
This does not mean that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an 
impact on policy.341 Thus deference played no role in this Court’s judgment as it 
made an order which has a significant impact on the government’s health-care 
                                                          
335  Soobramoney 755. See also Chapter 3 footnote 332. 
336  Soobramoney para 29. See also Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 180: “Whether 
or not there should be regulation and redistribution is essentially a political question which falls 
within the domain of the Legislature and not the Court. It is not for the Courts to approve or 
disapprove of such policies. What the Courts must ensure is that the implementation of any 
political decision to undertake such policies conforms with the Constitution”. See also footnote 
333-334 in Chapter 3. 
337  Soobramoney para 28. See also Mojapelo 2013 Advocate 44. 
338  Treatment Action Campaign 703. See also Chapter 3 footnote 323. 
339  Treatment Action Campaign para 97. 
340  Treatment Action Campaign para 98. 
341  Treatment Action Campaign para 98. 
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policy and budgetary implications. It seems that even amongst the South African 
judiciary, there is still uncertainty as to the meaning and application of judicial 
deference and restraint. 
4.3  Conclusion  
In this chapter, it was disclosed that courts have a degree of discretion regarding 
whether certain practices should be applied. This degree of discretion includes the 
concept of deference. Deference constitutes the court’s understanding of its role, 
and the role of the other branches of government in the adjudication process. This 
complex concept also arises out of the observation of the separation of powers 
doctrine, as it requires that the judiciary refrains from unnecessarily intruding into 
the domain of the other branches of government. While there are numerous 
definitions for the word ‘deference’, the South African Constitutional Court and the 
Canadian Supreme Court have adopted the understanding of deference as respect.  
Deference is also understood as referring to judges that are cautious about putting 
forward their own views, and restricting their discretion as far as possible. This is 
termed judicial restraint. How and when a court decides to defer is determined by 
the court’s approach to certain considerations, namely, the court’s understanding of 
its institutional role; the court’s understanding of its competence; and the nature of 
the matter before the court. Judicial restraint governs the extent to which, or the 
intensity with which the courts are willing to sacrifice a legislative decision, and the 
justification advanced in support of that decision.  
In the United States, courts are criticised for their willingness to adjudicate on nearly 
every subject, and this has resulted in some litigants distrusting the legislative and 
executive policy administration. It has been acknowledged that deference to the 
legislature might be difficult at times. Courts exercising deference have been 
criticised to have surrendered its power necessary to check on the power exercised 
by the legislature. Moreover, a judiciary acting without restraint has been criticised 
as disrespecting the role of the constitutional branches of government. Courts, as 
the unelected branch of government, should premise their decisions in some power 
external to a judge’s will, namely, in the text’s meaning and legal practices.  
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The United States’ Chevron deference has been questioned as it removes the 
authority from the judiciary to the executive to say what the law is. This removal of 
constitutional power violates the United States Constitution Vesting Clause of Article 
III. Its constitutionality is also questioned because it allows an agency to overrule a 
judicial opinion by issuing a new, reasonable interpretation of a legislation it 
administers, even if that interpretation is different from a previous judicial 
interpretation. This creates systematically biased judgments, as these agencies are 
often litigants in cases in which their interpretations are judicially reviewed, and 
courts are required to defer to the views of one of the parties to the case before 
them. This bias created is unconstitutional as it is in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process. Moreover, the Chevron deference allows the executive to appropriate 
much core judicial and legislative power, and federal power is concentrated in such 
a way that does not seem compatible with the Constitution of the framers’ design. 
Thus, it is a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of judicial duty.  
In Canada, the concepts of judicial restraint and deference are both exercised, and 
the courts advance the concept of a democratic dialogue to show its respect to the 
roles of the political branches of government interpreting the Constitution. Deference 
as respect forms part of the constitutional jurisprudence, however, it has been stated 
that care must be taken not to extend deference too far, and that deference must 
not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden which the 
Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it imposes on guaranteed 
rights are reasonable and justifiable. The legislature and the courts have their roles; 
and courts are not permitted to abdicate their responsibility to parliament. However, 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach to the reasonableness review in the light 
of this notion has at times been criticised as sending mixed messages regarding its 
scope and limitation. The Canadian Supreme Court’s articulation of this notion has 
also been slated as not being sufficiently formulated and articulated.  
It is difficult to understand why under the Canadian jurisprudence it was thought 
necessary in the Dunsmuir judgment - where Dyzenhaus’ concept of deference was 
approved of - that courts must give consideration to the knowledge, experience and 
determinations of the decision-makers, and to explain the exercise of deference in 
those circumstances. The problem presented by interpreting deference in this 
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manner is that if courts, with a little reserve, must only give due consideration to the 
case before them; this seems an unnecessary exercise which amounts to cautionary 
tautology. There are additional problems with the Canadian use of deference as it 
was applied in the Dunsmuir judgment, in that it is used to determine the standard 
of review, whether correctness or reasonableness. Its more significant role appears 
to lie in determining whether, on a question of law determined by an administrative 
decision-maker, the standard of review is correct or reasonable. 
In South Africa, the Canadian idea of judicial deference by judges to the legislature 
and the executive which also encompasses respect has been adopted. The need to 
develop a deference idea which will embrace respect to all government branches 
has been identified. There has been a mixed response to the application and 
justification for this doctrine. Deference to agencies’ interpretation of statutes they 
administer, even where these agencies are litigants in courts’ review proceedings 
where their interpretations of the legislation are questioned, has not be found to be 
creating systematically biased judgments, as suggested by Hamburger.  
Moreover, deference has not been considered as creating a doctrine made by 
judges for abdicating judicial duties, as contended by Gorsuch J and Thomas J. 
Their views that deference removed the judicial authority to say what the law is from 
the courts to the executive, are also not shared by South African courts. On the 
contrary, O’Regan J endorsed the Canadian deference approach under 
circumstances which result in an unconstitutional removal of judicial power to the 
executive or the agencies. O’Regan J’s views on deference are also shared by 
Cameron JA in Logbro Properties, and Schutz JA in Phambili Fisheries. 
Nonetheless, similar to the United States Supreme Court in the Chevron case, 
Schutz JA deferred to the agency’s own interpretation of the legislation they 
administer, and added that it was not the court’s job to impose its views on what it 
believed would be a proper decision. This decision was later confirmed in an appeal 
to the Constitutional Court where O’Regan J stated that a court should be careful 
not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other 
government branches.  
Still, the deference doctrine’s application by our courts has not been 
comprehensively and consistently formulated. In this regard, it has been observed 
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that it is impossible to articulate what deference means in general terms, as each 
case’s facts and circumstances will determine its particular meaning. The 
justification, scope and limitations of the courts’ exercise of discretion when showing 
respect to the constitutional domain of the political branches of government has 
been an issue in the courts’ application of the judicial restraint and deference 
concepts. Hence, the courts’ exercise of its discretion in the context of the 
mandatory minimum sentences, and the scope and the limits of this discretion in the 





MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: A NON-JUDICIAL BODY 
DECIDING APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENTS 
5.1  Introduction 
The punishment for crimes committed is a unique and policy-laden endeavour in 
any society. Criminal punishment enables a society to deprive individuals of 
fundamental rights such as life, liberty, and property. Where such essential rights of 
the individual citizen are affected, punishment must be limited and tailored to certain 
narrow circumstances.1 Certain procedures and standards of fairness must be 
followed before a citizen can be subjected to criminal punishment. One such 
procedure is the trial of a citizen by a jury of peers in countries such as the United 
States. Another safeguard of fairness is the separation of powers. This principle 
safeguards criminal defendants from a tyrannical government by ensuring that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial arms each perform a unique function in criminal 
proceedings, and that each has the means to check the authority of the other 
branches during such proceedings.2 
In countries like South Africa and Canada, governments have introduced sweeping 
substantial amendments to the criminal justice system to numerous offences 
carrying mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, for example, the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act3 in South Africa, and the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act4 in 
Canada. Historically, judges have had a broad discretion to formulate appropriate 
sentences for criminal offenders. It is argued that minimum sentences encroach on 
that wide discretion by setting a mandatory floor below which judges cannot 
sentence, even if to do so would be the proportionate sanction in the particular 
circumstances.5  
                                                          
1  Riley 2010 Public Interest LJ 285 
2  Riley 2010 Public Interest LJ 285 
3  Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
4  Controlled Drugs and Substance Act (SC 1996 c 19). 
5  Mangat More than we can afford 5. 
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There are rationales advanced in support of mandatory minimum sentencing which 
include their effect as a general deterrent, and their role in ensuring that the justice 
system is more transparent, certain and fair.6 Research, however, shows that 
punitive sentencing does not lead to safer communities.7 Instead of deterring 
potential offenders, mandatory minimum sentences result in excessive, harsh 
sentences that increase the likelihood of recidivism.8 Furthermore, mandatory 
minimum sentences remove sentencing discretion from judges (whose decisions 
are public and reviewable), and surrenders it to the legislature or the executive, 
whose decision-making is mainly beyond review.9 
Judicial discretion in sentencing has never been unfettered. A trial judge performs 
the sentencing process not in a vacuum, but exercises his discretion to impose a “fit 
and fair sentence within statutory and judicially defined limits”.10 Even in the absence 
of a mandatory minimum floor, judicially-determined sentencing ranges operate as 
guidelines; and sentencing decisions may be overturned on appeal if they stray too 
far. A fit sentence is broadly accepted as one imposed by the court after a 
consideration of the range of sentences imposed for similar crimes committed 
reasonably contemporaneously.11 
Mandatory minimum sentences feature in the criminal justice systems of Canada, 
the United States, England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, India 
and South Africa.12 These common-law jurisdictions’ sentences can be classified 
into three categories: 
(1) Sentences that are truly mandatory, in that they do not allow the exercise 
of judicial discretion either above or below the mandated sentence (such 
as a sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder);  
(2) Sentences that set a mandatory floor below which the court cannot 
sentence an offender, although courts may exercise discretion in 
sentencing above the mandatory minimum limited only by statutory 
maxima;  
                                                          
6  Mangat More than we can afford 5. 
7  Brooks 2017 Criminal Justice Ethics 122. 
8  Mangat More than we can afford 5. 
9  Mangat More than we can afford 5-6. This argument is made despite the fact that the executive 
and legislative branches are elected by the people as their representatives. See previous 
chapters.  
10  Mangat More than we can afford 11. 
11  Mangat More than we can afford 11. See also Ruby et al Sentencing 788. 
12  Mangat More than we can afford 13. 
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(3) Presumptively mandatory sentences of custody that permit courts to 
impose a lesser custodial sentence or non-custodial sentence only in 
exceptional circumstances.13 
Regardless of how minimum sentences come to bear on an offender, in all their 
forms the legislature has predetermined the baseline punishment for a specific act 
or omission, thereby preventing the court from fully considering the circumstances 
of the offence and the offender. Without a finding of unconstitutionality, courts are 
unable to account for any unforeseen factors that may result in the minimum 
sentence being inappropriate or excessive in the specific circumstances.14 
The discussion in this chapter will examine the history and application of the 
mandatory minimum sentences, and its effects on the courts’ role in deciding an 
appropriate punishment. The discussion will also probe whether sentencing is a 
judicial function in the constitutional sense, and, specifically, within the context of 
the separation-of-powers doctrine. In order to fully appreciate the constitutional role 
of the courts in the sphere of sentencing, the discussion will examine the extent to 
which the courts’ sentencing discretion can be fully exercised by the courts, and how 
the mandatory minimum sentences have shifted this discretion from the courts to 
other branches of government. The justification for this removal of judicial 
sentencing discretion will also be explored. The constitutionality and the rationale of 
the sentencing policy which shifts this discretion has been questioned, and will be 
investigated in order to establish its impact on the courts’ discretion to impose 
sentence, as well as on the separation of powers’ principles. This will necessitate 
an analysis of the historical sentencing principles, and what led to the introduction 
of the mandatory minimum sentences which are seen by “judges as an expression 
of a lack of confidence in their ability to dispense justice … [which] erodes judicial 
independence”.15 Lastly, the discussion in this chapter will consider how the courts’ 
sentencing discretion can be safeguarded, while the legislature at the same time 
enact laws which are constitutionally sound and not encroaching onto the courts’ 
independence and authority.  
                                                          
13  Mangat More than we can afford 13. 
14  Mangat More than we can afford 14-15. 
15  Mangat More than we can afford 10. 
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5.2  Origins of sentencing judicial discretion 
Sentencing has an ancient history. The idea that the punishment received by the 
offender must fit the crime committed appears in the Code of Hammurabi, and can 
be traced back to 1760 BC.16 This principle of proportionality has Biblical roots in 
the book of Exodus,17 and Leviticus.18 Aristotle already equated inequality with 
injustice, where he noted that: “What the judge aims at doing is to make the parts 
equal by the penalty … imposed”.19 
In feudal England, criminal punishment was arbitrary, and subject to the desires of 
monarchs or the local nobles who were delegated the monarch’s power to punish.20 
This resulted in little to no consideration of the proportionality of the punishment to 
the offence. Feudal officials imposed capital punishment for almost every violation, 
for example, murder, treason and minor theft.21 As the rule of law developed, trial 
court judges in England developed a vast degree of discretion in sentencing for 
misdemeanours.22 On the books, felonies remained capital offences that carried 
mandatory punishments, but, in practice, judges employed certain mechanisms 
through which they were able to use their discretion, and avoid the prescribed 
sentence.23 In the English legal system, the largest development as regards 
sentencing judicial discretion was the Magna Carta.24 This set of legal rules was 
demanded by the barons and granted by the king, and served as the most significant 
check on the king’s justice.25 The king controlled the royal courts too closely,26 and 
judicial discretion was limited to such an extent that the barons demanded 
changes.27 One significant outcome of the Magna Carta was to place the king “below 
                                                          
16  Fish 2008 Oxford J Legal Studies 57. 
17  See Holy Bible New King James Exodus 20:23-25: “you are to take life for life, eye for an eye, 
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise”. 
18  Leviticus 24:20: “fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth” in Holy Bible New King James. 
19  Aristotle The Nicomachean ethics 148-149. 
20  Riley 2010 Public Interest LJ 287. 
21  Riley 2010 Public Interest LJ 287. 
22  Mandiberg 2009 McGeorge LR 107,108. 
23  Mandiberg 2009 McGeorge LR 107,108. 
24  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 29. The Magna Carta Libertatum (the Great Charter of Liberties) was 
drawn up on 15 June 1215 by rebel barons who demanded protection against unlawful 
imprisonment, amongst other concerns. 
25  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 29; see also Pollock and Maitland The history of the English law 181. 
26  Pollock and Maitland The history of the English law 204: judges on the King’s Bench “were very 
truly the King’s servants”. 
27  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 29. 
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the law”.28 The Magna Carta was the first English statute which wrestled away some 
of the king’s control over judges and the law. From that point on, judicial discretion 
would continue to expand in England, and later some of the Magna Carta’s central 
discretionary principles would be embodied in the constitutions of some countries, 
for example, the United States.29 
Following Aristotle,30 the Magna Carta also refers to sentence proportionality, 
where, at times, only fines were imposed for certain criminal activities.31 Reference 
to proportionality in sentencing is further made in the case law of the Middle Ages,32 
and the seventeenth century, once the modern criminal justice system had been 
established.33 Section 10 of the Bill of Rights Act of 1689 (in England) forbid cruel 
and unusual punishments, shortly afterwards, the House of Lords found that a fine 
was “excessive and exorbitant, against the Magna Carta, the common right of the 
subject, and the law of the land”.34 
Closely associated with Anglo-Saxon legal traditions is the concept of judicial 
independence. Today, this concept might be understood as freedom from 
constraint, or the opportunity to exercise discretion.35 Yet, early English judges were 
not independent in the way we now understand “independence”.36 Between 1066 
and 1215, judges were never truly “independent”.37 Not only was the king “above 
the law”, but he was above “everyone else, at least until the Magna Carta, and 
judges were clearly his subjects”.38 Shapiro explains that: 
Most of the phenomena we come to call judicial independence, or see as the 
roots of judicial independence, are closely associated with a long-term English 
tendency towards extreme political centralization.39  
 
                                                          
28  Pollock and Maitland The history of the English law 181-182. 
29  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 29. 
30  See footnote 19 above. 
31  Gray 2017 New Crim LR 409. 
32  Le Gras v Bailiff of Bishop of Winchster YB Mich 10 Edw II pl 4 (CP 1316). 
33  Gray 2017 New Crim LR 409, see also Hodges v Humkin 2 Bulst 139 140 80 ER 1015,1016 
(KB 1615): “imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence”. 
34  Earl of Devon’s Case II State Tr 133 136 (1689). 
35  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 29. 
36  Shapiro Courts: a comparative and political analysis 66. 
37  Shapiro Courts: a comparative and political analysis 66-67. 
38  Pollock and Maitland The history of the English law 66-67. 
39  Shapiro Court: a comparative and political analysis 66. 
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The courts’ “powers and jurisdiction, indeed their very existence, have been 
determined by the King’s commission and/or parliamentary statute”.40 Even so, just 
prior to the Norman Conquest, English judges did occasionally exercise discretion 
when it came to imposing penalties.41 It was after the Conquest that the Norman 
kings would understandably be involved in the administration of justice as a 
mechanism for ruling a foreign land.42 
There were four main structural tools that acted to limit judicial discretion in medieval 
England between 1066 and 1215, or the period until the Magna Carta: (1) the 
centralisation of the courts, and the accompanying uniformity in the law; (2) the 
advent of the jury; (3) ‘appellate’ review; and (4) jurisdictional limitations, including 
specialisation of courts.43 Centralising courts permitted for the transmission of the 
king’s power through “tentacles running into the countryside”.44 As litigants 
discovered that the king’s justices were more efficient and less bias, many litigants 
began to pursue their cases in royal courts. This had the effect of limiting the number 
of cases in royal courts. Thus, the centralisation permitted the king more control 
over his own judges’ decisions, while, at the same time, structurally limiting the 
fundamental discretion of local judges by removing more and more types of claims 
or actions from their courts, and into the control of the king.45 The jury was, and 
would develop further into a body by which primary judicial discretion would be 
limited. These juries were concerned with factual matters, which reduced discretion. 
This reduction of judicial discretion was not by accident, as was evidenced by the 
conflict between secular and canonical law. Juries were employed where there was 
some disagreement between “the church and state and neither should be judge in 
their own cause”.46 
The first jury would hear and decide the factual issues, and it did not always have 
the last word. If the second jury decided that the first jury had perjured itself, the 
judge would impose stiff penalties on the attained jury. In addition, since the original 
                                                          
40  Shapiro Courts: A comparative and political analysis 66. 
41  Hurnard The King’s pardon for homicide 2. 
42  Turner The King and his courts 11. 
43  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 30. 
44  Shapiro Courts: A comparative and political analysis 78. 
45  Barber 2005 W Eng LR 31. 
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party to the case was a party along with the suspect jury, the original party also had 
to pay a fine. Just the threat of an attaint meant that the judge was entrusted with 
significant amount of power in shaping the outcome of a case. While the writ of 
attaint was initially only granted by permission of the king, its use was later given to 
the discretion of the judges.47 
Appellate review did not exist for medieval judges as it is understood today. An 
‘appeal’ in medieval England was in fact a charge against the judge, personally, for 
the decision he had reached in a case.48 There was no right to appeal and no 
formalised system. Only in certain circumstances did appealing act as a tool for 
righting a “miscarriage of justice”.49 Appeals hardly constituted the same kind of 
mechanism that would affect judicial decision-making as they are now conceived. 
Nevertheless, appellate review, as it existed in medieval England, still formed a 
primary and secondary discretion-limiting mechanism.50 
Jurisdiction was then, as currently understood, a significant limitation on judicial 
discretion. In some cases, the limitations were structural. As the court system was 
centralised, the king was able to divide up the work between the different types of 
courts.51 Turner suggests that judges also knew there were limits on which cases 
they should be deciding, and which ones were best left to the king.52 These types of 
procedures, while not necessarily instituted by the king, acted as a limitation on 
those judges’ discretion to decide certain types of cases, or make certain types of 
rulings.53 
The Normans kings used both structural tools and specific measures to limit both 
the primary and secondary discretion of judges.54 The creation of uniform laws 
vesting in one system of courts, the jury, the appellate process, and jurisdiction, all 
functioned then, as they do now, to restrict judicial discretion. The sentencing 
discretion of judges was also limited as more judges were reined in by legislature to 
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resemble the king’s justices.55 
During the eighteenth century, judges in England and the United States used their 
power under the common law to create complex rules and procedures that permitted 
them to circumvent convicting those defendants whom they did not consider fit for 
punishment.56 Three of these methods focused on the sentencing phase: the benefit 
of clergy, the suspension of the imposition of sentences, and the recommendation 
of executive pardons.57 
The benefit of the clergy began as a judicial power to grant clemency from the death 
penalty to convicted clergymen. Over time, it developed into a safety valve measure 
in which a judge could eliminate capital punishment for any defendant who was able 
to read.58 Suspension of sentences was another method through which a judge 
could avoid a mandatory sentence he deemed to be too harsh.59 Suspension of 
sentences eventually led to the creation of the probation system, and by the mid-
1900s suspended sentences combined with probation were common.60 
It is clear that the origin of sentencing discretion lay in the ancient principle of 
proportionality in order to advance a fair and just sanction. This principle was waylaid 
in feudal England where judges conceded to the wishes of the monarch. Although 
the Magna Carta created progressive transformation, judges’ discretion was still 
limited by procedural measures instituted by the king. Although not expressly stated, 
it appears that judges’ discretion has - in one way or another - always been limited 
by non-judicial bodies. This topic will be explored below. 
5.3  Non-judicial bodies deciding appropriate punishments under the 
common law 
The common-law understanding regarding the imposition of sentences is that “the 
determination of a sentence in a criminal matter is pre-eminently a matter for the 
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discretion of the trial court”.61 In exercising this function, the trial court has a broad 
discretion in: 
(a)  Deciding which factors should be allowed to influence the court in 
determining the measure of punishment and  
(b)  in determining the value to attach to each factor taken into account.62  
Part of the courts’ considerations in exercising its sentencing discretion is 
determining proportionality in sentencing. Proportionality in how an individual 
defendant is treated, and forbidding cruel and unusual punishments remain 
significant legal principles under the common law. 
Yet there seems to always have been cases where this function of the courts has 
been usurped by non-judicial bodies. Many such cases are found in the 
jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and the European Court for Human Rights 
(European Court), which will be utilised in this section for further illustration. For 
example, in the case of Liyanage v The Queen,63 Lord Pearce, for the Privy Council, 
found that the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) legislation violated the separation-of-powers 
principle enshrined in that country’s constitution. The impugned legislation provided 
for the imposition of a minimum mandatory jail term of ten years’ imprisonment on 
those involved in an aborted coup. In finding the legislation unconstitutional, the 
court discussed the minimum mandatory sentencing aspect: 
Their aim was to ensure that the judges in dealing with these particular persons 
on these particular charges were deprived of their normal discretion as regards 
appropriate sentences. They were compelled to sentence each offender on 
conviction to not less than ten years’ imprisonment … even though his part in 
the conspiracy might have been trivial … if such Acts as these are valid, the 
judicial power could be wholly absorbed by the legislature and taken out of the 
hands of the judges.64  
In the case of Reyes v The Queen, the Privy Council construed a provision of the 
Belize Constitution preventing the imposition of inhumane or degrading punishment, 
or other treatment, to prohibit the mandatory minimum imposition of the death 
                                                          
61  S v Kibido 1998 (2) SACR 213 (SCA) para 217g. See also S v Kruger 2012 (1) SACR 369 (SCA) 
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penalty. The Council concluded that it is not the function of a non-judicial body to 
“decide the appropriate measure of punishment to be visited on a defendant for a 
crime they have committed”.65 
Some challenges to minimum mandatory sentencing in the United Kingdom have 
involved articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), given the 
reflection of the ECHR in the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998,66 especially 
Article 667 which preserves the right to a fair hearing before an independent and 
impartial tribunal, and Article 368 prohibiting the use of torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
A violation of Article 6 was exemplified in the case of R (Anderson) v Home 
Secretary,69 where the appellant had been sentenced to mandatory life jail terms for 
murder. The legislation allowed the Home Secretary to set a minimum time to be 
served by such offenders, known as the ‘tariff’, in consultation with judges and 
departmental officials. The Home Secretary fixed a tariff period greater than that 
recommended to him, and the appellant challenged the consistency of the practice 
with the ECHR. The House of Lords found in favour of the appellant. Lord Bingham 
held that the practice amounted to a member of the executive determining the 
minimum sentence that a particular prisoner should serve, and, as this was a judicial 
task, Article 6 had been violated.70 Lord Steyn agreed, and stated that only a court 
could determine the punishment of a convicted person, which had been the position 
since at least 1688, and was required by the rule of law.71 Lord Hutton further added 
that the Home Secretary’s power was difficult to reconcile with the separation-of-
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powers principles.72  
As regards Article 3 of the ECHR, in R v Offen,73 the Court of Appeal indicated that 
a provision mandating the imposition of a life sentence on a repeat offender might 
offend this article by being arbitrary and disproportionate. It was asserted that in this 
case, the European Court applied a “gross disproportionate”74 test to determine 
whether a sentence amounted to inhumane or degrading punishment contrary to 
Article 3. It was also argued that continued imprisonment may be problematic where 
it no longer effectively serves any legitimate penological purpose,75 bearing in mind 
that rehabilitation is reflected in international norms, and has become more 
important.76  
The European Court has expressed negative sentiments about mandatory 
sentencing regimes, acknowledging that they deprive the defendant of placing 
mitigating or special circumstances before the Court, and, for that reason, they are 
“much more likely”77 to be grossly disproportionate. Life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is likely to violate Articles 3 (prohibition against torture) and 578 
(guaranteeing the right to liberty and security of the person) of the ECHR as being 
arbitrary and disproportionate.79 If release from life imprisonment is based on 
evidence that the person detained has been rehabilitated, the state must provide 
the treatment necessary for rehabilitation to take place; failure to do so breaches 
Article 3.80  
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On the African continent, the Botswana High Court in the case of Matomela and 
Another v The State81 held that determining the appropriate sentence is a function 
reserved for the judiciary, and mandatory minimum sentences erode judicial 
sentencing discretion. The court explained that: 
The practice of enacting mandatory minimum sentences for certain types of 
offences constitutes a threat to the independence of the courts as envisaged by 
the Constitution and the practice by the legislature of arrogating to itself the 
functions reserved for the judiciary by the Constitution is clearly undesirable and 
should be discouraged or discontinued as it erodes the discretionary powers of 
the courts in sentencing offenders. There is real danger that the often resorted 
to practice of prescribing mandatory minimum sentences may in the future bring 
very unhealthy conflict between the legislature and the judiciary.82 
These views seem to be aligned with common-law sentencing jurisdictions’ 
understanding of judicial sentencing powers, and appear to be prevalent. Yet, as 
disclosed above in paragraph 5.1, there are many jurisdictions that do have non-
judicial bodies deciding appropriate punishment under the common law, mainly in 
the form of mandatory minimum sentences. In the following paragraphs, these non-
judicial sentences will be elaborated on as utilised in Canada, the United States and 
South Africa. 
5.4  A comparative overview of mandatory minimum sentences in 
Canada, the United States and South Africa 
Sentencing is the most exacting of judicial duties because it takes into account the 
interests of the community, the victim, and the offender when just penalty is 
imposed. The judiciary should be entitled to employ their professional expertise and 
jurisdiction over all matters concerning an accused’s conviction and sentence, 
including the power to decide whether such conviction and sentence are compatible 
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with the sentencing principles and due process.83 Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)84 provides that: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.85 This 
creates a potential constitutional argument against mandatory minimum sentences 
as being contrary to constitutional constraints. In certain jurisdictions, for example, 
Papua New Guinea86 and Sri Lanka, the court found that mandatory minimum 
sentences were cruel, inhumane, and degrading.87  
What follows is a comparative overview of the application of mandatory minimum 
sentences and the courts’ sentencing discretion, as well as the broader questions 
regarding the determination of appropriate sentences by non-judicial bodies in the 
United States, Canada and South Africa. The discussion will briefly consider how 
mandatory minimum sentences respond to penological objectives, the impact of 
removing discretion from judges to other criminal-justice actors, and the impact of 
mandatory minimum sentences on the principles of fundamental justice. 
5.4.1  Mandatory minimum sentences in the United States 
The United States is one of the countries in the Western civilisation that has no 
system of sentencing review, and that places no constraints on sentencing 
discretion; other than maximum punishments set by the legislature.88 Due to 
sentencing disparities inherent in the indeterminate framework, the early 1960s 
witnessed a shift in the sentencing debate. Rather than arguing the justification of 
discretion, the issue became how to shape discretion in a practical and politically 
acceptable manner.89 A Sentencing Commission was established to reform the 
national sentencing guidelines in 1976 and 1977.90 Under the new sentencing 
guidelines model, the legislature retained its traditional function of defining criminal 
conduct, and imposing maximum sentences. A guideline created by the legislature 
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would have three main functions, namely; it would classify offences defined by the 
legislature into categories based on factors such as the seriousness of the offence, 
and the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. It would further 
stipulate guideline sentences for each offence or category of offence. In addition, it 
would monitor operation of its guidelines and alter them.91 
Despite these reforms, the current criminal-law system in the United States is an 
unbalanced framework in which the legislative and executive branches share 
incentives and cooperate with each other, to the exclusion of the judiciary.92 In the 
area of criminal sentencing, the legislature has created statutes that establish terms 
of punishment for certain crimes by mandating minimum prison terms for the 
violation of those statutes. These mandatory minimum sentences grant plenary 
decision-making powers to prosecutors of the executive brainchild, while restricting 
the judiciary’s discretion.93 Bowman explains that:  
The combination of complex Guidelines, overlaid on a system of statutory 
minimum mandatories and fact-based enhancements has turned prosecutors 
into primary decision-makers whose choices can, to a far greater extent than 
was ever before possible, unilaterally constrain the judge’s discretion.94 
Mandatory minimum sentences restrict a judge’s ability to set a sentence lower than 
that mandated in the applicable statute.95 Statutory mandatory minimum sentences 
enable the legislature to improperly use their authority to establish definitive 
sanctions for crimes; to improperly grant the executive arm wide power to impose 
that punishment, and to relegate the role of the judiciary to bureaucratic affirmation 
of the process.96 For this reason, such statutes violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.97 
In the United States, both legislators and prosecutors seek to win public favour by 
prosecuting crimes the public wants prosecuted, and by obtaining convictions in 
those cases.98 The United States Congress has an incentive to enact statutes that 
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make it easier for prosecutors to convict and punish criminals.99 Being soft on crime 
cannot win votes for legislators. Federal prosecutors are appointed and not elected, 
but gaining public favour through prominent convictions can be a great career 
boost.100 This politicisation of the criminal law results in ever-growing and harsher 
sentences, as individual justice is left behind.101 
On the other hand, federal judges - who serve for life - are impartial in their duty, 
and are likely to consider narrower criminal rules instead of broader ones.102 This 
position of judges should act as a check on the power of the other branches. 
However, this does not happen, as judges lack sentencing discretion due to 
statutory mandatory sentences, which disproportionately place the sentencing 
power in the hands of other government branches.103 
The United States Supreme Court precedent illustrates one similarity between all 
sentencing systems that the court has considered unconstitutional, and this is their 
lack of judicial discretion.104 In the same breath, sentencing frameworks deemed 
valid by the court have permitted judges to exercise their discretion, and to rely on 
sentencing factors when making their decisions.105 The Supreme Court seems to 
have recognised circumstances when judges are not playing a sufficient part in 
sentencing, and has found those situations to be unconstitutional.106 
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,107 every defendant receives a 
sentencing hearing after his conviction. This hearing provides more insight into the 
legislative and executive encroachment onto judges’ sentencing power by showing 
the judicial nature of the criminal sentencing process.108 At the hearing, the judge 
considers the facts and evidence in order to create a fair sentence. Mandatory 
minimum sentences prevent the judiciary from fully undertaking one primary task, 
namely; “weighing the evidence in individual cases in order to produce just 
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outcomes”.109 In other words, mandatory minimum sentences prevent judges from 
individualising each sentence according to each defendant’ unique personal 
circumstances. While defendants facing statutory mandatory minimum sentences 
still receive a sentence hearing, the discretion of the sentencing judge in applying 
the proper sentence is, at times, curtailed through the inability to impose a less 
severe sentence than that mandated by the legislature.110 The legislature, with no 
knowledge of what might be just and fair in individual cases, is seen overstepping 
its power by mandating blanket minimum sentences.111 
There are numerous examples of cases where federal judges have felt constrained 
by the necessity, under law, to impose mandatory minimum sentences. One such 
case is United States v Angelos.112 Weldon Angelos was convicted of selling bags 
of marijuana to an undercover police officer on three occasions. He was also 
carrying a gun strapped to his ankle on those occasions. Angelos never threatened 
anyone with that gun, nor showed anyone the gun, or even removed it from his 
ankle.113 Nonetheless, his mere possession of the gun resulted in the application of 
the mandatory minimum sentence of fifty-five years in prison.114 Cassell J was 
forced to impose this sentence on Mr Angelos, and observed that Angelos’ fifty-five 
year prison term is a longer sentence than Angelos would have received if he had 
hijacked a plane, attacked someone to death in a flight, detonated a bomb in an 
aircraft, or supplied weapons to support a foreign terrorist group.115 The maximum 
sentence for all these crimes added together is less than the mandatory minimum 
sentence under federal sentencing rules for a small drug dealer carrying a gun.116 
Cassell J criticised the statutory mandatory minimum sentences, noting that the 
sentence imposed was “unjust, cruel, and irrational”.117 Furthermore, he regretted 
that he had no way out, and had to follow the law as it was written. Yet Cassell J 
recommended that the-then President George W. Bush commute Mr Angelos’ 
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imprisonment term, and urged the legislature (Congress) to reform the law.118 
Another similar example is United States v Powell.119 In this case, it seems that Hurd 
J was “forced to sentence a thirty-two-year old small-time drug dealer with an IQ of 
seventy-two to serve life in prison”.120 The reason was that the defendant had two 
very minor drug sales when he was a juvenile, which were over ten years prior to 
the present case.121 Hurd J noted that: 
…this is what occurs when Congress sets a mandatory minimum sentence 
which distorts the entire judicial process … As a result, I am obliged to and will 
now impose this unfair and, more important, this unjust sentence.122 
A third example is United States v Farley,123 where the defendant Kelly Brenton 
Farley was convicted for crossing a state line with the intent to engage in a sexual 
act with a person under twelve years old, for which he faced a mandatory minimum 
sentence of thirty years to life in prison. This sentence was mandatory even though 
the defendant did not engage in any sexual act with a minor. He was facing thirty 
years to life in prison for an intention crime. The district court judge refused to apply 
the mandatory minimum sentence on the grounds that this statute was 
unconstitutional since it infringed the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel 
and unusual punishment.124 
While there are disputes as to whether this statute is unconstitutional, it is clear that 
federal sentencing judges have questioned its constitutionality, and are “unhappily 
locked into applying statutory mandatory minimums”.125 Thomas Jefferson predicted 
this outcome more than a century ago: “if the legislature assumes … judiciary 
powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual”.126 
Federal courts have begun opposing mandatory sentencing laws, as seen in the 
cases of Booker and Farley, yet this opposition has so far had little effect on the 
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imposition of statutory mandatory minimum sentences in the United States.127 
Mandatory minimum sentences are also thought to be forcing the courts to impose 
a standardised sentence onto juveniles based on the crime committed, and not 
based on their individual culpability, or other factors.128 The United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged this issue in Miller v Alabama: 
Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentences from taking 
account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and 
circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive 
the same sentence as every other -the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the 
shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child 
from a chaotic and abusive one and worse, each juvenile … will receive the 
same sentences as the vast majority of adults committing similar … offences.129 
It is not only the lower federal judges who have increasingly expressed their 
frustrations with statutory mandatory minimum sentences.130 President Obama has 
echoed his opposition against mandatory minimum sentences, and the separation 
of powers argument, stating that: 
…we have a system that locks away too many young, first-time, non-violent 
offenders for the better part of their lives – a decision that’s made not by a judge 
in a courtroom, but all too often by politicians in Washington.131  
Judicial criticism of mandatory minimum sentences crosses party lines, as is 
evidenced by remarks of both former United States Supreme Court Rehnquist CJ 
and current Kennedy J. Rehnquist CJ noted that, according to him, the best 
argument against any future and existing mandatory minimum sentences “is that 
they frustrate the careful calibration of sentences”.132 This is interpreted by Brickey 
as meaning that the “incautious federalization of the criminal law threatens to 
overwhelm the federal justice system”.133 Kennedy CJ has also spoken out against 
mandatory minimum sentences, stating that the jail terms mandated by these 
sentences are responsible for the current state of overcrowding and overpopulation 
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of prisons in the United States.134 More than eighty percent of the increase in the 
prison population between 1985 and 1995 was as a result of drug convictions that 
carried statutory mandatory minimum sentences.135 This state of affairs highlights 
another difficulty with mandatory minimum sentences, in that “they disproportionality 
affect drug and gun possession offences”.136 Statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences are imprisoning non-violent offenders for long terms, whereas violent 
offenders often serve less time.137 
Recent studies have shown that the United States’ taxpayers’ support for mandatory 
minimum sentences is on the decline.138 Polls conducted by the Christian Science 
Monitor report that sixty percent of Americans oppose statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences; and Families Against Mandatory Minimums, an organisation which cites 
a 2014 survey showed that seventy-seven percent of adults favour the elimination 
of mandatory minimum sentencing laws for non-violent offences in favour of letting 
judges decide the appropriate sentence on a case-by-case basis.139 
Most United States’ citizens support judicial discretion and individualisation in 
criminal sentencing, and are opposed to the blanket application of mandatory 
minimum sentences.140 These laws are criticised as depriving “the judiciary of its 
basic constitutional function, which is weighing facts in each case to ensure a just 
outcome for each criminal defendant”.141  
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines continuously advance the laudable objective of 
formulating reasonable and fair criminal sentencing in the United States.142 Despite 
this commendable goal, the Guidelines remain flawed because they often usurp 
power from the main judicial actors, namely, the judge and the jury. In United States 
v Booker,143 the court held that the mandatory Guidelines violate the right to a fair 
trial as provided by the Sixth Amendment144 because whenever a judge assigns a 
sentence that takes into account facts beyond those reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant, the Sixth Amendment is implicated.145 Hence, the 
Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment to the extent that they provide for judicial 
fact-finding of sentencing-enhancing facts.146 
To effect a remedy, the court transformed the Guidelines into an interim advisory 
sentencing framework.147 However, Tyler argues that the:  
Guidelines, by structuring discretion, offer reasonable expectations of certain 
punishment … [but] mandatory minimum sentences fail to anticipate the 
incredible diversity of facts of given offences and of the nature of offenders.148  
The view seems to be that while the Guidelines provide certainty regarding the 
application of discretion, mandatory minimum sentences are criticised for failing to 
take into account the individualisation principle of sentencing.149 This seems to be 
the same reason why mandatory minimum sentences are disapproved of in Canada 
and South Africa, as will be discussed below. 
5.4.2  Mandatory minimum sentences in Canada 
Mandatory minimum sentences have been a feature of the Canadian criminal justice 
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system since 1892, when the first Canadian Criminal Code150 (Criminal Code) was 
enacted.151 At that time, there were six offences carrying mandatory minimum terms 
of imprisonment, of which the most severe was a five-year sentence for “stopping 
the mail with intent to rob”.152 Today, there are about 50 offences carrying a 
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment in the Criminal Code; the majority of 
which came into force since 1995. Notwithstanding the opposition to mandatory 
minimum sentences in Bill C-10,153 the government continues to introduce new 
legislation featuring mandatory minimum sentences, and two of these are the 
Tackling Contraband Tobacco Act,154 and the Tougher Penalties for Child Predators 
Act.155 The former added new mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, and 
the latter increased the existing mandatory minimum sentences for a number of 
offences in the Criminal Code.156 
Mandatory minimum sentences in Canada arise in one of three general 
circumstances. Firstly, when an offence provides for a minimum sentence in all 
circumstances leading to the commission of the offence. Secondly, where a 
mandatory minimum sentence applies to a second, third or subsequent offence. 
Thirdly, for hybrid offences.157 The Crown Prosecutor decides the mode of 
proceeding, where a mandatory minimum sentence or a greater minimum sentence 
applies when the Crown elects to proceed by way of indictment.158 However, in such 
case, the court is prevented from fully considering the circumstances of the offence 
and the offender, as the legislature has predetermined the mandatory minimum 
sentences in all their forms, as well as the baseline punishment for a specific act or 
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omission.159 Absent of a finding of unconstitutionality, judges are unable to account 
for any circumstances that may result in the minimum sentence being inappropriate 
or excessive in the specific case or circumstances.160 
Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the primary purpose of sentencing in the 
jurisdiction, which are “to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to 
respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by 
imposing just sanctions”. These sanctions have to meet one or more of six 
objectives: (a) denunciation, (b) specific and general deterrence, (c) incapacitation, 
(d) rehabilitation, (e) reparation, and (f) promoting a sense of responsibility in 
offenders. None of these sentencing objectives is valued higher than any other.161 
Among the sentencing principles listed in the Code is the parity principle that like 
offenders be treated alike (s 718.2(b)); the totality principle that when combined, 
consecutive sentences not be unduly long or harsh (s 718.2(c)); and principles of 
restraint in sentencing, that there should be no deprivation of liberty if less restrictive 
sanctions are appropriate in the circumstances (s 718.2(d)). Lastly, all available 
sanctions other than imprisonment for all offenders, especially Aboriginal offenders, 
must be considered.162 
The Criminal Code identifies the fundamental principle of sentencing as 
proportionality between the gravity of the offence, and the degree of responsibility 
of the offender.163 The principle of proportionality has two significant dimensions:164 
A sentence that encompasses both the gravity of the offence and the level of 
responsibility of the offender is believed to enhance public confidence in the criminal 
justice system, and ensures that the sentence is no more than what is deemed 
appropriate.165 These latter views were also expressed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the case of R v Ipeelee; R v Ladue, where it was stated: “a just sanction 
is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at 
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the expense of the other”.166 
Proportionality in sentencing is so important to the Canadian criminal justice system 
that it can be suggested to be having a constitutional dimension, and may itself 
amount to a principle of fundamental justice.167 The Supreme Court of Canada in R 
v Nur,168 when describing the contrasting objectives between proportionality in 
sentencing and mandatory minimum sentences, noted that: 
Mandatory minimum sentences, by their very nature, have the potential to 
depart from the principle of proportionality in sentencing. They emphasize 
denunciation, general deterrence and retribution at the expense of what is fit 
sentence for the gravity of the offence, blameworthiness of the offender, and 
the harm caused by the crime. They function as a blunt instrument that may 
deprive courts of the ability to tailor proportionate sentences at the lower end of 
a sentencing range. They may, in extreme cases, impose unjust sentences, 
because they shift the focus from the offender during the sentencing process in 
a way that violates the principles of proportionality. 
In the case of R v Oakes,169 the Canadian Supreme Court adopted a two-stage 
approach to a challenge to laws that prima facie violated the Charter. Firstly, once 
it is established that there was such a violation of a Charter-protected right, it was 
for the authorities to explain an objective that the legislation was designed to serve, 
and which is sufficient to override the constitutionally safeguarded right. Secondly, 
the authorities would have to show that the means chosen were reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. A proportionality approach can be used in balancing the 
societal, group and individual interests. In other words, there should be 
proportionality between the effects of the measures restricting the right, and the 
intended or designed policy goal.170 The legislature’s intention with legislation or 
policy where fundamental rights are alleged to be violated is assessed together with 
the measure chosen by the authorities showing that it was reasonable or justifiable.  
In Canada, it has long been accepted that proportionality in sentencing is achieved 
through individualised decision-making by the courts having regard to both the 
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nature and circumstances of the particular offence and of the particular offender.171 
In the case of R v Proulx, the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed this notion, and 
stated that although the punishment must fit the crime, such individualised approach 
will inevitably lead to different sentences being imposed for certain crimes.172 More 
recently in the case of R v Nasogaluak, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the 
individualised approach in determining an appropriate sentence entails a process 
whereby judges, subject to statutory regulations, “weigh the objectives of sentencing 
in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of the case”.173 These latter 
sentiments were also expressed in R v Ipeelee that: “Sentencing judges must have 
sufficient manoeuvrability to tailor sentences to the circumstances of the particular 
offence and the particular offender”.174 Situating proportionality at the core of the 
sentencing principle enhances the legitimacy and justness of a particular sentence 
by connecting the offender’s punishment to the blameworthiness of his conduct. It 
is in this way that proportionality functions as a mechanism of restraint, such that: 
A fit sentence will impose no more coercion than is reasonably necessary to 
realize the relevant objectives as supported by the evidence concerning the 
offence and the offender.175 
While proportionality is used as a gauge to measure the justness of sentences 
precluding the imposition of unduly harsh or improper punishment, it is suggested 
that “the experience of the last decade shows that it is out of alignment”.176 Since 
1995, there has been a proliferation of pieces of legislation which restrict the 
alternatives to incarceration straining against, what was assumed to be, settled 
sentencing principles. Sentencing judges are placed right at the centre of these 
contradictory developments.177 The view that mandatory sentences are restraining 
judicial sentencing powers from judges, and negatively impacts on judges’ ability to 
assess a proportionate sentence is disputed by Caylor and Beaulne. They argue 
that instead of removing judges’ ability to assess a proportionate sentence, 
mandatory minimum sentences establish a fixed sentencing range for certain 
crimes, which will allow “citizens to know in advance the severity of the 
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consequences that attend the commission of that offence.”178 However, this view 
seems to be flawed because:  
Mandatory sentencing is a process which cannot be described as judicial, since 
it lacks any form of justification, which it is the purpose of the judicial involvement 
to bestow. It is not retribution. It is not deterrence. It is not rehabilitation. It bears 
no relationship to any sentencing principles outlined by the courts.179 
Yet, it is thought that as policy considerations; 
…mandatory penalties are a bad idea. They often result in injustice to individual 
offenders. They undermine the legitimacy of the courts and the prosecution 
system by fostering circumventions that are wilful and subterranean. They 
undermine achievement of equality before the law when they cause comparably 
culpable offenders to be treated radically differently when one benefits from 
practitioners’ circumventions and another receives a mandated penalty that 
everyone immediately involved considers too severe. There is insufficient 
credible evidence to conclude that mandatory penalties have significant 
deterrent effects.180 
Mandatory minimum sentences violate the right to equality before the law because 
some litigants might lack the benefit of legal practitioners who could circumvent its 
application, resulting in these litigants receiving a mandated penalty that might be 
deemed to be too severe.  
Mandatory minimum sentences are, however, not new to the Canadian criminal 
justice system, and the opposition to their imposition is also longstanding.181 
Minimum penalties and their concomitant fettering of courts’ discretion were 
considered to be “inadvisable”182 as long ago as 1938, in the first Royal Commission 
to address mandatory minimum sentences. It was almost 20 years after an 
extensive revision of the Criminal Code that another review of the criminal justice 
system concluded that the “question of the amount of punishment to be imposed 
upon a convicted offender is one exclusively for the courts”.183 More than a decade 
after this statement, the Canadian Committee on Corrections went further and 
recommended that the mandatory minimum penalties for all offences, except 
murder, be replaced because they “constitute an unwarranted restriction on the 
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sentencing discretion of the court”.184 
In 1987, the Canadian Sentencing Commission was also granted a wide-ranging 
mandate to review the overall structure and sentencing process in Canada. A 
chapter in the Commission’s report highlight the need for principles of proportionality 
and equity to guide sentencing judges, in that: 
…each criminal offence is uniquely defined by its own set of circumstances and 
the notion of a judge pre-determining a sentence before hearing the facts seems 
abhorrent to our notions of justice. If the punishment is to fit the crime, then there 
can be no pre-determined sentences since criminal events are not themselves 
pre-determined.185  
Yet, one of the issues concerning mandatory minimum sentences seems to be that 
they pre-determine a sentence before the hearing of the case facts. Despite its 
detractors, however, the history of minimum sentencing in Canada reveals strong 
and enduring support among legislators and policy makers. Justifications for 
mandatory sentences are premised around the certainty of punishment, their effect 
on deterring, denouncing and incapacitating offenders, and their role in enhancing 
public confidence in the justice system. It is thought that this outcome is achieved 
by making the process of sentencing more transparent.186 Mandatory minimum 
sentences in criminal offences are also supported as sound exercises of legislative 
power. They are viewed as setting a stable sentencing floor in an appropriate 
exercise of the policy- and law-making authority of legislators to sanction certain 
conduct in ways they consider fit.187 
Furthermore, the argument in support of mandatory minimum sentences also points 
out that, if properly used, mandatory minimum sentences are an important tool for 
ensuring, not inhibiting, justice in sentencing. This notion is premised on the 
understanding that: 
…the rule of law lies at the root of Canada’s system of government. It requires 
that laws exhibit five important qualities: certainty, accessibility, intelligibility, 
clarity, and predictability … Canadians must know what the law is in advance 
so that they can govern their conduct accordingly.188  
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Nonetheless, the Canadian Supreme Court in Smith v The Queen189 held that a 
conviction for drugs which attracted a minimum of seven years was contrary to the 
Canadian Charter, specifically section 9 forbidding arbitrary detention and 
punishment, and section 12 forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.190 The Court 
found that although the minimum mandatory sentences did not always breach 
section 12, there was a breach on this occasion because the offence applied to 
numerous different substances involving various degrees of dangerousness, and 
did not take into account the quantity of drug imported.191 
It has been assumed that deterrence can be achieved through tougher sentencing 
because “if sentences are increased in severity and duration, potential offenders will 
choose not to offend”.192 However, this belief is deeply flawed since countless 
studies have established that there is no evidentiary basis to support such 
supposition.193 In other words, deterrence through sentencing does not work, and 
mandatory minimum sentences do not deter any more than proportionate sentences 
reached through the exercise of wide judicial discretion.194 
The reason mandatory minimum sentences do not deter offenders is that, for this 
sentencing framework to deter, they must first be known. It is axiomatic that if 
potential offenders do not know that penalties upon conviction are harsh, or have 
become harsher, they will not be deterred.195 So is the immediate consequence of 
offending, which also matters. If offenders do not believe that they will be caught, 
the harsher penalty becomes irrelevant, regardless of how harsh it may be. 
Countless studies have concluded that the public is largely unaware of sentencing 
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in general, let alone which offence carries mandatory minimum sentences.196 
Support for mandatory minimum sentences is greatest when the issue is raised in 
the abstract. A lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system is also 
advanced as a justification for imposing harsher penalties on offenders. However, 
this appears to be exaggerated, and is without any evidentiary basis since public 
opinion research suggests that the public is concerned that offenders receive an 
appropriate sentence, not just more of it.197 
The great threat to public confidence in the justice system will come from the erosion 
of judges’ ability to impose proportional sentences with regard to all the relevant 
circumstances of a case.198 Long sentences of imprisonment are a recipe for 
recidivism as the Canadian Department of Justice observed in 1990: 
We instinctively look to long sentences to punish offenders, yet the evidence 
shows that long periods served in prison increase the chance that the offender 
will offend again. … In the end, public security is diminished rather than 
increased if we ‘throw away the key’ and then return offenders to the streets at 
sentence expiry, unreformed and unsupervised.199 
The mistaken belief that harsh sentencing laws will reduce crime also serves as a 
costly distraction which obviates the need to look at underlying causes of criminal 
behaviour, and for recourse to evidence-based approaches to reducing crime.200 It 
is argued that mandatory minimum sentences are not making things better but 
worse. 
Historically, Canadian courts have exercised broad discretion in sentencing. 
Canada has been in favour of courts retaining sufficient judicial discretion to ensure 
individualised sentences aimed at proportionality between the gravity of the offence 
and the culpability of the offender.201 The increasing use of mandatory minimum 
sentences are breaking with this tradition. The criminal justice system cannot 
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function without discretion operating at all levels. A system that tries to do away with 
discretion would be “unworkably complex and rigid”.202 
It is a mistake to believe that removing discretion from judges will not have wider, 
more invidious consequences for the criminal justice system. Experience has shown 
that “discretion removed from judges is discretion added to prosecutors”.203 
Restricting the exercise of judicial discretion makes the consequences of discretion 
exercised by other criminal justice actors much more significant. This development 
is worrisome to all who value transparency and fairness in criminal proceedings. 
The public interest is better served when wider sentencing discretion remains with 
judges, since their decisions are public, and subject to review on appeal. 
Prosecutorial discretion - shifting discretion from judges to prosecutors - lacks 
transparency, and increases the likelihood that individuals charged with offences 
carrying mandatory minimum sentences will be under great pressure to plead guilty 
to charges without minimum sentences, regardless of their culpability.204 This 
possibility was recently discussed by Pomerance where he noted that: 
…mandatory minimums may create a coercive environment that encourages 
false pleas of guilt – pleas entered by persons who are not guilty of the offence. 
This may happen where the Crown offers to take a plea to a lesser offence, one 
that does not carry a minimum penalty. The disparity between the sentence 
offered on a plea and that guaranteed on conviction may create an unhealthy 
inducement….205 
Plea bargains, while they are accepted practice, have become coercive in a system 
where mandatory minimum sentences are increasingly normalised.206 This practice 
and the implications inherent thereof seems to transgress the principles of 
fundamental justice, as contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms207 preserves the right to 
life, liberty, and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Mandatory minimum 
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imprisonment clearly constitutes a deprivation of liberty.208 The question is whether 
mandatory minimum sentences can be challenged substantively under section 7 as 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice? The Canadian legal system 
recognises four generally applicable substantive principles of fundamental justice, 
namely, the law must not be vague, overboard, or arbitrary, nor must it be grossly 
disproportionate in its effects.209 The underlying issue, when assessing law against 
one of these principles, is to consider whether: 
…there is a mismatch between the legislature’s objective and the means 
chosen to achieve it: the law is inadequately connected to its objective or in 
some sense goes too far in seeking to attain it.210  
Apart from being grossly disproportionate, mandatory minimum sentences are 
arguably also arbitrary or overly broad.211 Gross disproportionality, apart from being 
the standard upon which a cruel and unusual punishment is found under section 12 
of the Charter, is also indicative of a transgression of fundamental justice. Where 
the “effect of the law is grossly disproportionate to the state’s objective”,212 the law 
will not be in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice. The threshold for 
such a finding is high: it will be met where the “seriousness of the deprivation is 
totally out of sync with the objective of the measure”.213 
A challenged law will be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice where the 
law “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, its legislative objective”.214 In the 
case of Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney-General), it was observed that: “The question 
in every case is whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real 
relation to the goal and hence being manifestly unfair”.215 In other words, there must 
be a rational connection between the object of the measure that causes the 
deprivation of section 7, and the limits it imposes on the life, liberty, or security of 
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the person.216  
In the case of R v Nur,217 a two-year sentencing ‘gap’ in section 95 of the Criminal 
Code created between cases where the Crown proceeds summarily, and where the 
Crown proceeds by indictment was challenged on the ground that it is substantively 
arbitrary. Section 95 provided that if the Crown proceeds summarily, the maximum 
sentence is one-year imprisonment, but if the Crown proceeds by indictment, the 
minimum sentence is three years, creating a two-year gap. At the lower court, the 
gap was found to breach section 7. It was found that the two-year gap hindered the 
valid legislative purpose of hybrid offences in providing for flexibility in procedure. 
The gap in the law between the one-year maximum and three-year minimum 
sentences provides no rational sense from a sentencing perspective.218 
As a principle of fundamental justice, over-breadth takes place “where the law goes 
too far and interferes with some conduct that bears no connection to its objective”.219 
Together with the norm against arbitrariness, over-breadth is “directed at the 
absence of a connection between the infringement of rights and what the law seeks 
to achieve”.220 Over-breadth applies to a law that is so broad in its application that 
while it may be rationally connected in some cases, it will overreach in others. A law 
that mandates minimum sentences for everyone who commits the offence would ad 
hoc seem to be over broad.221 A successful over-breadth challenge to section 95 of 
the Code was brought in R v Adamo, where the court framed the question by asking: 
Whether Parliament, in deciding to imprison everyone who commits this offence 
(and is prosecuted by indictment) for a minimum of three years, has gone further 
than necessary to achieve its objective of combating gun violence and 
possessing prohibited and restricted weapons.222 
The Court found that the provision had a grossly disproportionate impact under a 
section 12 analysis, and that it served no general deterrent purpose; the provision 
was also found to be overbroad and violating section 7.223 
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According to the Supreme Court of Canada, sentencing is exclusively a judicial 
function.224 There is a potential constitutional perspective created by this view 
against mandatory minimum sentences in jurisdictions that recognise the separation 
of powers doctrine between the legislature, executive and the judiciary.225 This 
results in the argument that a legislature that mandates to the judiciary what the 
punishment must be for a person convicted of a specific offence violates the 
separation of powers, “because it purports in effect to exercise what is a judicial 
function, namely, that of sentencing”.226 A judiciary that is directed as to what 
punishment to impose does not function as a check-and-balance on legislative 
overreach. This, in turn, undermines the fundamental constitutional idea of checks 
and balances between the different government branches. The judiciary does not 
exist to rubber stamp legislative or executive decisions of punishment, but have to 
fulfil a “substantive role, not a decorative role in the constitutional design”.227 Similar 
conclusions were reached in South African courts, as will be evidenced below. 
5.4.3  Mandatory minimum sentences in South Africa 
In South Africa, section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act228 (CLAA) contains 
mandatory minimum sentences for most of the more serious crimes, and was 
intended to alleviate serious crimes. This legislation strictly curtailed the authority of 
judges to determine the length of imprisonment periods for offenders, and for certain 
offences.229 The provisions of this Act put in place certain categories of 
imprisonment terms as follows: 
51  Discretionary minimum sentences for certain offences 
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a 
regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of 
an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment for life. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a 
regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person who has been 
convicted of an offence referred to in    
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  (a) Part II of Schedule 2, in case of – 
(i) A first offender, to imprisonment for a period of not less than 15 years; 
(ii) A second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not 
less than 20 years; 
(iii) A third offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
than a period not less than 25 years; … 
(3)(a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence 
than the sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those 
circumstances on the record of the proceedings and must thereupon impose 
such lesser sentence: Provided that if a regional court imposes such lesser 
sentence in respect of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, it shall have 
jurisdictions to impose a term of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 
years. 
Under section 51(3), judges are permitted to depart from the mandatory minimum 
sentences only if they are “satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances 
exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence”. There has been a wide range 
of interpretations of the words “substantial and compelling”.230 Stegmann J in S v 
Mofokeng231 was of the view that these words allowed the sentencing court virtually 
no discretion. He explained:  
…for ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to be found, the facts of the 
particular case must present some circumstance that is so exceptional in nature, 
and that so obviously exposes the injustice of the statutorily prescribed 
sentence in the particular case that it could be described as ‘compelling’ the 
conclusion that the imposition of a lesser sentence than that prescribed by 
Parliament is justified.232 
As evidenced above, the courts disapproved of mandatory minimum sentences, a 
stance which is mainly premised on the assumption that they weaken the courts’ 
normal sentencing function to the level of a rubber stamp.233 The effect of mandatory 
minimum sentences on judicial sentencing discretion is also that it undermines it, 
and “creates the perception that judges and magistrates lack the ability to arrive at 
appropriate sentences on their own”.234 As echoed in both Canada and the United 
States, it is argued in South Africa that the imposition of sentence is a matter for the 
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discretion of the trial court. The imposition of mandatory minimum sentences by the 
legislature has always been considered as an undesirable intrusion upon the 
sentencing function of the courts.235 In S v Mofokeng, it was explained that: 
For the legislature to have imposed minimum sentences … severely curtailing 
the discretion of the courts, offends against the fundamental constitutional 
principles of the separation of powers of the legislature and the judiciary. … That 
the legislature has seen it fit to use courts as rubber stamps that must apply the 
legislature’s arbitrary sentences… is an unfortunate breach of the separation of 
powers. It tends to undermine the independence of the courts, and to make 
them mere cat’s paws for the implementation by the legislature of its own 
inflexible penal policy that is capable of operating with serious injustice in 
particular cases.236 
Terblanche questions the accuracy of the idea that sentencing is a judicial function 
in the constitutional sense, while conceding that sentencing is a function of the trial 
court.237 Terblanche advocates the view that an overview of the judicial function 
does not provide support for the suggestion that sentencing has to be a judicial 
task.238 He asserts that these latter views are also supported by Munro and Wasik 
who suggest that it is premised on Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers: 
In England, juries decide whether the accused is guilty or not … and, if he is 
declared guilty the judge pronounces the punishment that the law inflicts for that 
act, and, for this, he needs only to open his eyes.239 
As a result of this statement, the assumption is formed that there is no historical 
evidence for supporting the idea that sentencing belongs to the judiciary alone.240 
The availability of a judicial discretion in sentencing is considered a relatively 
modern phenomenon.241 Yet, in justifying these sentiments, it is observed that: 
…one may understand why judges might resent the curtailment of their 
discretion, especially against the earlier background of discretion at large. But, 
as we have seen, the legislative limitation of sentencing discretion was by no 
means unprecedented. Nor can it be said to be unconstitutional. In the United 
States, there has been a constitutional challenge to the federal sentencing 
guidelines formulated by the US Sentencing Commission pursuant to the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Supreme Court rebutted it by a majority of 
eight to one (Misretta v United States 488 US 361 (1989)), ruling that ‘“scope of 
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judicial discretion with respect of the sentence is subject to congressional 
control…”.242 
Parliament is entitled to formulate the law, and when parliament states the law in 
legislation, for example, when it declares life imprisonment for premeditated murder, 
or laws mandating mandatory minimum sentences, the courts have to impose such 
laws.243 The difficulty with such legislation, the argument continues, is not only that 
it violates the independence of the courts, or messes with the constitutional doctrine 
of the separation of powers. More importantly, the problem is that it cannot make 
sufficient provisions for an appropriate sentence in every case or in most cases.244 
In other words, it seems that the issue with the laws mandating mandatory minimum 
sentences is that they undermine the concept of individualisation in sentencing, or 
the appropriateness principle, and not that they encroach on the courts’ 
constitutional role regarding sentencing. These sentiments were also articulated in 
the case of S v Mofokeng;245 that courts have worked out the principles according 
to which fair and balanced sentences are arrived at. They take into account the 
nature and the seriousness of the particular crime, including its effect upon the 
victim. The legislature has passed these minimum sentences on future offenders 
without knowing the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, or of the 
victim, or of the criminal. This practice precludes a balanced judicial approach.  
As emphasised above, prescribing sentences has the effect of generalising 
sentences instead of individualising it.246 In the Mofokeng case, the criticisms for 
mandatory minimum sentences seem to be related to the idea that it contains pre-
determined sentences before the hearing of the actual facts and circumstances in a 
case, as also determined under Canadian jurisprudence. While all violent crimes 
should be punished, “minimum sentences are a poorly-thought out, misdirected, 
hugely costly and above all ineffective way of punishing criminals”.247 
The question can be asked why mandatory minimum sentences were introduced in 
South Africa? The answer is thought to be found in certain events that took place as 
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the country was becoming democratic. As South Africa was coming “out of the 
pernicious and degrading horrors of apartheid and started moving to democracy, 
there seemed to be an explosion of violent crimes”.248 In S v Makwanyane,249 a 1995 
decision of the Constitutional Court that declared the mandatory minimum sentence 
provision mandating the death penalty unconstitutional, Chaskalson CJ noted this 
“unfortunate reality”,250 and stated: 
The level of violence crime in our country has reached alarming proportions. It 
poses a threat to the transition to democracy, and the creation of development 
opportunities for all, which are primary goals if the Constitution.251 
In Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court referred to proportionality as an important 
factor to be taken into account when deciding that “a penalty is cruel, inhuman and 
degrading”.252 Section 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act253 imposed the death 
penalty as a competent sentence for murder. In a new democracy, the state needed 
to respond to an outcry about crimes which forced politicians to act, and “they felt 
compelled to be seen to act”.254 Parliament acted in haste, and the 1997 mandatory 
minimum sentences was adopted even though, just a year before, the Minister of 
Justice, Mr Dullah Omar, had appointed a committee of the South African Law 
Reform Commission (SALRC) to review sentencing policy, and before the 
Committee could report back to him.255 The SALRC’s report did eventually get to 
Parliament, but it came too late for consideration.256  
The SALRC’s report included more sensible, just measures such as presumptive 
sentencing guidelines, voluntary sentencing guidelines, and legislative 
guidelines.257 It also cautioned that, although it was too early to gauge the long-term 
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effects, the new sentencing regime would “produce an intolerable burden for an 
already overloaded system”.258 Parliament selected the harshest sentencing option 
without the benefit of mature law reform consultative processes. In adopting the new 
sentences, the South African government looked into the experiences of the United 
Kingdom and the United States with mandatory minimums, and it “hurriedly 
incorporated them”.259 
Politically, this sentencing regime provided benefits, namely, harsh compulsory 
sentences eroding the risk of judges as supposedly being ‘soft on crime’. The 
mandatory sentences also avoided the risk of inconsistent sentencing, and provided 
politicians with a pay-off as it created the appearance of a state-coordinated and 
purposeful effort in addressing crime, which is responsive to public anxiety and 
fears.260 Disappointingly, the outcome - though very beguiling - was considered by 
some as “…fraud. Minimum sentences achieve almost nothing in reducing crime”.261 
It was during that time, that there was a widespread assumption that crime had its 
roots in apartheid, and the struggle against it.262 Van Zyl Smit explains this 
assumption:  
Violent crime in particular was attributed to the dislocation caused by the 
struggle against apartheid. The belief was that in a democratic South Africa, the 
crime rate would gradually decline and that the remaining crime could be dealt 
with by a fair criminal justice system, following the precepts of the new 
Constitution and imposing relatively moderate punishments.263 
The author states that this attitude was reflected in the ‘Alternative White Paper’ on 
penal reform by the Penal Reform Lobby Group in 1995.264 This state of affairs - 
had it been known and understood - might have assisted parliament to provide for 
a more insightful approach. Between 1991 and 2000, before the 1997 legislation 
came into effect, the number of prosecutions dropped, and “there was a decline in 
the number offenders recorded as being guilty of crime”.265 These statistics could 
have pointed to a decrease in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, yet 
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they may also be indicative of a decrease in actual crime.266 Instead, parliament 
committed itself to the new sentencing regime, and intended to extend it every 
second year until 2007.267 In 2005, some years after the CLAA’s enactment and 
extensions, pertinent issues were raised regarding this legislation’s application, and 
its impact in South African prisons:  
Minimum sentence legislation should not be extended beyond 30 April 2005 for 
the following reasons: The legislation was brought in as a temporary measure 
because of the perception that crime was getting out of control and the belief 
that the remedy lay harsh sentencing. The increase in the number of prisoners 
due to the minimum sentence legislation has made our prisons terribly 
overcrowded. There is no evidence that the increase in the length of sentences 
has had a deterrent effect on would-be offenders.268  
The question should be asked as to how mandatory minimum sentences are 
justified in South Africa. The state’s moral authority to put people behind bars is 
premised on the understanding that there is some objective behind punishment, 
some underlying practice that justifies the use of state power to sanction individuals 
for their criminal conduct.269 If the mandatory minimum sentence is to be justified, it 
could be because it advances some defensible objective.270 Thus, these rationales 
might have been at the core of the government’s sentencing policy when enacting 
this sentencing regime. Yet, there are four possible justifications for incarceration: 
First, the threat of incarceration deters individuals from engaging in criminal 
activity. Second, incarceration incapacitated offenders while they are in prison, 
it prevents them from committing more crimes. Third, putting people in prison 
can rehabilitate them better, and it makes them better members of society when 
they get out. And fourth, prison is retributive. It is a vindication of justice, for 
victims and for society as a whole.271  
In the case of S v RO and Another,272 Heher JA articulated the object of punishment 
in the following terms: 
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Sentencing is about achieving the right balance (or, in more high-flown terms, 
proportionality). The elements at play are the crime, the offender and the 
interests of society or, with different nuance, prevention, retribution, reformation 
and deterrence. Invariably there are overlaps that render the process 
unscientific; even a proper exercise of the judicial function allows reasonable 
people to arrive at different conclusions. 
The proportionality approach as adopted by the courts in the United States and in 
Canada was found in the case of S v Dodo,273 to be “compatible with and supportive 
of the analysis employed by under our Constitution”. However, the imposition of 
mandatory sentences contradicts the application of a discretion.274 The mandatory 
minimum sentences that parliament adopted cannot be adequately justified by any 
of these grounds.275 There is a further perception that mandatory minimum 
sentences deter crime. The theory of deterrence is that punishment is justified, 
because it deters people from committing crime.276 Deterrence has been described 
as the “essential”, “all important”, “paramount” and “universally admitted”277 object 
of punishment. Yet, it is believed that “the other objects are accessory”.278 It is the 
government’s argument that mandatory minimum sentences stop people from 
harming others. This assumption is based on the premise that criminals consider 
both the severity of the punishment, and the probability of getting caught before they 
commit a specific crime.279 Mandatory minimums result in making the punishment 
clear and well-known to the public. It is argued that they deter through increasing 
the severity of the impeding punishment.280 While this argument is intellectually 
appealing, it is not supported by evidence.281 It is believed that they make “little or 
no significant impact”282 in reducing serious and violent crime. Though punishment 
does have a deterrent effect, “it is the certainty of punishment rather than the 
severity of the sentence that is likely to have the greatest deterrent impact”.283 In the 
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case of Makwanyane, it was argued on behalf of the state that the mandatory death 
sentence would have some deterrent effects.284 Chaskalson CJ disagreed with this 
view, and noted that: 
…we would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that the execution of 
the few persons sentenced to death during this period, … will provide the 
solution to the unacceptably high rate of crime.285  
He added that “the greatest deterrent to crime is the likelihood that offenders will be 
apprehended”.286 A report from the American National Academy of Sciences in 2004 
endorsed these latter views.287 In themselves, mandated long sentences have no 
known deterrent effect. 
Yet in South Africa, there is still a perception that mandatory minimum sentences 
deter crime. On the contrary, there is clear and substantial evidence that mandatory 
minimum sentences have “either no deterrent effect or a modest deterrent effect 
that soon wastes away”.288 Doob et al explain that they do not know of any reliable 
criminologist who posits that the crime rates will be lessened through deterrence if 
the severity of the sentence is raised.289 Harsher sentences have little impact on the 
offenders since they do not consider the severity of the sentence they may face prior 
to committing the crime.290 The deterrence justification in criminal law is the most 
significant of all the rationales. Mandatory minimum sentences play no role or an 
insignificant role in deterring crime.291  
There is another justification that longer prison sentences reduce crime by 
incapacitating individuals who are prone to commit crimes.292 Yet, this does not help 
explain mandatory minimum sentences, and how they are applied in South Africa. 
                                                          
deters rapists or robbers generally, or even discourages them individually from committing a 
crime that otherwise they would not have risked”. 
284  Makwanyane para 118. 
285  Makwanyane para 121. 
286  Makwanyane para 122. 
287  Hofer et al Fifteen years of guideline sentencing 41-45. 
288  Cameron Imprisoning the nation 15. 
289  Doob, Webster and Gartner Issues related to harsh sentences and mandatory minimum 
sentences A-3. 
290  Anderson 2002 American Law and Economics Rev 293-313. 
291  Cameron Imprisoning the nation 16: “studies that show that most active and violent offenders 
either don’t think that they will be caught, or if they were to be caught they don’t have any idea 
what punishment to expect from their crimes”; Cameron Imprisoning the nation 15: the 
“enactment of mandatory penalty laws has either no deterrent effect”. 
292  Travis and Western (eds) The growth of incarceration in the United States 155. 
244 
 
It is mainly because the ‘incapacitation effect’ is weakened as the incarceration rate 
increases.293 Offenders should be locked up, but putting numerous less dangerous 
persons in jail “for long periods simply does not help very much to further reduce 
crime”.294 There is another equally important consideration. The idea of locking 
away and incapacitating violent offenders is usually fully achieved by the time they 
reach the age of 50 or 60. This is the age where it is believed that they are not likely 
to commit such crimes again.295 However, statistical evidence also shows that 
higher number of incapacitation and longer sentences may not reduce crime.296 
Rehabilitation is the third justification for imprisoning offenders.297 The South African 
Correctional Services Act298 provides that the purpose of the correctional system is 
to contribute to maintaining a just, peaceful and safe society by “promoting the social 
responsibility of human development of all sentenced offenders”.299 Yet mandatory 
minimum sentences apply perversely against such laudable goal. This is because: 
An offender serving a long-term or life sentence, becomes a different type of 
prisoner with generally loss of hopes and shorn ties of community kinship, 
suffering the uncertainty of indeterminate release. These prisoners are 
generally more susceptible to social and psychological problems than shorter-
term prisoners.300 
The issue is that some offenders should not be imprisoned for long; this includes 
indeterminate sentences, but this has happened because the government has 
“engaged in sweepingly counter-productive overkill in forcing the courts to apply 
these sentences”.301 Correctional officers state that extremely long prison sentences 
leave offenders with no hope, and release is so long off that they are not amenable 
to rehabilitation.302 Considering the known effect of long-term sentences on 
rehabilitation, the South African mandatory minimum sentences regime is in fact 
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primarily at odds with the Correctional Services Act’s objectives, which makes it 
clear that incarceration is to create a more socially responsible society.303 
Furthermore, rehabilitation is lacking in many South African prisons. Altbeker points 
out that overcrowding in prisons have made implementing rehabilitation (an 
unproven science) impracticable and impossible.304 He adds that “our overcrowded 
prisons will rehabilitate no-one … They are also a potential time bomb that needs to 
be defused”.305 More than a decade ago, Fagan J also warned that overcrowding 
“precludes proper rehabilitation [and] turns prisons into places where criminality is 
nurtured”.306 Neither the facilities nor the personnel exist to facilitate rehabilitation 
programs.307 There is furthermore not sufficient funds for rehabilitation. Cameron J 
imparts a personal experience as regards rehabilitation facilities. He discloses that 
in June 2017, he visited the Devon Correctional facility some kilometres from 
Johannesburg, which is a training facility for rehabilitation. He was informed that the 
training was stopped due to budgetary constraints as the Department did not have 
money for rehabilitation training, which he described as “a very major tragedy”.308 
The fourth ground for justifying the mandatory minimum sentences is retribution. 
The idea is that severe sentences should be imposed upon offenders engaged in 
the most severe of crimes,309 as a wrongdoer is “morally blameworthy and deserves 
to be punished”.310 Retribution is certainly the only sensible rationale for the death 
penalty, that someone who commits a serious crime against another should die an 
“unspeakable death at the hands of the state, when his spinal column is broken at 
the end of a rope round his neck after a two-metre fall”.311 Yet, that same emotion 
and hunger for revenge result in a terrible logic in that a terrible crime deserves a 
“horrific enough punishment to slake our thirst for vengeance.”312 This impulse has 
been responsible for the cruellest of punishments in history. While mandatory 
minimum sentences can be criticised for promoting the notion of revenge as an 
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object of punishment, Shongwe JA in S v Kruger discouraged such a view, and 
emphasised that “punishing a convicted person should not be likened to revenge”.313 
The question can be asked as to “whether the state that represents our aspirations 
to just order, should be the instrument of horrific punishment?”.314 Most societies 
have answered this question in the negative.315 Under the South African 
Constitution, retribution alone cannot be justified as the principle upon which our 
criminal punishment is premised.316 So why are minimum sentences justified? This 
sentencing regime is regarded as:  
…a product of misshapen history, the wish of our politicians to be seen to be 
doing something about crime, and their desire to seem tough on crime.317  
Even though mandatory minimum sentences carry no proven benefit under any 
practice of punishment, they were nonetheless enacted as a hurriedly-passed, 
temporary measure to respond to the fears of a new democratic post-apartheid 
society. As with President Mbeki’s policies on AIDS, the mandatory minimum 
sentences were not a policy which was the result of well-informed research or 
sensible policy-making.318 This law was formulated to respond to past fears, and is 
misdirected and ineffective. It also continues to impose an enormous economic and 
human toll upon our democracy.319  
The Bill of Rights guarantees the rights of all people in our country, and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.320 The Bill of Rights 
safeguards the right to equality and the right to dignity before the law.321 In addition, 
the Constitution specifically provides that detainees and sentenced prisoners have 
the right to “conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity”.322 This 
provision requires that, at a minimum, detainees and prisoners should have access 
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to exercise, adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material,323 and medical 
treatment.324 The Bill of Rights further protects the right to freedom and security of 
the person which includes the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or 
without just cause.325 The Constitution also protects prisoners and detainees from 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.326 In the case of Lee v 
Minister of Correctional Services, the Constitutional Court observed that “prisoners 
are amongst the most vulnerable in our society to the failure of the state to meet its 
constitutional and statutory obligations”,327 and that: 
…a civilized and humane society demands that when the state takes away the 
autonomy of an individual by imprisonments it must assume the obligation … 
inherent in the right … to conditions of detention that are consistent with human 
dignity.328  
In a dissenting judgment, Cameron J concurred that prisoners are a “vulnerable 
group to whom our system of constitutional protection owes particular solitude”.329 
In assessing the government’s policy or political acts, the principle of rationality has 
been applied by our courts.330 In the case of Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation,331 the court noted that the executive has a wide discretion in 
selecting the means it chooses to achieve its constitutionally permissible objectives. 
In this case, it was held that the court may not interfere and impose the means that 
it feels would be more appropriate, however, when these means are being 
challenged on the ground of rationality, the court has a duty to examine these means 
in order to ensure that it rationally related to the objective that it seeks to achieve. 
The court further elaborated on this approach: 
What must be stressed is that the purpose of the enquiry is to determine not 
whether there are other means that could have been used, but whether the 
means selected are rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved. 
And it objectively speaking they are not, they will fall short of the standard 
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demanded by the Constitution. 
Rationality was also applied in Democratic Alliance v The President of the Republic 
of South Africa,332 a case which dealt with the appointment of the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions by the President. It was argued by the applicants that the 
decision of the President to appoint Mr Menzi Simelane as the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions was irrational as he was not a fit and proper person, which was 
required by the National Prosecutions Act.333 Yacoob ACDJ observed that a 
rationality review is concerned with the “relationship between means and ends”.334 
Yacoob ACDJ relied on the cases of Albutt,335 Bato Star336 and Affordable Medicines 
Trust v Minister of Health,337 for finding that executive decisions may only be set 
aside if they are irrational, and may not ordinarily be set aside if procedurally unfair 
or unreasonable. The rationality standard to be applied to the review of executive 
decisions thus prescribes the lowest possible threshold.338 He went on to further 
note that the separation of powers has no concern with a rationality review, and was 
not of particular importance in this case.339 The conclusion reached by Yacoob 
ADCJ is puzzling, as it does not follow why he relied on the decisions in Albutt, Bato 
Star and Affordable Medicines, which are believed to have highlighted the fact that 
although all public power is reviewable; there should be respect for the decision-
making of the legislature and executive branch if it is rational.340 It is suggested that:  
This overarching rationality (or reasonableness) can surely be argued to be an 
intrusion on the separation of powers. It is speculated that Yacoob stretched 
rationality review as a matter of judicial pragmatism.341 
The South African courts have not interpreted the constitutionality of our mandatory 
minimum sentences through section 7 (principles of fundamental justice) of the 
Canadian Charter or the rationality review approach. Yet, the Makwanyane court’s 
reasoning in concluding that the death penalty was unconstitutional was premised 
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on the understanding that “proportionality is an ingredient to be taken into account 
in deciding whether a penalty is cruel, inhuman or degrading”.342 Section 39(1) of 
the Constitution provides a proper approach for the interpretation of the Constitution:  
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum  
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b)  must consider international law; and  
(c)  may consider foreign law”.  
The South African Constitution provides in section 2 that it is “the supreme law of 
the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid…”, and the Canadian 
Constitution in section 52 states in similar terms that it is the supreme law of the 
country, and “any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, 
to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”. Both these Constitutions 
enshrine the concept that these statues are the supreme law, and that laws which 
are inconsistent with its provisions have no force. It will be difficult for our courts not 
to pay attention to the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences in other 
jurisdictions in the light of what seems to be the sentencing regime’s violation of 
fundamental rights. 
In the case of S v Dodo,343 the constitutionality of this penal law was questioned. 
Dodo was convicted on one count of murder and one count of rape. In respect of 
the count of murder, the provisions of Part I of Schedule 2 of the CLAA were 
applicable, and the minimum sentence of life imprisonment had to be imposed in 
terms of section 51 of the Act. The counsel for the accused argued that the 
provisions of section 51(1) were unconstitutional on the grounds that they do not 
only offend against the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular section 
35(3)(c) (the right to a public trial before an ordinary court) and section 35(3)(i) (the 
right to adduce and challenge evidence), but they also offended against the 
constitutional requirement of the separation of powers (sections 301f-h). The court 
held that the right to a trial in an ordinary court as provided by section 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution was limited by the provisions of CLAA section 51(1) in that the 
imposition of sentence was governed by the dictates of the legislature. In addition, 
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there was no evidence to suggest that the limitation of the right to a fair trial in an 
ordinary country would meet the purpose for which the limitation was introduced. 
The extent of the infringement was significant, and there was no apparent legitimate 
relation between the limitation and its purpose. In the court’s view, there was less 
restrictive means to combat the crime wave which was plaguing the country. In 
addition, the court held that whatever the boundaries of separation of powers 
eventually are determined to be, the imposition of the most severe penalty open to 
the High Court had to fall within the exclusive prerogative and discretion of the court. 
The provisions of section 51(1) undermined the doctrine of separation of powers 
and the independence of the judiciary as required by the Constitution.344  
In this case, it was held that individual criminal offenders need to be protected 
against “the occasional excesses of the popular will”.345 It is the duty of the court to 
protect and uphold the constitutional system of check and balances that is “precisely 
designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will”.346 This 
is also the view held by the South African Constitutional Court.347 The Constitutional 
Court has held that: “The primary duty of the courts is to the Constitution and the 
law”.348 This does not happen when judges lack sentencing discretion as a result of 
statutory mandatory minimum sentences, which disproportionately shift sentencing 
powers into the hands of the legislature and the executive.349  
The High Court’s decision in Dodo was appealed to the Constitutional Court,350 
where it was held that the statement in the High Court that the imposition of the most 
severe punishment fell within the exclusive prerogative and discretion of a High 
Court did not correctly reflect the law. In addition, it was also held that the separation 
of powers under the Constitution, although not intended as a means of controlling 
government by separating or diffusing power, was not strict. There was no absolute 
separation of powers under the South African Constitution: 
When the nature and process of punishment was considered in its totality, it was 
apparent that all three branches of the state played a functional role and 
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necessarily had to do. No judicial punishment could take place unless the 
person to be punished had been convicted of an offence which either under the 
common law or statute carried with it a punishment. It was pre-eminently the 
function of the legislature to determine what conduct should be criminalised and 
punished. Even here the separation of powers was not complete, because this 
function of the legislature was checked by the Constitution in general and by the 
Bill of Rights in particular, and such checks were enforced through the courts.351 
The Court’s view is that sentencing is not exclusively the function of the judiciary, 
but that “all three branches of the state played a functional role”.352 Both the 
legislature and the executive share an interest in the punishment to be imposed by 
the courts.353 Yet, it is difficult to reconcile this decision of the Court with the historical 
rationales for the separation of powers and a court’s sentencing role.354 This 
Constitutional Court decision lacks historical evidence in that the courts should have 
sentencing discretion, and that deciding sentencing was intended to be the role of 
a judicial body, as evidenced above. This Court’s decision is also in contrast to our 
own post-1994 sentencing jurisprudence as held in S v Kibido that “the 
determination of a sentence in a criminal matter is pre-eminently a matter for the 
discretion of the trial court”.355 The decision can also not be supported by common-
law sentencing jurisprudence, as discussed in the paragraphs above. 
There has also consistently been a lack of support for mandatory minimum 
sentences in South Africa. Even in the pre-Constitutional era, it was realised that 
mandatory minimum sentences need to be abolished from South African law. In the 
mid-1970s, Mr Justice Viljoen, the then president of The Commission of Inquiry into 
Penal System,356 helped develop the pragmatic argument that judges hold a unique 
position, and are the most suited to impose appropriate sentences.357 At the time, 
there was no South African Constitution that provided for the accused’s right against 
cruel and unusual punishment. Yet Mr Justice Viljoen firmly rejected the imposition 
of the mandatory minimum sentences, premising his argument on the appreciation 
of the general purposes of sentencing, where he suggested that using deterrent 
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sentences to stamp out the use of drugs was “from a retributive point of view, 
outrageously unreasonable.”358 
The second argument put forward in favour of judicial sentencing discretion in South 
Africa was based on the principle of the separation of powers. This argument is 
believed to have gained prominence from the 1960s onwards as the government 
sought to severely criminalise any form of political resistance to its power.359 The 
primary pragmatic arguments for judicial independence were consequently 
supported by political opposing groups, which maintained that judges were not only 
in a unique position to select the appropriate sentence, but were also constitutionally 
required to do so.360 Judges further supported this approach to sentencing, as it was 
in the context of political cases that the imposition of mandatory sentences sparked 
the most controversy.361 Against this background, where mandatory minimum 
sentences were closely associated with ruthlessly punishing political opposition, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in Dodo is strange. This judgment is difficult to be 
reconciled not only with foreign or international sentencing jurisprudence, but mostly 
with our own. On the contrary, the High Court’s decision in Dodo is historically 
supported, not only by the Viljoen Commission report, but also by the medieval 
England’s judicial sentencing discretion approach, and the common law. 
Even though the South African Constitutional Court has found in Dodo that 
mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional, the criticisms of Cameron J 
should be heeded. It is submitted that these penal laws are unconstitutional, and do 
not serve any legitimate purpose because they cannot deter crime, but result in 
more persons being jailed. This again results in overcrowding in prisons, with the 
domino effect of no or little rehabilitation occurring. Taking into consideration the 
Canadian principles of fundamental justice as to whether a disparity exists between 
the legislature’s objective and the means chosen to achieve it; it is deemed that the 
South African mandatory minimum sentences are inadequately connected to its 
objective, or it goes too far in seeking to attain its objective. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that our sentencing statute is unconstitutional for violating the principles 
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of fundamental justice as it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with its legislative 
objective. 
5.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was evidenced that the punishment for crimes committed is a 
unique and policy-laden exercise in many societies. Criminal punishments enable a 
society to deprive individuals of fundamental rights, such as life, liberty, and 
property. Certain standards and procedures of fairness must be followed before 
citizens can be subjected to such sentences. A trial by a jury and the separation of 
powers safeguard citizens against tyrannical governments by ensuring that the 
legislative, executive, and the judicial branch each perform a unique function in 
criminal proceedings, and that each has the means to check the authority of the 
other branches during such proceedings. 
Historically, judges have had a broad discretion to formulate appropriate sentences 
for criminal offenders. This is also the position in common-law. However, in some 
countries, like in South Africa, the government has introduced mandatory minimum 
sentences. These sentences encroach on judicial discretion by setting a mandatory 
floor below which judges cannot sentence, even if to do so would be the appropriate 
sanction in the specific circumstances. Mandatory minimum sentences have, 
however, been supported for numerous rationales, for example, that they act as a 
general deterrent, and their role in ensuring that the justice system is more 
transparent, certain and fair. Yet, research shows that these punitive sentences 
have no deterrent effect nor do they reduce crime, instead they may increase the 
likelihood of recidivism. 
As stated above, mandatory minimum sentences remove discretion from judges - 
whose decisions are public and reviewable - to prosecutors or the executive, whose 
decision-making is mainly beyond review. A fit sentence is accepted as one where 
the court, after considering a range of sentences imposed for similar crimes 
committed reasonably contemporaneously, pass a comparable type of sentence, 
depending on the individual circumstances of the case. Mandatory minimum 
sentences have pre-determined the baseline punishment, thereby preventing a 
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court from fully considering the contexts of the offence and the particular offender. 
These penal laws have been criticised for not being reconcilable with the principles 
of sentencing in countries such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Papua New Guinea.   
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords has emphasised that only a court could 
determine the punishment of a convicted person, and this has been the position 
since 1688, as was required by the rule of law. Similarly, the Privy Council has also 
concluded, when interpreting the common law, that a non-judicial body cannot 
determine an appropriate punishment for a particular crime. In the United States, 
mandatory minimum sentences are criticised for preventing the judiciary from fully 
undertaking one primary task, namely, the weighing of evidence and the unique 
circumstance of the offender in each individual case with the purpose of producing 
just outcomes. Federal judges have criticised the mandatory minimum sentences 
as cruel, irrational and unjust. The United States Supreme Court Chief Justices and 
President Obama have disapproved of these sentences, and their effects on 
offenders. 
In Canada, mandatory minimum sentences are also criticised for preventing the 
court from fully considering the circumstances of the offence and the offender. 
These pre-determined sentences have the potential to depart from the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing, as they underscore denunciation, general deterrence 
and retribution at the expense of a fit and proper sentence for the gravity of the 
offence. Supporters of mandatory minimums, conversely, state that these sentences 
set a stable range of sentences for an offence, which will permit people to know in 
advance that if a certain offence is committed, what the severity of the 
consequences will be. It has been submitted that this view is flawed as countless 
studies have shown no evidentiary basis to support it.  
The Canadian Supreme Court has found that sentencing is exclusively a judicial 
function, and that mandatory minimum sentences violate the principles of 
fundamental justice. These penal laws are inconsistent with its legislative objective, 
and results in over-breadth. This view creates a potential constitutional argument 
against mandatory minimum sentences in jurisdictions where the separation of 
powers doctrine is recognised. It can be argued that a legislature that mandates to 
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the judiciary what the sentence must be for offenders convicted for particular offence 
violates the separation of powers. It is because a judiciary that is directed as to what 
punishment to impose fails to act as a check and balance on legislative overreach.  
The South African courts, like the Canadian Supreme Court, have found that 
sentencing is pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial courts. In South 
Africa, prior to 1994, mandatory minimum sentences have been criticised by the 
courts mainly on the premise that they weaken the courts’ sentencing function to the 
level of a rubber stamp. After 1994, this view was confirmed by our courts and these 
types of pre-determined sentences were also found to offend against the 
fundamental principles of the separation of powers of the legislature and the 
judiciary. It has been suggested that sentencing is not exclusively a judicial task, but 
that the executive and the legislature also have an interest in the punishment of an 
offender. However, it has been shown that historically courts’ control over the 
sentencing function has been wrestled away by the monarch. The development of 
the rule of law, and the creation of a system where each division of government 
would check on the powers exercised by the other branches specifically safeguard 
citizens against any abuse of power by their rulers or governments. The adoption of 
laws mandating mandatory minimum sentences has had severe effects in South 
Africa, not only in the unreasonable sentences mandated, and in the spiralling 
outcomes of overcrowding, no rehabilitation, and high recidivism, but also as these 
sentences affect judges’ unique position to impose appropriate sentences. This, of 




RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
This chapter will draw some conclusions and attempt to put forward some answers 
to the research questions of this study. An endeavour will also be made to proffer 
proposals for comprehensive and extensive reforms on the doctrine of separation 
of powers, while addressing its current state and its weaknesses. 
Chapter one of this thesis presented the background information to the research. 
The separation of powers’ doctrine traced back to Montesquieu’s work is premised 
on the reasoning that the government’s powers, in order to safeguard citizens and 
their rights, must be divided into three branches. The idea was that the power should 
not only be focused in one person, but be shared amongst the government branches 
(as in paragraph 1.1 above). The research problem constitutes two distinct 
statements. The first question probes whether the South African Constitution 
provides sufficient safeguards in order to protect judicial authority and independence 
against encroaching conducts of the other government’s branches. The second part 
of the research problem focuses on the question whether South African courts have 
absolute powers to rearrange South African laws and public policy to conform to 
their theoretical and dogmatic views (as in paragraph 1.2 above). It was seen that, 
amongst the different branches of government, the judiciary is unique, in that judges 
are selected, their powers’ carefully upheld, but also in the fact that the judiciary is 
not elected by the citizens of a country. The fact that the judiciary is unrepresentative 
simultaneously stipulates and limits their power. 
Chapter two presented the origins of the separation of powers doctrine, as well as 
the challenges experienced in its application. It was illustrated that as the role of the 
judiciary is to efficiently check and to enforce constitutional values that are counter-
majoritarian, the courts’ independence and morality must be protected, especially 
against the intrusion of the other two representative branches. This is corroborated 
by Hamilton (as in paragraph 2.2.1.1 above) who emphasizes that the power of 
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judging must be kept separate from the legislative and the executive; otherwise 
there will be no liberty.  
The historical origin of the separation of powers doctrine revealed that the idea of 
rule by all of the people had merit, as independence and sound policymaking were 
promoted. This notion was first found in the mixed regime concept, where the 
governing power was separated instead of such power being consolidated into the 
hands of one social class. It was for this reason that Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, 
Aquinas, and Machiavelli all highly rated the concept of a mixed regime. It was also 
in this concept of a mixed regime - with its components of checks and balances - 
where the separation of powers doctrine originated from (as seen in paragraph 
2.2.2). These two concepts both share a common assertion that power corrupts, 
and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. 
It was especially during the political beliefs of the seventeenth century that the notion 
of the mixed regime seemed to become prominent. In England, for example, many 
Englishmen thought that English system constituted a form of Aristotelian mixed 
regime. The three huge domains of the English social order were believed to be the 
King (‘the one’), the House of Lords (‘the few’), and the House of Commons (‘the 
many’). All three domains were subject under the law to the constitution of King 
Edward, the Confessor. The ‘king-people’ unit was vested with supreme power, 
which included the power to make decrees. When these laws were accepted and 
enacted by Parliament, the King or his judges no longer had the authority to dispute, 
to remove or judicially review the laws. 
Montesquieu, on his first visit to England, observed this governmental system, and 
consequently based his government constitutional structure, which is built on the 
rule of law, there upon. In his The spirit of laws, he illustrates the well-known three 
government branches, and states that government’s authority must be divided 
amongst these political actors so that it would not be possible for any one section to 
determine its own authority. This would ensure political liberty, in that power will not 
be exercised arbitrarily, which constituted the ultimate purpose of his scheme. The 




Because of his own background as a judge in France, Montesquieu did not 
acknowledge that part of English courts’ function consists of deciding what 
legislation specifically may entail. He did concede that, under monarchies, laws 
might not be straight-forward and precise, and that judges consequently may be 
tasked with determining their true essence. Yet according to him, in more republican 
types of governments, judging is more fixed and certain. This idea has resulted in 
the principle of legal certainty, which is still a fundamental concept in British law. 
Legal certainty contains the notion that legal decisions are based on the letter of the 
law in determining the facts, and not on judges’ private opinions.  
Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers has been much debated, 
specifically his misinterpretation of the nature of the English common law, and how 
his doctrine is currently applied in modern-day democracies. It has been asserted 
that Montesquieu failed to take into consideration the concept of precedent in 
English jurisprudence. As stated in paragraph 2.2.1.2, Montesquieu – when 
composing his doctrine of separation of powers - failed to notice how the 
Westminster constitution really operated. When the Constitution of the United States 
of America was drafted, they faithfully followed Montesquieu’s prescriptions of good 
government, without realising his mistake.  
In the United States, the English mixed regime political system was replicated in the 
colonies from 1607 to 1776. However, the notion of the mixed regime ended with 
the end of feudalism. As the American Revolution advocated the equality of all 
people, it consequently rejected bequeathed aristocracy or class divisions. As 
shown in paragraph 2.2.3, all powers to govern were to be in the hands of the 
majority. After the English Civil War in the 1650s, attempts were made to find a 
suitable replacement for the mixed regime idea. The most important requirement 
was that the majority rule not be concentrated in only one person or institution, as a 
single entity could easily be influenced and corrupted. The resulting concept 
constituted the desirability to separate the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
powers as to their function. Jefferson fully supported this model of divided and 
balanced powers, and proposed that these governmental bodies should not go 
beyond their legal powers, and that they should check and restrain each other. 
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Courts were also to be graded, with the Supreme Court placed at the apex of all 
courts. 
In paragraph 2.2.4, the Canadian separation of powers was discussed. The 
constitutional historical origin of this ideal in Canada has disclosed that the 1867 
British North America Act (the founding Constitution for Canada) as well as the 1982 
Constitution provided no sufficiently formulated and articulated separation of power 
doctrine. In spite of this impasse, Lamer CJ in the Provincial Court Judges 
Reference case, found that the separation of powers is a fundamental principle of 
the Canadian Constitution (as in paragraph 2.2.4). It was also the views of 
McLachlin J in the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, that this doctrine forms an 
integral part of Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence. Albeit, the Crown and the 
executive were described as different branches of government, while the Crown is 
in fact, the executive branch. The development of the separation of powers by the 
Canadian Supreme Court has been marred by confusion since the Court’s 
jurisprudence has not been consistent and comprehensive. Like in the South African 
jurisprudence, the development of this principle in Canada was left to the courts and 
not the legislature or the executive (as in paragraph 2.2.4).  
In paragraph 2.2.5, the South African separation of powers – as found in Principle 
VI of the South African Interim Constitution – was discussed. In describing the 
nature of the South African constitutional separation of powers, the Constitution 
Court in the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa case 
confirmed that this doctrine values the functional independence of the branches of 
government. Built into this principle are checks and balances in order to safeguard 
the branches from arrogating power from one another. It could therefore be said that 
the separation of powers doctrine actually foresees the possibility that one branch 
may intrude on the terrain of another. As such, there is in reality no complete or 
absolute separation of powers, only partial separation. Even against this 
background, this provision of the Constitution remains insufficiently formulated in its 
content and nature. In the Constitutional Court’s decision of De Lange v Smuts, 
Ackerman J stated that the courts will cultivate a South African version of this 
principle as provided for in the Constitution, yet, until now, there has been no 
indication as to how this doctrine will be developed.  
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The doctrine of the separation of powers remains somewhat of a mystery in South 
African law. Though frequently cited by courts, and having clear and practical effect 
on the Constitutional Court’s judgments, little or no explicit, concrete, distinctively 
South African content has yet been given to this concept. This has resulted in 
unpredictability in its application, and vigorous, at times, acerbic disagreement 
between judges on its application in specific cases. The confusion in the application 
of the doctrine was recently observed in the scathing dissent of Mogoeng CJ in the 
case of Economic Freedom Fighters, where the court’s majority judgment was 
characterised as judicial overreach, and against the prescriptions of the separation 
of powers. In contradistinction, Froneman J deemed the majority’s decision to be 
simply that of interpreting the Constitution, and providing parliament guidance in 
order to achieve its constitutional duty. Competing perspectives on the application 
of this doctrine have, in this way, frequently dictated the outcomes of courts’ 
decisions. 
The lack of jurisprudence clarifying this doctrine has resulted in public confusion of 
the role of key state institutions. It is held that if the judiciary cannot fully comprehend 
the concept, or convey its application in simple and clear terms, members of the 
public will certainly not understand its meaning and use. One of the unfortunate 
consequences of the Constitutional Court’s decision to slowly and incrementally 
develop a distinctively South African separation of powers doctrine over a period of 
time is therefore that its content is not clear to anyone - legal elites included - while, 
in the course of time, this process unfolds. Without a degree of clarity on the content 
of this doctrine and its conceptual basis, the public is without any guidance as to 
whether Mogoeng CJ’s assertion that his colleagues’ decision constitutes an 
overreach, and an undemocratic encroachment on the functional sphere of 
parliament, is correct or not. Lack of clarity on the content of this doctrine routinely 
leaves crucial state institutions, for example, the judiciary, the Public Protector and 
the Human Rights Commission vulnerable to critiques of overreach or interfering in 
the affairs of parliament. Instead of assisting in clarifying the separation of powers 
doctrine, courts often play a role to perpetuating confusion about it. As stated at the 
end of paragraph 2.2.5, this doctrine seems to appear and disappear in South 
African courts’ jurisprudence at their convenience, and to satisfy their whims.  
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This state of uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding our separation of powers 
doctrine may also undermine the court’s exercise of its judicial review role under 
section 172 of the Constitution. Similar to the puzzlement regarding the nature and 
content of the separation of powers; the nature and content of judicial review also 
remains unpredictable and undecided, not only to the courts, but to other state 
institutions as well. These doubts occur mainly as a result of the insufficiently 
formulated separation of powers doctrine in the Constitution. The South African 
constitutional separation of powers scheme entrusts the judiciary with the role to 
defend the Constitution, and citizens are empowered to look to the courts to protect 
their constitutional rights. The Constitution also entrusts the courts with 
constitutional powers to decide on constitutional matters, and to declare law or 
conduct of other government branches inconsistent with the Constitution invalid. 
The courts seem to be the only government branch vested with the powers to review 
conducts and laws enacted by the other branches of government, and to determine 
their constitutional validity. While this is the most influential role vested on the courts; 
the nature, content and the application of this power within the context of the 
separation of powers doctrine as illustrated in the Economic Freedom Fighters case, 
still remains unclear in South African jurisprudence. 
Such challenges in the separation of powers doctrine are not only experienced in 
South Africa, but also in other jurisdictions, as pointed out in paragraph 2.3. In the 
United States, Marshall CJ stated in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Marbury v Madison (1803) that it is unequivocally the jurisdiction and duty of the 
judiciary to say what the law is. This is termed judicial review, which he defines as 
the authority of a court to determine whether any law, any authoritative law-based 
undertaking, or any other government official’s action is unconstitutional, and thus 
unenforceable. Judicial review is objected to by many critics as it entrusts unlimited 
power to the courts to change laws. These laws were enacted by the elected 
representatives of the people; thereby indirectly nullifying the choice of the majority. 
Judicial review has also been criticised on two main grounds, namely, firstly, that 
judicial review does not protect rights better than democratic legislatures. The 
second reason is based on the assertion that judicial review is democratically 
unlawful. Supporters of judicial review again argue that the authority of the majority 
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is limited through courts that consigned with the power to protect individual rights, 
so as to make democratic self-government possible. Chilton and Versteeg maintains 
in paragraph 2.3 that whether one is for or against judicial review –whether weak or 
strong - the challenge still is that courts have limited capacity to protect constitutional 
rights, as there is no guarantee that governments will continually respect 
constitutional rights. As illustrated in Chapter two, the application of judicial review 
in the Dred Scott case led to some doubts being raised against the trust placed in 
the courts to truly protect constitutional rights, and at the same time, the resultant 
uncertainty and limitations embedded in this principle. These doubts also raise 
concern in South Africa as regards judicial review, as its nature and content are not 
adequately outlined in section 172 of the Constitution. The question to be asked is 
whether South Africa - with its past political history – should not learn from the Dred 
Scott decision. Should the courts be entrusted with the power to interpret and apply 
a principle which has not been sufficiently formulated by the people’s elected 
representatives in the Constitution?  
In Chapter three, the role of courts in developing public policy and criminal offences 
were probed. Sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution provide for the 
development of South African law by the courts through the interests-of-justice 
framework. These constitutional provisions not only assign the courts with judicial 
law-making powers, but they further provided courts with unrestrained and not fully 
formulated judicial law-making powers, as the content and nature of the separation 
of powers doctrine remain unclear. It is difficult to discern whether certain laws or 
conducts are invalid, and are in need of the courts’ reform or development through 
the interest of justice framework when the text of the Constitution does not clearly 
proscribe this function, and does not provide the nature and content of the interest-
of-justice framework. Scalia questions (in paragraph 3.1) how judges are able to 
discern what the interest of justice could possibly constitute when developing the 
laws, and whether this is an ability which the other political arms of government lack 
– a secret sort of knowledge?  
While it is acknowledged that courts do make laws, the foundation of the present-
day governments would be truly weakened if the extent of the legitimacy and 
procedure of judicial law-making remain incomprehensible and vague. While the 
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courts are acknowledged by some as the major entity amongst the government 
departments in making law, it is more desirable to leave the process of developing 
the common law in the hands of the legislature. There is much controversy on 
whether the development of the common law by means of dispute-based practice is 
the appropriate approach to formulate legal rules which predictably and 
meaningfully prescribe future legal affairs within a particular area of law. It is 
submitted that courts may lack reliable information about the broader-based facts of 
society that might justify a change of law. 
While there are views in support of judicial law-making in the United States, 
O’Scannlain argues in paragraph 3.2.1 that judicial law making is a trend that is 
troubling, unconstitutional and threatens constitutional democracy. Litigants tend to 
increasingly turn to the judiciary in order to achieve political ends. This is done 
because, instead of persuading a bicameral legislature and other elected officials 
such as the President and the electorate constituencies, these litigants must only 
focus on one judge in a trial, or two appeal court judges, or five High Court judges 
– of which not one of them are democratically elected.  
It is argued that when courts exercise the role of the legislature, they encourage the 
unreasonable acts of political litigants. In showing their willingness to legislate, 
courts open up the floodgates for these litigants and interest groups to initiate law 
suits, as litigation is less costly and easier than involving the democratic process, as 
explained above. In this manner, democracy is undermined and denigrated. While 
political actors can be held answerable for their acts by the electorate, judges cannot 
be held responsible for their decisions. Consequently, it is of the utmost importance 
that when policy changes are sought after, the country’s democratic processes 
should be engaged. Courts should restrict themselves to performing their allocated 
constitutional function. Furthermore, as seen in the United States Supreme Court 
case of Obergefell v Hodges, the personal opinions of judges should not feature in 
the judicial law-making process. Such decisions based on an individual’s beliefs are 
not only in breach of the rule of law, but is also illegitimate.  
In Canada, the judicial power to effect judicial legislation or invalidate legislation is 
embodied in section 52 of the Canadian Constitution Act. Similar to the situation in 
the United States, these issues present confusion in Canada. There seems to be a 
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lack of a coherent remedy to invalidate laws, as the nature and content of judicial 
law-making remain unpredictable and unclear. McLachlin argues in paragraph 3.2.2 
above that Canadian courts continue to perform an essential and fundamental role 
in developing and transforming the law - which entails law-making - under the 
common law. It is not only the elected representatives that can legitimately exercise 
power on behalf of the people, since the Canadian Charter does not create a 
constitutional democracy that confines total power to the elected representatives. 
Courts find its judicial law-making role within this context. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has, as a result of these constitutional powers, 
changed the legal definition of, for example, the word ‘spouse’, and legalised same-
sex marriages, a role that could have been accomplished by the legislature. 
However, in the Newfoundland (Treasury Board) case, in a unanimous decision, 
judicial law-making as applied by the Canadian Supreme Court was criticised as 
amounting to unwarranted intrusions onto the sphere of government’s elected 
branches. Hence, the Canadian jurisprudence shows that Canadian judges hold 
divergent views regarding the nature and the content of the Canadian judicial law-
making jurisprudence as provided in section 52 of the Canadian Constitution, as 
lacking sufficient details in its nature and content. This section contains similar 
wording to that found in section 173 of the South African Constitution, consequently, 
it is expected that a parallel problem will surface in this jurisdiction. 
Section 173 of the South African Constitution provides for the development of laws 
through the interest-of-justice framework. This framework is stipulated as a 
discretion used in regulating the admission of hearsay evidence under the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act. According to the Law Reform Commission of Hong 
Kong, this open-ended discretion in South African law (i.e. admitted in the interest 
of justice) is a point of great concern. Apprehension was also expressed regarding 
the United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice Act, which also makes use of the interest-of-
justice test in the admission of hearsay evidence. These tests are not regarded as 
a sufficient safeguard against the dangers of hearsay, for, as in the South African 
model, this discretion is too subjective and open-ended to guard against the perils 
of hearsay evidence. It can thus be argued that the interests-of-justice framework 
as a tool used to develop laws under the South African Constitution lacks sufficient 
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formulation as to its content and its scope. It also permits the use of open-ended 
personal value-judgments, and may thus result in unpredictability and uncertainty in 
South African law. 
This contention was confirmed in paragraph 3.2.3, where it was shown that judicial 
law-making in South Africa has resulted in the development of the definitions of 
criminal-law offences, same-sex marriages legalisation, as well as providing how 
policy issues are to be protected and formulated by the courts. For example, in the 
Treatment Action Campaign, it was held that there are no clear boundaries that 
separate the roles of the legislature, the executive, and the courts from one another 
as regards policy making. Courts, in this case, were allowed to amend a policy. 
However, in the Soobramoney case, which also dealt with government policy and 
budgetary implications, it was stated that government was the appropriate branch 
to handle such policy issues; and that courts will be hesitant to intervene in 
government’s bona fide decisions.  
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in the protection of socio-economic rights, 
and its judicial-law making role in the Treatment Action Campaign and 
Soobramoney, has not been consistent in formulating policy in the protection of 
these rights. In the Treatment Action Campaign case, for example, part of the 
government’s argument was premised on budgetary constraints. This, it is 
submitted; was correctly dismissed by the Court, because, as tendered, there was 
an urgent need to prevent any possible loss of further lives. This same line of 
argument could also have been relevant in Mr Soobramoney’s matter in order to 
prolong his life through renal dialysis. Yet, as he had no organised public campaign 
demonstrating on his behalf as in the Treatment Action Campaign case, the Court 
arrived at a different decision. 
In Chapter four, the concepts of judicial deference and judicial restraint were 
elucidated. In paragraph 4.2, judicial deference was explained as constituting either 
respect or submission to authority. Most courts, even in South Africa, prefer an 
interpretation of deference as respect. Judicial restraint, again, basically entails the 
non-interference of personal views in judging cases.  
The courts in the United States follow a two-step process (as described in paragraph 
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4.2.1) in reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of statutes, the so-called 
Chevron deference-doctrine. Courts must first examine whether the question at 
issue was distinctly addressed in the statute, as drawn up by the legislature. If this 
is found to be so, both institutions are bound by the legislature’s statutory directive. 
If the specific question at issue is not directly addressed in the statute, the second 
step must be followed; where the court merely asks if the interpretation of the statute 
by the agency is acceptable. If the agency’s interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable (although perhaps not the best interpretation), the court must uphold this 
interpretation.  
It is as regards this second phase of the test that the constitutionality of the Chevron 
deference has been queried. Most critics in the United States disapprove of the 
Chevron deference practice, as it is believed to undermine the courts’ obligation to 
check on the political branches, and hands judges’ ability to interpret judgments to 
other agencies. This was also the conclusion of Thomas J in Perez v Mortgage 
Bankers Association. According to him, the Framers of the Constitution took into 
consideration that legislation may sometimes be ambiguous, and that judges then 
had the power to resolve these ambiguities. Judicial deference permits executive 
bureaucracies to consume much core judicial power, to be concentrated in federal 
power which is unconstitutional. It is also argued that because the legislature does 
not have the power to allocate to agencies the right to interpret their regulations, 
they consequently need the courts to defer to their interpretations. 
It is also a challenge for the United States’ courts to establish appropriate 
boundaries as to their constitutional function. Some critics maintain that the courts’ 
lack of democratic legitimacy should pressure judges into exercising restraint when 
dealing with the elected branches’ decisions on fundamental rights. The manner in 
which restraint is exercised by the courts directly impacts on the degree to which 
the political branches are restricted by these rights, and the extent to which the 
rights’ claims are recognised by the courts. In this regard, judicial restraint presents 
a quandary to the courts as their institutional limitations at times necessitate judicial 
restraint. Courts have a level of discretion as to their application of norms. They can 
apply these norms strictly or leniently. It is mainly by means of the lenient approach 
that the legislature’s statutes are approved of as complying with the level required 
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by the norm in question. The concept of deference falls under this level of discretion. 
While there are divergent views questioning Chevron deference, this decision has 
not been overruled by the United States Supreme Court, and still provides the 
authority in the United States deference jurisprudence. 
Paragraph 4.2.2 considered the Canadian perspective on judicial restraint and 
deference. The Canadian Constitution is broadly drafted in - what is considered by 
some – as vague language. This has resulted in judges being entrusted with a 
measure of discretion in its interpretation. Still, although judges have much leeway 
in the constitutional interpretation, they do not possess the power to arbitrarily strike 
down laws, or to subject the Constitution to their personal views. Judges are obliged 
to first to take part in a ‘dialogue’ with the legislative branch. This notion of a 
democratic dialogue demonstrates the necessary respect the judiciary must show 
in respecting the roles of the other government branches. This process was 
exemplified in Vriend v Alberta, where it was held that courts are required to speak 
to the legislative and executive branches when reviewing legislative enactments and 
the executive decisions to safeguard constitutional validity. The response of the 
legislature to the courts constitutes a dialogue amongst the different branches. By 
means of this dialogue, the courts ensure that they do not to second-guess their 
judgments in areas where they might be ill-equipped to decide upon. 
Some factors make this dialogue possible, namely, section 33 of the Charter 
provides the power of legislative override. The legislature is empowered to re-enact 
laws that has been struck down by the courts. The legislature can also include an 
‘express notwithstanding clause’ into a statute, which would result in shielding the 
legislation from judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, section 1 of the Charter provides that 
a right can be limited with reasonable limits. By means of this limitation analysis 
courts are permitted to contemplate as to on how the affected legislation could be 
improved. There are also some rights in the Charter that are internally qualified, 
which allow the courts to work out other measures that could fulfil the constitutional 
requirements. Lastly, the right to equality as guaranteed in section 15(1) of the 
Charter can be satisfied by way of numerous remedies. 
Yet, despite these factors listed above which are believed to be making dialogue 
possible, concerns are raised regarding the inconsistent application of the 
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reasonableness standard by the Canadian Supreme Court. In the Dunsmuir case, 
the Supreme Court applied the reasonableness review, but it conveyed mixed 
messages. The court adopted Dyzenhaus’s principle of judicial deference which 
requires the court to give respectful consideration of the reasons offered by an 
administrative decision-maker. But the court also added to this principle by insisting 
that reasonableness is by and large depended on the existence of intelligibility, 
transparency and justification within the decision-making process. While judicial 
deference is exercised by the Canadian Supreme Court through the concept of 
dialogue between government branches, its limits and content remain unclear and 
contradictory, and this seems to result in an uncertain and inconsistent 
jurisprudence. 
Similar to the Canadian Supreme Court, the South African Constitutional Court (as 
in paragraph 4.2.3 above), has exercised both judicial restraint and deference as 
premised on the separation of powers. This has included not interfering with 
decisions by other government branches, when it found such decisions to be in line 
with the Constitution. The respect shown for the domains of other government 
branches reflects a central characteristic of the separation of powers doctrine, as 
well as the idea of judicial restraint. The content and nature of South Africa’s 
deference doctrine is still unclear, which has led to O’Regan J in the Bato Star case 
to employ Dyzenhaus’s notion of deference as respect. Her conclusion in this case 
thus was that our deference jurisprudence would entail that the courts give respect 
to an administrative agency’s decision, depending upon the nature and the identity 
of the decision-maker. There are, however, many contradictory views on the origins 
of South Africa’s deference idea. According to O’Regan J, the courts exercised 
deference during apartheid, and consequently they exhibited a passive attitude 
under the authoritarian state powers. O’Regan J also made it clear in Bato Star that 
deference, although not clearly articulated in the Constitution, does form part of the 
South African constitutional jurisprudence. It is generally accepted that the South 
African notion of judicial deference emanated from Canada. Yet some critics, such 
as Wallis, still have reservations as to whether we need such a foreign concept, as 
it adds nothing to our judicial system. The borrowing of foreign concepts may also 
create problems when a rule is torn from its domestic roots and transplanted into 
foreign soil.  
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The other problem presented by the application of deference in South Africa seems 
to stem from the fact that its nature, scope, content and limitations are not clearly 
formulated or defined. These sentiments are evident in Ackermann J’s reasoning in 
the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality where he states that it 
is impossible to formulate the concept in general terms, as deference will be 
determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. Inconsistency in the 
application of deference has also led to different outcomes in judgments, as seen in 
the Soobramoney and Treatment Action Campaign cases. Both these cases 
involved government’s policy and budgetary implications, yet in Soobramoney, 
Chaskalson JP dismissed Mr Soobramoney’s claim for his right not to be refused 
emergency treatment under section 27(3) of the Constitution, while the claim in 
Treatment Action Campaign was successful. In Soobramoney, Chaskalson justified 
his decision by stating that health care policy and funding decisions should be made 
by the responsible provincial government, and that courts will be ‘be slow to 
interfere’ with government’s decisions if they are bona fide. While the court 
exercised deference, its limits and content were not comprehensively formulated or 
defined by the court. For example, it can be argued that it did not comprehensively 
articulated or determined the circumstances in which a court would ‘be slow to 
interfere’. Conversely, in Treatment Action Campaign, it was contended that courts 
can or should make orders that have an impact on government’s policy. The court, 
in this case, did not consider the making of policy as the prerogative of the executive 
only. The view was advocated that courts can make orders that have the effect of 
requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy, as there are no clear lines that 
separate the roles of each of the branches of government. Thus, deference played 
no role in this court’s decision, as the court ordered government to provide health 
care, which had a significant impact on the government’s health care policy and 
budgetary implications. It is against this background that deference and judicial 
restraint as exercised by South African courts remain unclear, and impossible to put 
into words, which may result in undermining the courts’ constitutional role in its 
application. 
The last chapter of this thesis, Chapter five, contemplated mandatory minimum 
sentences. In paragraph 5.1, it was explained that the separation of powers act as 
a safeguard to ensure fairness in sentencing. Historically, judges deciding a 
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punishment had been regulated through a broad judicial discretion. However, 
mandatory minimum sentences create a floor below which judges cannot sentence. 
It is believed that mandatory minimum sentences encroach on judge’s sentencing 
discretion by the creation of this mandatory floor. The origins of judicial discretion in 
sentencing was shown in paragraph 5.2 to be the Magna Carta, which was the first 
English statute which limited the king’s control over judges and the law, and, thereby 
resulted in judges exercising judicial discretion during sentencing. However, the 
concept of proportionality in sentencing has ancient Biblical roots, which is also 
referred to in the Magna Carta. In feudal England, sentencing was arbitrary, and 
judges employed certain mechanisms through which they were able to use their 
discretion in order to avoid the prescribed sentence. 
The determination of sentence in criminal matters has always been deemed as pre-
eminently a matter for the discretion of the court, after taking into account certain 
factors when imposing sentence. However, it seems that there have always been 
cases where attempts to usurp this function of the courts has been made by non-
judicial bodies, as illustrated in paragraph 5.3. In Liyanage v The Queen, for 
example, the United Kingdom’s Privy Council found that legislation forcing judges 
to sentence persons convicted in an aborted coup to a minimum mandatory jail term 
of 10 years’ imprisonment was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that such type 
of legislation will allow the legislature to wholly absorb the judiciary’s power. This 
reasoning continued when, in 2003, the House of Lords questioned the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences. It was held that this sentencing 
practice violated Article 6 of the European Convention (guaranteeing the right to a 
fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal), because sentencing was 
the court’s duty. Such sentencing practice was difficult to be reconciled with the 
separation of powers principle and the rule of law, because only a court can decide 
the appropriate punishment of a convicted person. Similarly, the European Court 
has held that mandatory minimum sentences deprive defendants of the opportunity 
to place mitigating factors before the court, and consequently, these sentences are 
much more likely to be grossly disproportionate. 
In the United States, a sentencing commission was specifically established in 1976 
in order to formulate national sentencing guidelines, as seen in paragraph 5.4.1. 
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Although the legislature retained its role of defining criminal conduct, this branch 
could now also create statutes that establish pre-determined terms of punishment 
for certain criminal offences. These mandatory minimum sentences furnished 
prosecutors with the decision-making role, while at the same time restricting the 
judiciary’s discretion. Mandatory minimum sentences disqualify judges from 
imposing sentences lower than that mandated in the relevant statute.  
These sentences are criticised in the United States because they enable the 
legislature to improperly use their power to establish definitive sanctions for crimes, 
and relegate the courts’ role to an affirmation of the process. This has been 
described as a trial by legislature. It is submitted that such statutes violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. These sentences are seen to benefit only the 
prosecutors, the executive and the legislature - to the exclusion of the judiciary. 
Sentencing regimes that are not harsh on crime cannot win votes for legislators. 
This politicisation of the criminal law results in individual justice being discarded. 
Federal judges have felt obliged to enforce the standardised mandatory minimum 
sentences in many cases. There has especially been a backlash by judges when 
imposing these sentences on juveniles based on the crime, and not on their 
culpability or other factors. For example, in the United States Supreme Court case 
of Miller v Alabama, it was noted that under this type of sentencing regime, every 
juvenile will receive the same sentence, whether the child is the shooter or the 
accomplice, and irrespective of whether the child is from a stable household, or from 
a chaotic and abusive one.  
While many judges disapprove of these sentences, the United States Supreme 
Court, in its decision in Misretta v United States, held that the portion of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 establishing the Sentencing Commission did not 
violate the separation of powers. The Sentencing Commission was entrusted with 
the power to decide and formulate sentencing, even though these powers were 
historically considered a judicial task. Consequently, according to United States 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, these sentences are valid and do not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
In Canada, mandatory minimum sentences are imposed for numerous offences (as 
shown in paragraph 5.4.2). In justifying the practice of mandatory minimum 
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sentences, it is argued that these sentences create certainty in punishment, they 
have deterrent effect, they condemn and incapacitate offenders, and enhance public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Contrary to these optimistic views, it is 
submitted that these sentences do not deter offenders. This mistaken belief serves 
as a costly distraction which circumvents the need to examine the underlying causes 
of criminal behaviour.  
Similar to public opinion in the United States, it is alleged that mandatory minimum 
sentences remove any discretion from courts in imposing sentence, and transpose 
this discretion to prosecutors who lack transparency in their decisions. This is 
discouraging as judges’ decisions are public, and subject to review on appeal. It is 
also argued that these sentences breach the four principles of fundamental justice 
in Canada, namely, laws must not be vague, overbroad, arbitrary, or grossly 
disproportionate in its effects. The first issue concerning mandatory minimum 
sentences is whether there is mismatch between the legislature’s objective and the 
means chosen to achieve it. It is also asserted that these sentences are arbitrary or 
overly broad. A law will be overbroad when the law goes too far, and interferes with 
conduct that bears no connection to its objective. Legislation that directs the 
judiciary as to what punishment to impose undermines the fundamental 
constitutional idea of checks and balances between the political branches. It is not 
the function of the judiciary to merely rubber-stamp the decisions of the political 
branches on punishment. A legal system wherein a judge is a prescribed pre-
determined sentence before hearing the facts is generally criticised as not forming 
part of Canadian criminal justice system. Despite these criticisms, mandatory 
minimum sentences remain an integral part of Canadian law, as justified by the 
government. 
In paragraph 5.4.3, mandatory minimum sentences as applied in South Africa are 
discussed. Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act provides mandatory 
minimum sentences for the more serious crimes. The intention of such sentences is 
to alleviate serious crimes. This legislation strictly prohibits judges to determine the 
length of imprisonment period for offenders for certain offences. Section 51(3) 
permits judges to depart from the mandatory minimum sentences only if there are 
‘substantial and compelling’ reasons why a lesser sentence should be imposed. The 
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words ‘substantial and compelling’ have been subjected to many interpretations, 
however, Stegmann J holds that they afford the sentencing court no discretion. 
Courts have disapproved of mandatory minimum sentences mainly on the 
assumption that they weaken the courts’ normal sentencing function to the level of 
a rubber stamp. However, it has also been claimed that no historical evidence exists 
supporting the idea that sentencing belongs to the judiciary alone.  
Mandatory minimum sentences are justified in South Africa based on four possible 
rationales, namely, the threat of incarceration deters potential criminals from 
committing crimes; incarceration incapacitates offenders; incarceration can 
rehabilitate offenders, and incarceration is retributive, as imprisonment is seen as 
proof of justice being done. The objectives of this sentencing regime are disputed 
on numerous grounds. For example, in the decision of Makwanyane, the court held 
that mandatory minimum sentences do not have a deterrent effect. It is also 
assumed that longer prison sentences reduce crime by incapacitating criminal 
offenders. Still, it has been shown in this section that statistics show that higher 
number of incapacitation and longer sentences may not reduce crime. 
The third justification of rehabilitation, as also outlined in the Correctional Services 
Act, is also disputable as the objectives of mandatory minimum sentences apply 
contrarily against such laudable goal. This is because an offender serving a long-
term sentence or life imprisonment becomes a prisoner who experiences a loss of 
hope, and who is cut off from all community ties and relationships. These types of 
prisoners suffer from insecurities, and are more susceptible than shorter-term 
prisoners to social and psychological problems, exacerbated by an unspecified date 
of release. As observed by Fagan, proper rehabilitation is lacking in South African 
prisons. These institutions are too overcrowded, which makes it impracticable to 
have rehabilitation programs. Instead, prisons turn into places where criminality is 
nurtured. 
Retribution, as the final rationale for justifying incarceration, dates from the Old 
Testament principle of an eye for an eye. Criminals who commit crimes are morally 
blameworthy, and deserve to be punished. This hunger for revenge has been 
responsible for the cruellest of punishments in history. Mandatory minimum 
sentences can thus be criticised for promoting revenge as an ideal of sentencing. 
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Shongwe JA in Kruger discouraged such notion, and declared that the punishment 
of a convicted felon should not be equated to revenge. According to the South 
African Constitution, the idea of retribution can also not be justified as the ideal on 
which to premise our criminal punishments. It can also be queried whether 
retribution as justification for incarceration under the mandatory minimum sentences 
is an adequately connected law to its constitutionally permissible objective, or does 
it go too far in some sense in seeking to attain it? It is submitted that it will be difficult 
to find reasons in support of such law.  
The constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences was questioned in S v Dodo, 
as to whether this sentencing regime violates the separation of powers doctrine. 
Many other similar cases, such as that of the House of Lords and the Privy Council, 
have previously judged that sentencing is the task of the judiciary, and that 
mandatory minimum sentences cannot be reconciled with the separation of powers 
doctrine. The same cannot be said regarding the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Dodo where this sentencing regime was found to be constitutional.  
Hence, in this study serious challenges have been highlighted in the content and 
nature of our judicial law-making which makes use of the interest-of-justice test. The 
shortcomings and deficiencies of this test have been revealed, and the lack of clarity 
which contributes to this state of confusion in the application of our separation of 
powers doctrine has also been shown. Questions have also been raised regarding 
the rationales and constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences, especially 
in South Africa, where a non-judicial body decides appropriate punishments. 
6.2 Recommendations 
After researching the interpretation and application of judicial law-making in South 
African courts, and comparing how this principle is treated in jurisdictions such as 
the United States and Canada, the following recommendations can be made: 
6.2.1 Development of the separation of powers doctrine  
The separation of powers doctrine – its nature and content – must be developed 
through constitutional amendment of the Constitution by the legislature since the 
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“over time” development by the courts has failed, and resulted in lack of clarity and 
uncertainty on the application and content of this principle. As shown above, the 
South African separation of powers notion - because of South Africa’s British 
colonial history - is based on the British system (Westminster system), where there 
is no distinct separation between members of the executive and the legislature. The 
Canadian Constitution which also has strong roots in the Westminster parliamentary 
system has also adopted this system. In the United States, the Incompatibility 
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 6 forbids members of 
Congress (legislature) from holding any executive or judicial offices. This latter 
model is recommended for South Africa because it creates a comprehensive and 
distinct composition of the three agencies of government. 
6.2.2 Development of judicial review 
The nature and content of judicial review as in section 172 of the Constitution must 
be developed in order to give more clarity as regards courts’ powers. The concept 
must fully account for the separation of powers doctrine and the rule by the majority, 
and outline the extent of this judicial authority. It should also be emphasized on that 
it should be exercised very rarely, and in most instances, courts should refer 
challenged legislation to the legislature to correct. There is the understanding that 
when a court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will of the representatives of the people. 
6.2.3 Determining the nature and content of judicial law-making 
The nature and content of sections 173 and 39(2) (judicial law-making) must be set 
out through a constitutional amendment. It should not be the norm that courts 
exercise this power. Legislation must be clear on the use of this power as a last 
resort after questioned legislation was referred to the legislature to correct. Its scope 
should be sufficiently formulated, taking into account that the legislature is the 
government branch that is entrusted with law-making. The Canadian Supreme Court 
in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) found that judicial law-making amounts to undue 
incursions into the public domain of the elected branches of government. The 
interest-of-justice test was rejected by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission as 
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a tool to develop laws. This should also be abandoned through constitutional 
amendment. Instead, a more reliable and predicable tool must be developed that 
would be used to effect judicial law-making. The nature and content of this new tool 
should be sufficiently formulated by the legislature.  
6.2.4 Regulating the nature and content of judicial restraint and deference 
Constitutional amendments must be considered regulating the nature and content 
of judicial restraint and judicial deference. The meaning and extent of these 
principles must be clearly formulated by the legislature. There is confusion on 
whether these concepts, especially judicial deference, form part of the South African 
constitutional jurisprudence, and there is also lack of clarity on their application. 
Ackermann J’s view that it is difficult to establish when deference could be 
applicable, and the effect of this lack of clarity or sufficient formulation of this 
principle has been evident in the discussion of the South African jurisprudence in 
this thesis. 
6.2.5 Abolishment of mandatory minimum sentences 
It is disputed that mandatory minimum sentences are well-informed governmental 
policies. It can be argued that they are not a rational government’s policy since they 
seem to amount to a law that is inadequately connected to its objective, or in some 
sense goes too far in seeking to attain it. When measured against the Canadian 
principles of fundamental justice, it cannot be said that it is a law that does not go 
too far and not interfere with some conduct that bears no connection to its objective. 
All the four grounds for our justification for these sentences have been questioned 
for being legal principles that goes too far in seeking to attain its objective. There 
were also questions raised on the constitutionality of a sentencing regime that 
mandates a non-judicial body to decide punishment. These mandatory minimum 
sentences were questioned as not to being reconcilable with the separation of 
powers doctrine as they violate this doctrine in that they permit a member of the 
executive to decide the minimum sentence that a specific offender has to serve, 
which is the task of the judiciary, and has been the case since at least 1688. 
Cameron and Fagan’ views on these aspects should be heeded and the mandatory 
277 
 
minimum sentences be abolished. This legislation should be replaced by the 
legislature after comprehensive public reviews that would be tough on crime, and 
yet still leave the trial court with a broad discretion to decide punishment. Such 
discretion would be exercised in public, and can be subject to review. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This study on the legitimacy of judicial law-making in South Africa strived to answer 
pertinent research questions raised under Chapter one. A comparative evaluation 
was employed intending to provide more and different perspectives on the concept 
of judicial law-making in order to appropriately appreciate its interpretation and 
application in South African criminal law. In conclusion, it can be stated that the 
research questions of this thesis have been answered, and the hypotheses proved. 
 While the origins of the separation of powers can traced back to the Bible, 
Montesquieu’s work titled The spirit of the laws, is widely accepted as this 
doctrine’s origin in most modern democracies, including South Africa, (as in 
paragraph 2.2). 
 The protection of citizens’ rights and political liberty were the core factors 
warranting the formation of this doctrine (as in paragraph 2.2.1.1). While 
stressing the rationale for this doctrine, Madison noted that it would be a device 
necessary to control abuses of government and that “if men were angels, no 
government would be necessary” (see paragraph 2.2.3).  
 Separation of powers connotes the idea that government’s powers must be 
divided into three branches, namely, the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. Furthermore, the power should not be entrusted in one person, but 
be shared amongst government’s branches in order safeguard the citizens 
against tyranny and also ensure that their rights are protected (see paragraph 
1.1).  
 The main objectives of this ideal were the safeguarding of citizens’ basic 
fundamental rights since it divides powers between different government’s 
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branches. Montesquieu and Madison thought that the separation of powers’ 
main objective was to restrain authoritarianism and to protect freedom and 
independence (as in paragraph 2.2.5). This assumption was partly premised 
on the belief that power entrusted to one person might lead to tyranny 
(paragraph 1.1). 
 The origin concept of separation of powers was intended to safeguard basic 
fundamental rights and ensure a system where there would be checks and 
balances which at the same time would ensure that the ruler is held 
accountable to the citizens. While this doctrine remains ill-defined and its 
scope remains not clearly formulated, the doctrine remains relevant during this 
century because it can assist in ensuring that governments are held 
accountable to the electorate, and its checks and balances can also assist in 
preventing one government branch from usurping power from another. This 
was the understanding of this doctrine in the Constitutional Principle VI of the 
South African Interim Constitution (as in paragraph 2.2.5). 
 According to Ackermann J in the Dodo case, separation of powers cannot be 
absolute, this were also the views articulated in the Constitutional Principle VI 
of the South African Interim Constitution where it was noted that no 
constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers (see 
paragraph 2.2.5). 
 South African apply the interests of justice test when developing laws under 
the provisions of section 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. This is a legal 
framework for the development of law which is used the admission of hearsay 
evidence under the Law of Evidence Amendment Act in South Africa and the 
Criminal Justice Act in the United Kingdom. This test has been found to be 
open-ended and prone to contributing to uncertainty in the law by the Hong 
Kong Law Reform Commission and the Irish Law Reform Commission, as in 
paragraph 3.2.3). Amongst the concern regarding this test, is the fact that its 
scope and its boundaries are not sufficiently formulated in the Constitution. 
Hence, the current South African legal judicial law-making framework seems 
to lend support to the criticism raised by some critics of an unrestrained 
separation of powers doctrine, namely, that “if both the courts and the 
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legislature make law, how can we distinguish between them?” (see paragraph 
1.5.2). Furthermore, it was determined that fundamental social policy and law-
making processes are not to be decided by the electorally unaccountable 
officials since it results in illegitimate judicial law-making processes (as in 
paragraph 3.2.1). 
 Under the common law, the court had the power to determine the punishment 
of a convicted person. The CLAA is criticised in removing the courts’ 
sentencing discretion, and giving it to prosecutors whose decisions are not 
subject to review. The CLAA is also criticised for pre-determining a sentence 
before the judge could hear the facts. It is assumed that if a punishment is to 
fit a crime, there can be no pre-determined sentences since criminal events 
are not pre-determined (as in paragraph 5.4.2). It should be noted that the 
United States Supreme Court in the Booker case has found that the mandatory 
minimum sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional as they violate the 
accused’s right to a fair trial as provided by the Sixth Amendment because 
they allow a court to take into account facts beyond those reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant (as in paragraph 5.4.1). 
 Ackerman J’s vision that over time South Africa’s courts will develop a 
distinctively South African model of separation of powers is doubted since it 
remains questionable whether it has been or will be realised. There is still 
confusion surrounding the scope and the meaning of this doctrine, and its 
application by our courts, as was evident in Constitutional Court’s decision in 
the Economic Freedom Fighters case (as in paragraph 2.2.5).  
 The South African Constitution under sections 39(2) and 173 seems to give 
courts unrestrained and ill-formulated powers to make laws by making use of 
what has been found to be an open-ended unpredictable test, namely, the 
interests of justice test (paragraph 3.2.3). There are divergent views on the 
scope and boundaries of this constitutional power, and its application by the 
courts has been unpredictable and uncertain. 
 As was disclosed in paragraph 2.2.5, our current constitutional framework fails 
to guarantee the original concept of separation of powers. For example, 
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members of the executive are also members of the legislature (Parliament), 
see section 86 of the Constitution. It is also thought that South Africa’s concept 
of separation of powers constitutes government branches that are not 
hermetically sealed from one another. According to Vile, under the original 
concept of separation of powers, persons who composed the three branches 
of government must be kept separate and distinct; no individual should be 
allowed to be a member of more than one branch at the same time (as in 
paragraph 1.5.1). 
 In the United States, while the overwhelming view seems to be the belief that 
this doctrine forms part of the country’s constitutional jurisprudence, there 
remain challenges regarding the extent of the courts’ application of this 
doctrine and its current understanding by the political arms of government is 
criticised for grifting away from the country’s founding principles, as Calabresi 
points out in paragraph 2.2.3. In Canada, while this doctrine is not sufficiently 
articulated and formulated in both Canadian Constitutions, its application by 
the courts has created confusion since its scope and perimeters remain 
unclear. The view held is that there is no separation of powers in Canada. The 
lack of formulation and articulation of this doctrine also forms part of its 
jurisprudence in South Africa. South Africa, as was discussed above, does not 
have a comprehensive separation of powers doctrine. Hence the interpretation 
and application of this doctrine remains a challenge in most jurisdictions and 
not only in South Africa. Britain, which shares historical ties with the United 
States, Canada and South Africa, also does not have a comprehensive and 
fully articulated separation of powers principle but has what has been termed 
a close union, with nearly a complete fusion of the executive and the legislature 
(as in paragraph 2.2.4). 
 South Africa can learn from these jurisdictions, that in order for this doctrine to 
be achieved what it was thought to represent, its scope and meaning has to 
be well-defined through legislation. In the United States and in Canada, this 
doctrine is sufficiently articulated and formulated in the Constitutions (as in 
paragraphs 4.2.1 and 2.2.4 above). In South Africa, the doctrine only appears 
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in Constitutional Principle VI of the Constitution where its scope and limitations 
are not fully articulated and formulated. 
 Law reform is needed to clarify the courts’ constitutional limitations and role in 
developing the laws. The legislatures’ powers in enacting legislation which 
seem to usurp courts’ judicial authority and independence also need to be 
comprehensively formulated. 
 The separation of powers has not been fully articulated and applied in South 
African law, as was seen in Mogoeng CJ’s dissent in the Economic Freedom 
Fighters case in paragraph 2.2.5 above.  
 Judicial supremacy and judicial review, as provided by sections 2 and 172 of 
the Constitution (as discussed in paragraph 2.3) are not comprehensive and 
fully formulated, and a more extensive legislative framework is required to 
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